Ayers v. City of Cleveland, et al.

Filing 58

Opinion and Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 11/14/12 denying the parties' proposed confidentiality agreement. The parties may move to seal individual documents provided they make the requisite particularized showing. (Related Doc. 57 ) (M,G)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
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DAVID AYERS
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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CITY OF CLEVELAND, et al.
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Defendants.
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CASE NO. 1:12-CV-00753

OPINION & ORDER
[Resolving Doc. No. 57]

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
The parties in this civil rights case jointly propose a protective order allowing them to limit
public disclosure of information they designate as confidential. [Doc. 57.] Granting a protective
order motion is within the trial court’s discretion, but that discretion “‘is circumscribed by a longestablished legal tradition’ which values public access to court proceedings.” Procter & Gamble Co.
v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983)). Unwarranted restriction of court
documents hampers the public’s ability to act as an important check on judicial integrity. See Brown
& Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179; see also Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570 (11th
Cir. 1985) (observing that “trials are public proceedings” and that access to court records preserves
“the rights of the public, an absent third party”). Thus, in the Sixth Circuit, courts approach
protective order motions with a presumption in favor of public access to judicial records. See, e.g.,
In re Perrigo Co., 128 F.3d 430, 447 (6th Cir. 1997).
Moreover, the fact that all parties jointly seek a protective order does not overcome this

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Case No. 1:12-CV-00753
Gwin, J.
presumption. See Proctor & Gamble Co., 78 F.3d at 227 (warning district courts against
“abdicat[ing their] responsibility to oversee the discovery process and to determine whether filings
should be made available to the public” and against “turn[ing] this function over to the parties,”
which would be “a violation not only of Rule 26(c) but of the principles so painstakingly discussed
in Brown & Williamson”).
A successful protective order motion must show specifically that disclosure of particular
information would cause serious harm. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179-80. Here,
the movants completely fail to meet this standard, stating instead that a protective order is necessary
“to facilitate discovery.” [Doc. 57.] The proposed confidentiality agreement is exceedingly broad
and unspecific. The movants ask for blanket authority to designate documents as confidential that
they mark as “Confidential—subject to protective order.” [Doc. 57-1, at 2.] However, they have
failed to show that public disclosure of any information might cause serious harm or is otherwise
warranted.
The movants may move to seal individual documents provided that they make the requisite
particularized showing. For example, upon a proper motion, the Court will consider limiting public
disclosure of information that is highly sensitive or embarrassing. However, the Court will not
simply grant the parties blanket authorization to cloak the entire case under a veil. The Court thus
DENIES the proposed confidentiality agreement.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: November 14, 2012

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