Reid v. Berkman et al

Filing 5

Opinion and Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 12/28/11. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The Court finds that the complaint fails to sufficiently set forth any federal constitutional claims and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state law claims. This action is dismissed as set forth in this entry. (Related Docs. 1 , 2 ) (M,G)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
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TOBIAS R. REID,
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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RONALD BERKMAN, et al.,
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Defendants.
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CASE NO. 1:11-CV-2159

OPINION & ORDER
[Resolving Doc. No. 1]

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Pro se plaintiff Tobias R. Reid filed this civil rights action against Cleveland State
University (“CSU”) President Ronald Berkman; Provost Geoffrey Mearns; Vice Provost for Health
Affairs Mark Penn; Dean of the College of Science Betty Bonder; Professor Sun; and Dean of the
College of Urban Studies Edward Hill. In the Complaint, plaintiff alleges defendants violated his
civil rights, engaged in fraud, and misused state and federal funds. He seeks monetary and
injunctive relief.
Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). That Motion is
granted.
I. Background
Plaintiff alleges he was a graduate student from 2002 through 2010 at CSU’s Division of
Continuing Education, College of Urban Studies, and Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. He
claims he has been pursuing “medical training through CME, Lerner Research Institute, American

Holistic Medical Association, American College of Forensic Examiners, American Association of
Integrative Medicine, Media Lab, Cleveland Clinic, Medline University in clinical chemistry,
pathology, surgery, holistic medicine and pharmacology.” (Doc. 1 at 3). Plaintiff’s claims appear
to relate to CSU’s decisions to dissolve its Division of Continuing Education,1 and to form a
partnership with Northeast Ohio Medical University (“NEOMED”).
Plaintiff alleges that, in March 2010, defendant Berkman announced that a deal had been
made to bring a medical school to CSU. Plaintiff asserts he spoke with Berkman about this
announcement, and the possibility of a consulting position for plaintiff in light of his alleged
medical training. He maintains Berkman instructed him to send “all documents” to Barbara
Harriford, Dean of the Division of Continuing Education, in order to document completion of
plaintiff’s Continuing Education course work.
In the summer of 2010, CSU announced its Division of Continuing Education would be
closed but that some of its continuing education programs would be transferred to the University’s
various academic colleges. Plaintiff alleges CSU’s decision to close this Division was made
“without hearing and/or notice” and that information regarding his “post-doctorate training was not
dissolved into other departments at CSU, Defendant just simply closed the graduate school without
any obligation to the current students, faculty and alumni from the Division of Continuing
Education.” (Doc. 1 at 4). Plaintiff further states defendant Hill, Dean of the College of Urban
Studies, indicated he did not have records of plaintiff’s Continuing Education course work.
In the fall of 2010, plaintiff alleges defendant Sun received a federal grant for medical

1

CSU’s Division of Continuing Education offered various non-credit courses and certification
programs.
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research and that this grant was based on research done by graduate students at the Division of
Continuing Education. He claims defendants Bonder and Sun were “elusive” about how the grant
funds would be used “from a public standpoint.” (Doc. 1 at 5). He maintains these defendants failed
to respond to his communications regarding (1) his Continuing Education transcripts; and (2) the
use of grant monies.
In November 2010, plaintiff learned CSU had formed a partnership with NEOMED in order
to produce doctors committed to practicing in urban neighborhoods. Plaintiff claims defendant
Penn assured him consultants would be hired to implement sensitivity training for working in the
inner city, and CSU/NEOMED would participate in the grant research secured by defendants
Bonder and Sun. Finally, plaintiff claims he did not receive timely notice of CSU’s October 6, 2011
President’s Convocation.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on October 12, 2011, raising general allegations of fraud, civil
rights violations, illegal seizure, and misuse of state, federal and public funds.

He seeks

compensatory damages in the amount of $25,000 per defendant “to be paid to a consultant to
implement NEOMED into residential training program for inner city Cleveland residents.” (Doc.
1 at 7). He further seeks punitive damages for defendants’ allegedly willful failure to transfer his
continuing education records to other CSU colleges. Finally, he seeks an injunction preventing CSU
from receiving state and federal monies “for expansion, NEOMED, College of Science, and Urban
Studies until case is resolved.” (Doc. 1 at 8).
II. Legal Standard
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam), the district court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28
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U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable
basis in law or fact. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997). A claim
lacks an arguable basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory
or when the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility
in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007).
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The factual allegations in the
pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption
that all the allegations in the Complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff is not
required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. A pleading that offers
legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this
pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a Complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th
Cir.1998).
III. Analysis
“It is well-established that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only
that power authorized by the Constitution and statute.” Hudson v. Coleman, 347 F.3d 138, 141 (6th
Cir. 2003). See also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). One
of the bases for federal court jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Under that statute, “[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
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treaties of the United States.” The party who seeks to invoke a federal district court’s jurisdiction
bears the burden of establishing the court’s authority to hear the case. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377.
Plaintiff claims generally, in the caption of his Complaint, that defendants violated his civil
rights. Presumably, he intends to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under
§ 1983, plaintiff must establish that (1) he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or
the laws of the United States, and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of
state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Simescu v. Emmet County Dep’t of Soc.
Services, 942 F.2d 372, 374 (6th Cir. 1991). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive
rights,” but merely provides “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Baker
v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979). The first step in any such claim is to identify the
specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989);
Baker, 443 U.S. at 140.
Plaintiff fails to identify any specific constitutional right that might form the basis of his
claims. He does not cite to any constitutional amendment or federal statute in his Complaint, nor
does he identify any legal theories or concepts of a constitutional dimension. While he vaguely
asserts fraud, illegal seizure,2 and misuse of public funds, he provides no explanation as to how
these causes of action might form a federal claim against any of these defendants.
Principles requiring generous construction of pro se pleadings are not without limits. See
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). A complaint must contain either direct or
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy
2

While “illegal seizure” may sometimes refer to a Fourth Amendment violation, the Court
finds no possible factual basis for such a claim in the instant case. Plaintiff sets forth no allegation
that either he or his property was “seized”within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
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federal notice pleading requirements. See Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d
434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). District courts are not required to conjure up questions not squarely
presented to them or to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments. See Beaudett v. City
of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985); Crawford v. Crestar Foods, 2000 WL 377349 at
* 2 (6th Cir. April 6, 2000). To do so would require the courts “to explore exhaustively all potential
claims of a pro se plaintiff . . . [and] would transform the district court from its legitimate advisory
role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful
strategies for a party.” Id. at 1278. Moreover, a plaintiff’s failure to identify a particular legal
theory in his Complaint places an unfair burden on defendants to speculate about the potential
claims that a plaintiff may be raising against them and the defenses they might assert in response
to each of these possible causes of action. See Wells, 891 F.2d at 594. Even liberally construed,
the Complaint in the instant case fails to sufficiently state any federal constitutional claims and it
is, therefore, subject to summary dismissal under § 1915(e).
Inasmuch as plaintiff’s federal claims cannot survive, this Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state law claims in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c). Supplemental jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which includes an explicit
provision permitting the district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when that
court has dismissed all of the claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);
Saglioccolo v. Eagle Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 226, 233 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that a district court may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims once it has dismissed all claims
over which it possessed original jurisdiction). Accordingly, to the extent any of plaintiff’s claims
are asserted under state law, they are subject to summary dismissal under § 1915(e).
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IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, this action is dismissed under section 1915(e). The court certifies, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.3
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: December 28, 2011

3

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides that “[a]n appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the
trial court certifies that it is not taken in good faith.”
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