Shepherd et al v. Sheldon et al

Filing 54

Memorandum of Opinion and Order granting City of Mansfield's Motion for judgment on the pleadings (Related Doc # 40 ). Judge Patricia A. Gaughan on 8/15/11.(E,P) Modified text on 8/16/2011 (B,B).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

Randy Shepherd, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Vs.
J. Steve Sheldon, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 1:11 CV 127
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

Memorandum of Opinion and Order

INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant City of Mansfield’s Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings (Doc. 40). This is a civil rights case. For the following reasons, the motion is
GRANTED.
FACTS
Plaintiffs, Randy Shepherd (hereinafter “Shepherd”) and Cynthia Shepherd, bring this
action against defendants, J. Steve Sheldon and Eric Bosco of the Richland County Sheriff’s
Department; the City of Mansfield; Magistrate Judge Gary Dalbey; James Mayer, Jr.,
Christopher Tunnell, Gary Bishop, Brent Robinson, and Andrew Kvochich of the Richland
County Prosecutor’s Office; Alyce Cline, the Clerk of Court for Shelby Municipal Court; Teena
Barber, the Deputy Clerk of Court for the Shelby Municipal Court; the Department of Veteran’s
Affairs; Julie Berg and Lisa Salzer of the Department of Veteran’s Affairs; the Richland County

1

Sheriff’s Department; the City of Shelby; and the Richland County Prosecutor’s Office.1
In general, plaintiffs allege that defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive them of
their constitutional rights.
Defendant City of Mansfield (“City”) moves to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds
that plaintiffs fail to allege that any individual defendant was employed by the City. Plaintiffs
oppose the motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides, “After the pleadings are closed but
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is based on the argument that the complaint fails
to state claim upon which relief may be granted, it is judged under the same standard of review
as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 11 (6th Cir. 1987).
As such, the allegations of the complaint must be taken as true and construed liberally in
favor of the plaintiff. Lawrence v. Chancery Court of Tenn., 188 F.3d 687, 691 (6th Cir. 1999).
Notice pleading requires only that the defendant be given “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. However, the complaint
must set forth “more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions.” Allard v. Weitzman (In Re
DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993). Legal conclusions and unwarranted
factual inferences are not accepted as true, nor are mere conclusions afforded liberal Rule
12(b)(6) review. Fingers v. Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District, 101 F.3d 702

1

Plaintiffs also sued the Honorables James DeWeese and James
Henson. The Court previously dismissed these defendants.
2

(6th Cir. Nov. 21, 1996), unpublished. Dismissal is proper if the complaint lacks an allegation
regarding a required element necessary to obtain relief. Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899
F.2d 485, 489-490 (6th Cir. 1990).
In addition, a claimant must provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 (2007). A pleading
that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1955 (2009). Nor does a complaint suffice
if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The
plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts
that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’
Id. at 1949 (citations and quotations omitted). See also, Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d
603 (6th Cir.2009).
ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that although the complaint generally alleges that it employed “one or
more of the defendants,” the other, more specific allegations, belie this general statement. In
particular, each individual defendant is allegedly employed by an entity other than defendant.
Moreover, there are only two factual allegations directed at defendant. Plaintiffs allege that one
of the individual defendants told City police officers that Shepherd made certain threats. In
addition, plaintiffs allege that another individual defendant informed City police officers that
Shepherd used marijuana. There are no allegations as to what, if anything, City police officers
3

did with the information. The remaining allegations of wrongdoing, including the arrest, search,
and prosecution of Shepherd, are directed at individual defendants employed by other
governmental agencies. According to defendants, many of the claims fail as a matter of law and
those that are potentially viable must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
In response, plaintiffs allege that the “fact of employment” has been properly alleged.
Plaintiffs also claim that governmental law enforcement agencies are often interrelated and that
“employment of individuals within those systems are often combined.” Plaintiffs argue that
factual discovery is needed to determine issues of employment, training, education, policies, and
practices. In addition, plaintiffs argue that there are allegations of a conspiracy and that they
have also alleged inadequate training.
Upon review, the Court finds that defendant’s motion is well-taken. In the complaint,
plaintiffs allege the following,
59.

Defendant #3, City of Mansfield, is a political subdivision organized and existing
under Ohio law. At all relevant times Defendant #3 employed one and/or some or
all of the Defendants in whole or in part.

As defendant correctly notes, however, the more specific allegations in the complaint
directly contradict this allegation,
56.

Defendant #2, Eric Bosco, is and/or was at times relevant to the Complaint,
employed by the Richland County, Ohio Sheriff’s Department.

(See also, Compl. ¶52)
60.

Defendant #4, James DeWeese, Richland County, Ohio Common Pleas Court
Judge, acting as an individual and/or beyond the scope of his authority, and/or
without jurisdiction as a Richland County, Ohio Judge....

(See also, Compl. ¶¶ 65, 69).
76.

Defendant #8, Christopher Tunnell, was at all times relevant to this Complaint, an
4

agent/employee of the State of Ohio and/or the County of Richland, Ohio and was
employed by the Richland County, Ohio Prosecuting Attorney and/or was an
agent/employee of Richland County, Ohio Prosecutor’s Office.
(See also, Compl. ¶¶ 80, 81, 83).2
There are no allegations suggesting that any individual defendant is employed by
defendant City. In fact, plaintiffs expressly allege that the individual defendants are employed
by other governmental units. In light of these allegations, the Court finds that plaintiffs have not
properly plead that the individual defendants are employees of defendant City. Moreover,
defendant is further correct that there are no allegations of wrongdoing directed at it. Rather,
plaintiffs only allege that on two occasions City police officers received information regarding
plaintiffs. There are no further factual allegations directed at the City. These allegations fail to
state any claim against defendant City under the pleading standards set forth in Twombly and
Iqbal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant City of Mansfield’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date:

2

8/15/11

/s/Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge

Plaintiffs make similar allegations with regard to the Shelby
Municipal Court Clerk’s office employees and the individuals
employed by the Department of Veteran’s Affairs.
5