James v. Vitran Express, Inc.

Filing 41

Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 9/14/11 denying defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's jury demand. (Related Doc. 34 ) (M,G)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
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WILFRED C. JAMES
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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VITRAN EXPRESS, INC.,
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Defendant.
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CASE NO. 1:11-CV-23

ORDER
[Resolving Doc. No. 34]

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
On September 6, 2011, Defendant Vitran Express, Inc., filed a motion to strike the Plaintiff’s
jury demand. [Doc. No. 34.] The Plaintiff, Wilfred C. James, opposes this motion. [Doc. 39.] For
the following reasons the Court DENIES the Defendant’s motion to strike the Plaintiff’s jury
demand.
I. Background
In this diversity action involving an age discrimination claim by Plaintiff James against his
former employer, James sues Defendant Vitran Express, Inc., under Ohio Revised Code § 4112.14
for alleged age discrimination1/. James alleges in his complaint that Vitran fired him because he was
among the oldest and highest paid drivers. He seeks compensatory damages for his lost wages, along
with associated costs and fees. [Doc. 1-1.]
1/

The Plaintiff originally brought additional claims for wrongful termination and breach of employment contract.
[Doc. 1-1.]

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Case No. 1:11-CV-23
Gwin, J.
On September 6, 2011, Vitran moved the court to strike James’ jury demand. Citing Hoops
v. United Telephone Co. Of Ohio, 50 Ohio St. 3d 97, 553 N.E. 2d 252 (1990), Vitran argues that
according to the Ohio Supreme Court there is no right to a jury trial under Ohio Revised Code §
4112.14. [Doc. 34.] The Plaintiff responds that the applicable chapter of the Ohio Revised Code
has changed in the twenty years since the Hoops decision and must be analyzed in light of its current
construction. [See Doc. 39.]
II. Discussion
The Parties disagree as to the statutory interpretation of state law, but “the right to a jury trial
in the federal courts is to be determined as a matter of federal law in diversity as well as other
actions.” Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222. (1963) (“[T]he right to a jury trial in the federal
courts is to be determined as a matter of federal law in diversity as well as other actions. The federal
policy favoring jury trials is of historic and continuing strength. … In diversity cases, of course, the
substantive dimension of the claim asserted finds its source in state law, … but the characterization
of that state-created claim as legal or equitable for purposes of whether a right to jury trial is
indicated must be made by recourse to federal law.”) Therefore, the question of whether the Plaintiff
has a right to a jury trial is a question of federal law.
The Seventh Amendment mandates, “[i]n suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” The Seventh
Amendment has long been interpreted to preserve the right to a jury trial where legal rights are at
issue. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 447 (1830) (“In a just sense, the amendment then may
well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever
might be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights.”).
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Case No. 1:11-CV-23
Gwin, J.
To determine whether legal rights are at issue is made, the court looks to “both the nature of
the issues involved and the remedy sought.” Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v.
Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570 (1990) (“First, we compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions
brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we
examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature. The second
inquiry is the more important in our analysis.”) (citations omitted). The “general rule,” however, is
that monetary relief is a legal remedy. Id. In this case, the Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages
in for lost wages under Ohio Revised Code § 4112.14.
In Leininger v. Pioneer Natl. Latex, 115 Ohio St.3d 311, 318, 875 N.E.2d 36, 44 (2007), the
Ohio Supreme Court, found “[a] violation of R.C. 4112.14 (formerly R.C. 4101.17), therefore, can
also support a claim for damages, injunctive relief, or any other appropriate relief under R.C.
4112.99.” (Citing Elek v. Huntington Natl. Bank, 60 Ohio St.3d 135, 573 N.E.2d 1056 (1991).
Leininger makes clear that all the remedies afforded by Ohio R.C. 4112.99, including legal remedies,
are available even if James is restricted to claiming a violation of R.C. 4112.14.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Terry found that the Plaintiff’s action for backpay did not
seek restitutionary (and therefore equitable) damages. See Terry, 494 U.S. at 570-71. Rather,
backpay is compensatory in nature because it represents the wages and benefits employees would
have otherwise received. See id. Similarly, James seeks the wages he would have otherwise
received. Thus, the Plaintiff seeks a legal remedy, and his right to a jury trial is preserved by the
Seventh Amendment. The Court therefore finds that striking the Plaintiff’s demand for a jury trial
is improper.

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Case No. 1:11-CV-23
Gwin, J.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Defendant Vitran Express’s motion to
strike Plaintiff James’s jury demand.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: September 14, 2011

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