Lovett et al v. Lucas et al

Filing 150

Memorandum Opinion and Order granting defendants' Motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Monell claims (Related Doc # 139 ).For each of the foregoing reasons, the United States is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs' FTCA claims, and Richland County and the City of Cleveland are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs' Monell claims. Judge Donald C. Nugent(C,KA)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

NOLAN LOVETT, DANIELLE CARTER,
JOHNNY ROBERTSON, ARRICO SPIRES,
CHARLES MATHEWS, MARLON
BROOKS, TYRON BROWN,

Plaintiffs,

v.
LEE LUCAS, et al.,

Defendants.

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CASE NOS.: 1:08CV1253
1:09CV1131
1:09CV1132
1:09CV1133
1:09CV1134
1:09CV1135
1:10CV1674
JUDGE DONALD C. NUGENT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

The above-captioned matters are before the Court on the Motions to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction and for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant United States of America,1 and the
Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Monell claims filed by Defendants Richland County, Captain
Larry Faith, and Sergeant Matt Mayer,2 and by the City of Cleveland.3 Plaintiffs have responded
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Lovett v. Lucas et al., Case No. 10CV1674 (ECF #16); Robertson v. Lucas et al., Case No. 9CV1131
(ECF #134); Spires v. Lucas et al., Case No. 9CV1132 (ECF #134); Mathews v. Lucas et al., Case No. 9CV1133
(ECF #138); Brooks v. Lucas et al., Case No. 9CV1134 (ECF #132); Brown v. Lucas et al., Case No. 9CV1135
(ECF #133).
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Lovett v. Lucas et al., Case No. 8CV1253 (ECF #139); Robertson v. Lucas et al., Case No. 9CV1131
(ECF #132); Spires v. Lucas et al., Case No. 9CV1132 (ECF #132); Mathews v. Lucas et al., Case No. 9CV1133
(ECF #136); Brooks v. Lucas et al., Case No. 9CV1134 (ECF #131); Brown v. Lucas et al., Case No. 9CV1135
(ECF #131).
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Lovett v. Lucas et al., Case No. 8CV1253 (ECF #139); Robertson v. Lucas et al., Case No. 9CV1131
(ECF #132); Spires v. Lucas et al., Case No. 9CV1132 (ECF #132); Mathews v. Lucas et al., Case No. 9CV1133
(ECF #136); Brooks v. Lucas et al., Case No. 9CV1134 (ECF #131); Brown v. Lucas et al., Case No. 9CV1135
(ECF #131).

to the Motions, and Defendants have replied. Thus, the Motions are ripe for review. For the
reasons stated, the Motions are GRANTED.
A. FACTS
The facts of these cases are set forth in the Court’s previous Memorandum Opinion and
Order granting summary judgment to the individual Defendants on qualified immunity grounds,
and holding that the individual Defendants did not violate any Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
(See Case No. 1:08CV1253, ECF #137.)
B. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

Summary judgment under Rule 56 is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show “that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed .R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The moving party has the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue
of material fact exists,” and the court must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power Sys., 269 F.3d 703, 710 (6th
Cir. 2001). When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported and the
nonmoving party fails to respond with a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of its
case, summary judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23
(1986).
With regard to the non-moving party’s obligation to set out specific facts showing a
genuine issue for trial, “Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the
record in search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment.” Williamson
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v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 481 F.3d 369, 379-80 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Rather, “Rule 56
allocates that duty to the opponent of the motion, which is required to point out the evidence,
albeit evidence that is already in the record, that creates an issue of fact.” Id.
Accordingly, the ultimate inquiry is whether the record, as a whole, and upon viewing it
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, could lead a rational trier of fact to find in
favor of the non-moving party. Matushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586-87. The Court’s inquiry, therefore, asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the non-moving party is entitled to a verdict. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
B.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

When a court’s subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. McNutt v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Rogers v. Stratton Indus., Inc.,
798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1986). A 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss may constitute either a facial
attack or a factual attack. United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). Facial
attacks question the sufficiency of the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint. Id. Thus, those
allegations must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Id. Factual attacks, however, challenge the actual fact of the court’s jurisdiction. Id. In
such cases, the court is free to weigh any evidence properly before it to satisfy itself as to the
existence of its power to hear the case. Id. See also Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. v. United States, 922 F.2d
320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990).

