White v. Huntington National Bank

Filing 17

FILING ERROR; TO BE REFILED IN CASE NO. 1:11CV265. Memorandum of Opinion and Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 5/11/11 dismissing this action pursuant to 28 USC Sec. 1915(e) and certifying that an appeal could not be taken in good faith. (Related Docs. 1 , 4 ) (M,G) Modified text on 5/11/2011 (M,G).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

KENNETH WHITE,
Plaintiff,
v.
HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK, et al.
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 1:11CV0265
JUDGE JAMES S. GWIN

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

Plaintiff pro se Kenneth White filed this action under the Home Ownership Equity Protection
Act, (HOEPA”) 15 U.S.C. § 1639 et seq., the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”),
12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., the Truth-In-Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., and the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, against Huntington National Bank, MERS
Mortgage and Security Instrument, Loan Officer Ryan Howard and Sky Bank. Included are State
pendent claims for Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Unjust Enrichment,
Civil Conspiracy, Ohio Civil RICO, R.C. 2923.31, and Complaint to Quiet Title.
Plaintiff’s claim arises out of a loan obtained from Huntington Bank or Sky Bank. He alleges
in his 34 page Complaint that the Defendants conspired to commit fraud. “To wit... Assignment of
title 50 Hamlet Court, Bratenah [sic], Oh, 44108 parcel no. 631-06-571.” Comp. pg. 2. Although he
has requested and demanded compliance with the various statutes, Defendants have either ignored
or refused to acknowledge or resolve his complaints. “Besides the alleged obvious theft of identity
which lies at the core of the pattern of conduct defining Defendants’ illegal and fraudulent scheme,
it is allegedly observably obvious that the property was appraised improperly, never verified despite

‘stringent underwriting’ standard imposed by government sponsored entities with which the
Defendants purported to comply (and did not)...” Comp. pg. 5. The Complaint continues to assert
conduct that Plaintiff contends violates the various statutes. Plaintiff seeks damages and an order
finding that the foreclosure action which was instituted be declared illegal and void and any further
proceedings in connection with it be enjoined. 1
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to
dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989);
Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197
(6th Cir. 1996). For the reasons stated below, this action is dismissed pursuant to section 1915(e).
The basic premise of Plaintiff’s Complaint is that the underlying mortgage loan obligation
is invalid and the foreclosure judgment should be void. This Court cannot void the judgment of
foreclosure. United States District Courts do not have jurisdiction over challenges to state court
decisions even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional. See
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n. 16 (1983); Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). Federal appellate review of state court judgments
can only occur in the United States Supreme Court, by appeal or by writ of certiorari. Id. Under this
principle, generally referred to as the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, a party losing his case in state court
is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United

1

Plaintiff filed the exact same Complaint against the same Defendants in Case No.
1:11CV0264.
2

States District Court based on the party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates his or her
federal rights. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). Federal jurisdiction cannot be
invoked merely by couching the claims in terms of a civil rights action. Lavrack v. City of Oak Park,
No. 98-1142, 1999 WL 801562, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 28, 1999); see Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d
288, 296 (3d Cir.1992).
The United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has set forth two elements to a RookerFeldman analysis. First, in order for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply to a claim presented in
federal district court, the issue before the court must be inextricably intertwined with the claim
asserted in the state court proceeding. Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th Cir. 1998); see Tropf
v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co., 289 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 2002). “Where federal relief
can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive
the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state court
judgment.” Catz, 142 F.3d at 293. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies when the party losing his
case in state court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused
by the state court's decision itself. Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 857-59 (6th Cir. 2006). Second,
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a district court’s jurisdiction where the claim is a specific
grievance that the law was invalidly or unconstitutionally applied in plaintiff’s particular case as
opposed to a general constitutional challenge to the state law applied in the state action. Id.
Plaintiff questions the state court’s decision granting a foreclosure. Any review of federal
claims asserted in this context would require the court to review the specific issues addressed in the
state court proceedings against him. This court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to conduct such a
review or grant the relief as requested. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n. 16; Catz, 142 F.3d at 293.

3

Moreover, Plaintiff simply seeks to litigate matters which were raised or which should have
been raised in the state court foreclosure and eviction proceedings. A federal court must give a state
court judgment the same preclusive effect it would have in the courts of the rendering state. 28
U.S.C. § 1738; Dubuc v. Green Oak Township, 312 F.3d 736, 744 (6th Cir. 2002). The preclusive
effect of the previous state court judgments are therefore governed by Ohio law on preclusion. Id.
Under Ohio law, an existing final judgment or decree is conclusive as to all claims which were or
might have been litigated in the first lawsuit. National Amusement, Inc. v. City of Springdale, 53
Ohio St. 3d 60, 62 (1990). The doctrine of res judicata requires a plaintiff to present every ground
for relief in the first action he files, or forever be barred from asserting it. Id. The purpose of this
doctrine is to promote the finality of judgments and thereby increase certainty, discourage multiple
litigation, and conserve judicial resources. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). The state court
has already granted judgment in favor of Defendant. This Court is bound to give full faith and credit
to the decisions of that court.
Accordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court certifies,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good
faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: May 11, 2011

s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4