Bradley v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems et al

Filing 10

Opinion and Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 2/10/12 granting the motion to dismiss filed by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. (Related Doc. 5 ) (M,G)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
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BEVERLY A. BRADLEY,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
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REGISTRATION SYSTEM, et al.,
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Defendants.
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:
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CASE NO. 1:11-CV-02492

OPINION & ORDER
[Resolving Doc. No. 5]

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
With this case, originally filed in Rhode Island state-court, Plaintiff Beverly Bradley seeks
injunctive and declaratory relief against Defendants Mortgage Electronic Registration System and
AmTrust Bank. Bradley seeks a declaration that a mortgage held by AmTrust is void, an injunction
on eviction proceedings, and an order quieting title. [Doc. 1-2.]
AmTrust is, however, in receivership, with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) as receiver. See [Doc. 4.] On November 16, 2011, FDIC removed Bradley’s action to this
Court, [Doc. 1], and the Court granted FDIC’s motion to substitute itself for AmTrust Bank, [Doc.
4]. On November 23, 2011, FDIC moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)-(8) & (13) and for failure to
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Bradley did not respond. Finding that
Bradley failed to exhaust the administrative remedy and fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, the Court GRANTS FDIC’s motion to dismiss.
On a factual jurisdictional attack, such as this one, the Court must “weigh the conflicting
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Case No. 1:11-CV-02492
Gwin, J.
evidence to arrive at the factual predicate that subject matter jurisdiction exists or does not exist.”
Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990). Moreover, this Court
“has wide discretion to allow affidavits, documents and even a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve
disputed jurisdictional facts.” Id. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
As part of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), 12
U.S.C. § 1821(d) establishes the “[p]owers and duties of [FDIC] as conservator or receiver,” for a
depository institution, including the power to manage the depository institution’s assets. Once FDIC
is appointed receiver, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) mandates an administrative-claims process for claims
against the depository institution (and the FDIC as receiver). Moreover, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(d)
provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction over . . . any claim or action for payment from, or any
action seeking a determination of rights with respect to, the assets of any depository institution for
which the [FDIC] has been appointed receiver . . . .”
That section is not an “absolute bar to jurisdiction.” Village of Oakwood v. State Bank and
Trust Co., 539 F.3d 373, 385 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Home Capital Collateral, Inc. v. F.D.I.C., 96
F.3d 760, 763 (5th Cir.1996)). But the Village of Oakwood court further explained that 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(13)(d) is a statutory exhaustion requirement and that the “failure to file an administrative
claim within the period provided by § 1821(d)(6) results in [the claimant] having no further rights
or remedies with respect to such claims . . . .” Id. at 385-86.
That statutory exhaustion requirement applies to Bradley’s claims. On December 4, 2009,
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Gwin, J.
the Office of Thrift Supervision closed AmTrust Bank and appointed FDIC as its receiver. [Doc. 5-2;
Doc. 5-3.] Nearly two years later, on November 16, 2011, Bradley filed her complaint.1/ [Doc 1-2.]
Bradley’s claim for a declaration that a mortgage held by AmTrust is void is an “action seeking a
determination of rights with respect to the assets” of AmTrust Bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(d).
Accordingly, Bradley’s claims against AmTrust, with FDIC as receiver, fall within the class of
claims governed by § 1821(d).
Bradley has not fulfilled that section’s exhaustion requirements. According to FDIC, Bradley
never filed an administrative claim with the FDIC. [Doc 5-1.] Bradley provides no proof (or
argument) to the contrary. Because Bradley has not exhausted her administrative remedies as
required by § 1821(d), the Court lacks jurisdiction over Bradley’s claim.
Furthermore, Bradley’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are barred by 12
U.S.C § 1821(j) which provides that “[e]xcept as provided in this section, no court may take any
action . . . to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the [FDIC] as a conservator or
a receiver.” Citing a D.C. Circuit decision, the Sixth Circuit noted that “§ 1821(j) barred the court
from restraining the foreclosure . . . because that would restrain or affect the FDIC’s exercise of its
powers or functions as . . . receiver.” Superior Bank, FSB v. Boyd (In re Lewis), 398 F.3d 735, 740
(6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Freeman v. F.D.I.C., 56 F.3d 1394, 1398
(D.C.Cir.1995)).
Similarly, Bradley’s complaint, seeking to quiet title and injunctive relief preventing eviction,
would “restrain or affect the FDIC’s exercise of its powers” as receiver. Id. Accordingly, Bradley’s
1/

Bradley, apparently aware that FDIC was appointed receiver, states that “the U.S. Office of Thrift Supervision
closed down the bank after its’ [sic] parent company, AmTrust Financial Corp. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.” [Doc.
1-2.]

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Case No. 1:11-CV-02492
Gwin, J.
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are barred by 12 U.S.C § 1821(j) and, under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), must be dismissed.
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS FDIC’s motion to dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT

Dated: February 10, 2012

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JUDGE