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C.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court construes the complaint in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, accepts all factual allegations as true, and determines whether the complaint states a
plausible claim for relief. Albrecht v. Treon, 617 F.3d 890, 893 (6th Cir.2010) (citing Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009)).
The now familiar Rule 12(b)(6) pleading requirements explained in Twombly and Iqbal
require that plaintiffs must “ ‘plead ... factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ ” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.
at 1949); see New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc., 650 F.3d 1046, 1049–51 (6th
Cir.2011). Merely pleading facts that are consistent with a defendant's liability or that permit the
court to infer misconduct is insufficient. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949–50; see Courie v. Alcoa Wheel
& Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2009). Additionally, when considering a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the Court “need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual
inferences.” Kottmyer, 436 F.3d at 689.
The plausibility pleading standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal requires a plaintiff to
have pled enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at
1950. A complaint that allows the court to infer only a “mere possibility of misconduct” is
insufficient to “show” that the complainant is entitled to relief and fails to meet the pleading
requirements of Rule 8. Id.

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C. ANALYSIS
1.

Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) Claims – The United States

Plaintiffs bring false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and conspiracy claims against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. The United States has moved for dismissal and/or summary judgment on each of
these claims.
First, the United States argues that Plaintiffs’ false arrest claims are time-barred under the
FTCA. Under the FTCA, “a tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it
is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim
accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). This two-year time limitation is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
suit. Roman-Cancel v. United States, 613 F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[c]ompliance with the
FTCA’s temporal deadlines is both mandatory and jurisdictional”); see also Hertz v. United
States, 560 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal under Rule12(b)(1) for failing to
comply with FTCA’s statute of limitations); Flory v. United States, 138 F.3d 157, 159 (5th Cir.
1998) (“it is well settled that these [the FTCA’s] limitations periods are jurisdictional”).
A claim for false arrest under the FTCA accrues at the moment of arrest. Wang v. United
States, 61 Fed.Appx. 757, 759 (2d. Cir. 2003) (“false arrest claim accrued, as it ordinarily does
under federal law, at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest”); Sandles v. U.S. Marshals Serv., No. 0472426, 2007 WL 4374080 at *7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 18, 2007); Davis v. United States, 430
F.Supp.2d 67, 74 (D. Conn. 2006).
None of Plaintiffs asserted their false arrest claims within two years after the claims
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accrued:
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Plaintiff Lovett was arraigned on November 22, 2005. United States v. Nabors,
1:05CR00537 (N.D. Ohio) (11/22/05 Docket Entry). But he did not present his
administrative claim alleging false arrest until three years after he was arrested,
on April 25, 2008.

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Plaintiff Robertson was arraigned on January 31, 2006. United States v. Nabors,
1:05CR00537 (N.D. Ohio) (1/31/06 Docket Entry). But he did not present his
administrative claim for over three years after he was arrested, on April 25, 2008.

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Plaintiff Spires was arraigned on November 10, 2005. United States v. Nabors,
1:05CR00537 (N.D. Ohio) (11/10/2005 Docket Entry). He did not present his
administrative claim for more than three years after he was arrested.

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Plaintiff Mathews was arraigned on November 22, 2005. United States v. Nabors,
1:05CR00537 (N.D. Ohio) (11/22/05 Docket Entry). Yet, he did not present his
administrative claim for over three years after he was arrested, on April 25, 2008.

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Plaintiff Brooks was arraigned on November 10, 2005. United States v. Nabors,
1:05CR00537 (N.D. Ohio) (11/10/05 Docket Entry). He did not present his
administrative claim for more than three years after he was arrested, on April 25,
2008.

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Plaintiff Brown was arraigned on December 21, 2005. United States v. Nabors,
1:05CR00537 (N.D. Ohio) (12/21/05 Docket Entry). But he did not present his
administrative claim for over three years after he was arrested, on April 30, 2008.

Plaintiffs’ opposition to the United States’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary
Judgment does not refute that Plaintiffs’ false arrest claims are untimely under the FTCA.
Accordingly, because Plaintiffs failed to present their administrative claims alleging false arrest
within the FTCA’s two-year time limitation, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear their false arrest
claims against the United States. Those claims are dismissed as time-barred.4

