Rega v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, et al

Filing 39

Opinion and Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/23/12 denying defendants' motion to file under seal the deposition transcript and exhibits of Robert Kennedy. (Related Doc. 35 ) (M,G)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
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PETER REGA,
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE :
CO, et al,
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Defendants.
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CASE NO. 1:11-CV-1822

OPINION & ORDER
[Resolving Doc. No. 35]

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
The Defendants in this case move to file the deposition transcript and exhibits of Robert
Kennedy, corporate designee for non-party Fiserv, under seal. [Doc. 35.] Apparently, the parties
entered into their own (that is, unapproved by this Court) “Confidentiality Agreement and Protective
Order.” [Doc. 35-1.] Granting a protective order motion (including a motion to seal, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(F)) is within the trial court’s discretion, but that discretion “‘is circumscribed by a
long-established legal tradition’ which values public access to court proceedings.” Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983)). Unwarranted
restriction of court documents hampers the public’s ability to act as an important check on judicial
integrity. See Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179; see also Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp.,
759 F.2d 1568, 1570 (11th Cir. 1985) (observing that “trials are public proceedings” and that access
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Case No. 1:11-CV-1822
Gwin, J.
to court records preserves “the rights of the public, an absent third party”). “Thus, documents filed
in the court generally must be made available to the public.” Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc.,
628 F.3d 790, 791 (6th Cir. 2010).
Moreover, the fact that all parties jointly seek a protective order or propose a confidentiality
agreement does not overcome the general rule against sealing cases and documents. See Proctor &
Gamble Co., 78 F.3d at 227 (warning district courts against “abdicat[ing their] responsibility to
oversee the discovery process and to determine whether filings should be made available to the
public” and against “turn[ing] this function over to the parties,” which would be “a violation not only
of Rule 26(c) but of the principles so painstakingly discussed in Brown & Williamson”).
A successful protective order motion must show specifically that disclosure of particular
information would cause serious competitive or financial harm. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson,
710 F.2d at 1179-80. Here, the Defendants fail to meet this standard: they do not provide a single
reason why the deposition and exhibits are confidential other than to say that Fiserv’s lawyer asked
that they be labeled as such. [See Doc. 35.] To the contrary, it seems rather unlikely that the
pertinent deposition testimony (that is, how Fiserv processed Plaintiff Rega’s payment to the
Defendants) involves any confidential or trade secret information at all.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to seal.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: July 23, 2012

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