Cawley v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 27

Memorandum Opinion and Order that the decision of the Commissioner is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings (Related Doc # 1 ). For purposes of any potential application for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the Court concludes that the position of the Commissioner was substantially justified. Signed by Magistrate Judge William H. Baughman, Jr. on 1/4/2013. (S,G)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

AVEN CAWLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

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CASE NO. 1:12 CV 47

MAGISTRATE JUDGE
WILLIAM H. BAUGHMAN, JR.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER

Introduction
This is an action for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security denying the applications of the plaintiff, Aven Cawley, for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The parties have consented to
magistrate judge’s jurisdiction.
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), whose decision became the final decision of
the Commissioner, found that Cawley had severe impairments consisting of affective
disorder and degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, sleep apnea, and migraines.1 The ALJ
made the following finding regarding Cawley’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”):
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except Claimant can lift and
carry 5 pounds occasionally and less than 2 pounds frequently. She can sit for
1.5 hours with a sit/stand option. She can be on her feet only occasionally and
1

Transcript (“Tr.”) at 14.

sit for approximately 6 hours in an 8 hour workday. Claimant can never stoop,
crawl, kneel or bend. Claimant is able to perform simple routine tasks in a
relatively static work environment.2
Given that RFC, the ALJ found Cawley incapable of performing her past relevant work.3
Based on an answer to a hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert at the
hearing setting forth the RFC finding quoted above, the ALJ determined that a significant
number of jobs existed locally and nationally that Cawley could perform.4 The ALJ,
therefore, found Cawley not under a disability.
Cawley asks for reversal of the Commissioner’s decision on the ground that it does
not have the support of substantial evidence in the administrative record.
I conclude that the ALJ’s analysis of Cawley’s credibility does not adequately address
the factors set out in the applicable regulation and, therefore, does not have the support of
substantial evidence. The case, therefore, must be remanded for reconsideration of that
finding.

Analysis
This is essentially a pain case. Cawley suffers from several herniated discs in her back
with a history of a lumbar laminectomy, post-gastric bypass surgery, and a diagnosis of
fibromyalgia.

2

Id. at 16-17.

3

Id. at 22.

4

Id.
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The ALJ found degenerative disc disease and fibromyalgia as severe impairments,
among others,5 and adopted an extremely restrictive residual functional capacity to perform
sedentary work with additional exertional, postural, and mental limitations.6 Cawley’s core
argument here is that the pain she experiences renders her totally disabled in that she cannot
consistently do work at the limited functional capacity indicated by the RFC finding and has
difficulty completing a normal workday.
Cawley challenges both the ALJ’s step two and step four findings. At step two she
maintains that the ALJ should have found as a severe impairment orthostatic hypotension,
a condition that results in lightheadedness and possible fainting caused by low blood
pressure. At step four Cawley argues that the RFC finding should have contained additional
limitations for an ability to complete the workday. Further, Cawley takes issue with the
ALJ’s handling of the opinion of Dr. Baum, a treating source, and the ALJ’s credibility
finding.
As indicated in my comments to counsel at the oral argument, this case boils down
to whether or not substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility finding. In adopting the
restrictive RFC finding, the ALJ discounted Cawley’s allegations that her pain was so severe
that she was unable to work.7 In doing so, he makes numerous references to her pain being

5

Id. at 14.

6

Id. at 16-17.

7

Id. at 17.
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inconsistent with the objective medical findings.8 Of particular interest in this regard is the
observation of Dr. Devereaux, a treating neurologist from University Hospitals, who
observed that Cawley is incapacitated by her pain, and the pain has a significant
psychological component that cannot be addressed by a procedural approach.9
The ALJ properly evaluated the objective medical evidence and properly handled and
weighed the opinion of Dr. Baum. As noted by the ALJ,10 Dr. Baum’s two-page assessment11
contains cursory explanations and no detail. My review of the treatment notes from Dr. Baum
in the file12 do not support the exertional limitations contained in his assessment.
Credibility, however, is another matter. As set forth in my opinions in Wines v.
Commissioner13 and Cross v. Commissioner,14 objective medical evidence is important in
evaluating credibility. The regulations recognize, however, that a claimant’s subjective
complaints of pain may be indicative of a severity of impairment not susceptible to proof by
objective medical evidence.15 In such instances, the ALJ must go beyond the objective

8

Id. at 81-20, 21.

9

Id. at 43.

10

Id. at 20.

11

Id. at 934-35.

12

Id. at 936-51.

13

Wines v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 268 F. Supp. 2d 954 (N.D. Ohio 2003).

14

Cross v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 373 F. Supp. 2d 724 (N.D. Ohio 2005).

15

Cross, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 732.
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medical evidence and examine other indicia identified in the regulation.16 In doing so, the
ALJ must adequately articulate the reasons for any discounting of credibility in a way that
provides for meaningful judicial review.17
Here, although the ALJ at various points touches on the factors set out in the
regulations for evaluating subjective complaints of pain beyond objective medical evidence,
his articulation leaves much to be desired. There is little or no discussion of Cawley’s daily
activities, her medications, the side effects of those medications, and of other therapies tried
to relieve the pain.
Accordingly, this case will be remanded with directions to reconsider the credibility
finding and properly articulate with respect to reasons given for the credibility finding made.
If the ALJ finds that Cawley’s complaints should receive greater credibility, then perhaps this
would require a reconsideration of some of the treating physicians’ opinions. Although
Dr. Devereaux is a treating physician, he is not identified as such, and no weight is given to
his opinions.18 He make diagnoses and opines as to the severity of various impairments.19
This potentially qualifies for controlling weight and consideration in the disability decision.20

16

Id. at 732-33, citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.

17

Id. at 733.

18

Tr. at 19, 21.

19

Id. at 476-99.

20

See, Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F. App’x 543, 551 (6th Cir. 2010).
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Conclusion
Substantial evidence does not support the finding of the Commissioner that Cawley
had no disability. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner denying Cawley disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income is reversed and the case remanded for
reconsideration of the finding as to Cawley’s credibility.
For purposes of any potential application for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access
to Justice Act,21 the Court concludes that the position of the Commissioner was substantially
justified.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 4, 2013

21

s/ William H. Baughman, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
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