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For the same reason, Plaintiff Lovett’s trespass claim is also barred. The factual basis for
the claim is unclear from Mr. Lovett’s Complaint; he fails to allege how federal agents
unlawfully trespassed on his property. Indeed, Plaintiff Lovett turned himself into federal
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The United States next argues that this Court’s previous summary judgment ruling – that
(a) probable cause foreclosed malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims against individual Defendants, and that (b) no conspiracy existed among the
individual Defendants to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights – necessarily defeats the
same claims levied against the United States. (See Case No. 1:08CV1253, ECF #137.) The
Court agrees. There is no basis in law or fact to support a conclusion that Plaintiffs’ malicious
prosecution, emotional distress, and conspiracy claims can survive despite the existence of
probable cause for Plaintiffs’ arrests and prosecutions.
Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. First, Plaintiffs try to distinguish
this FTCA case by saying that the United States is not entitled to qualified immunity. This
argument is inapposite; the United States does not claim entitlement to judgment on Plaintiffs’
FTCA claims based on the qualified immunity of its employees. Rather, the United States asserts
that Plaintiffs’ state law malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress
torts against the United States are necessarily disposed of by the Court’s recent judgment holding
that probable cause barred the very same torts. The United States further asserts that Plaintiffs’
conspiracy claims are precluded by the Court’s ruling that no evidence exists to show that
Defendants shared a single plan to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs fail
to set forth any reasons why these claims are not similarly disposed of here.
Further, Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to more discovery here than in a qualifiedimmunity context. Plaintiffs conclude that more discovery would allow them to “respond to the

authorities – he was not arrested at his home. Regardless, this claim must logically be based on
conduct preceding Mr. Lovett’s arrest, and is therefore also time barred.
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Court’s reasoning that the existence of probable cause was conclusively established by Plaintiffs’
acknowledgments of wrongdoing at their guilty pleas.” Plaintiffs point out that “a later
development of probable cause has no effect on the existence of probable cause at an earlier
point in time.” While this last statement is not untrue, Plaintiffs avoid the point. The Court
determined that probable cause existed at the time of Plaintiffs’ arrests, independent from, and
without consideration of, Plaintiffs’ guilty pleas. The Court’s reasoning makes clear that
probable cause existed at the time of Plaintiffs’ arrests, even if Plaintiffs had never admitted their
guilt under oath. While Plaintiffs’ guilty pleas reinforced the existence of probable cause for
Plaintiffs’ prosecutions, the Court did not consider the guilty pleas when determining that
probable cause existed prior to the guilty pleas and at the time of Plaintiffs’ arrests.
Finally, Plaintiffs’ nebulous assertions that more discovery will further allow them to
support their claims are not well-taken. Plaintiffs support this claim with the very Rule 56(d)
affidavits that this Court has already found insufficient. As the Court made clear, Plaintiffs’
vague assertion that “discovery would allow Plaintiffs to support their allegations that
Defendants violated their Constitutional rights” does not provide any insight into what benefits –
if any – Plaintiffs would achieve from “further inquiry into the factual underpinnings of these
cases.”
For all of these reasons, Plaintiffs’ claims under the FTCA cannot survive. These claims
are dismissed.
2.

Monell Claims – Richland County and the City of Cleveland
a.

Monell Claims

As discussed, this Court recently entered summary judgment on qualified immunity
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grounds in favor of Defendants Larry Faith, Matt Mayer, Charles Metcalf, and Jamaal Ansari,
concluding that they did not violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights (See Case No. 1:08CV1253,
ECF #137.) The Court’s Order did not address Plaintiffs’ Monell claims against Richland
County or the City of Cleveland.
Plaintiffs concede that their Monell claims are no longer viable given the Court’s decision
respecting Defendants Faith, Mayer, Metcalf and Ansari. (ECF #146.) Indeed, the “conclusion
that no officer-defendant ha[s] deprived the plaintiff of any constitutional right a fortiori defeats
[a] claim against the [government entity] as well.” Scott v. Clay County, 205 F.3d 867, 879 (6th
Cir. 2000 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799). In this case, since no
employee of Richland County (Defendants Faith, Mayer, and Metcalf), and no employee of the
City of Cleveland (Defendant Ansari) has violated any Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Richland
County and the City of Cleveland are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
3.

Plaintiffs’ Request for Reconsideration of Judicial Estoppel Ruling

To the extent Plaintiffs request reconsideration of the portion of the Court’s Opinion
granting summary judgment to the individual Defendants on the independent ground of judicial
estoppel, the request is denied. For all of the reasons stated in the Court’s previous Opinion,
there could rarely be a more appropriate set of circumstances for the application of judicial
estoppel. The doctrine prohibits Plaintiffs from having things both ways; they may not benefit
from their guilty pleas given under oath and with the advice of counsel, and then hope to cash in
by asserting their innocence in a civil suit.
Even if judicial estoppel did not bar Plaintiffs’ claims, the individual Defendants are still
entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. As the Court stated in its previous
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Order, judicial estoppel provides a wholly separate and independent ground for judgment as a
matter of law.
D. CONCLUSION
For each of the foregoing reasons, the United States is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on Plaintiffs’ FTCA claims, and Richland County and the City of Cleveland are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs’ Monell claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Donald C. Nugent
DONALD C. NUGENT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED:6/13/2012

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