Harris v. Luther et al

Filing 3

Opinion and Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 7/19/12. The Court, as set forth in this entry, dismisses this action without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A and certifies that an appeal could not be taken in good faith. (Related Doc. 1 ) (M,G)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
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ERNEST C. HARRIS,
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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RODDY LUTHER, et al.,
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Defendants.
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CASE NO. 1:12-CV-969

OPINION & ORDER
[Resolving Doc. No. 1]

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Pro se plaintiff Ernest C. Harris brings this action against City of Cleveland Mayor Frank
Jackson, City of Cleveland Safety Director Martin Flask, Roddy Luther, and John Hall. In the
Complaint, plaintiff appears to allege harassment. He does not specify the relief he is seeking.
I. Background
Plaintiff is a state prisoner, incarcerated at Lorain Correctional Institution in Grafton, Ohio.
In its entirety, the Complaint asserts as follows:
(1) The policy of Mayor Frank Jackson and Safety Dir. The search warrant was
attain under false facts. There never been any drugs found. (2) Paraphenlia [sic]
belong to alcoholics and drugs addict that would come to the house to eat, take
shower or bath and change clothes the police knew this I just didn’t have the
paperwork from I.R.S. We have a group over zealous in their jobs– police. No
crime was done.
(Doc. 1 at 1). The caption of the Complaint states “harassment– planting evict. Paraphenalia.”
Plaintiff does not identify the relief he is seeking.

II. Standard of Review
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), a district court is expressly
authorized to dismiss any civil action filed by a prisoner seeking relief from a governmental entity,
as soon as possible after docketing, if the court concludes that the complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or if the plaintiff seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 (6th Cir.
2010); Siller v. Dean, 2000 WL 145167 , at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 2000).
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
“plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A pleading
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be
sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the Complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. The Plaintiff is not required
to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. A pleading that offers
legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this
pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a Complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th
Cir.1998). See generally Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (holding that “the dismissal standard articulated
in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” pursuant to §§ 1915A and
1915(e)(2)).

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III. Analysis
Plaintiff fails to identify any specific legal theory or cause of action in his Complaint. He
does not identify defendants Luther or Hall or explain how any of the named defendants may have
violated his legal rights. While he alleges generally that an unidentified search warrant was
obtained based on “false facts,” and a “group” of people are “overzealous in their jobs,” plaintiff
fails to clearly identify any legal claims or set forth any facts explaining the alleged involvement
of defendants Jackson, Flask, Luther or Hall.
Principles requiring generous construction of pro se pleadings are not without limits. See
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). A complaint must contain either direct or
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy
federal notice pleading requirements. See Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d
434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). District courts are not required to conjure up questions not squarely
presented to them or to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments. See Beaudett v. City
of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985); Crawford v. Crestar Foods, 2000 WL 377349
at * 2 (6th Cir. April 6, 2000). To do so would require the courts “to explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se plaintiff . . . [and] would transform the district court from its legitimate
advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Id. at 1278. Moreover, a plaintiff’s failure to identify a particular
legal theory in his Complaint places an unfair burden on defendants to speculate about the potential
claims that a plaintiff may be raising against them and the defenses they might assert in response
to each of these possible causes of action. See Wells, 891 F.2d at 594. Even liberally construed,
the Complaint in the instant case fails to sufficiently state any federal claims and it is, therefore,

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subject to summary dismissal under § 1915A.
In addition, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state
law claims in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Supplemental jurisdiction is governed by
28 U.S.C. § 1367, which includes an explicit provision permitting the district court to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction when that court has dismissed all of the claims over which it has
original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Saglioccolo v. Eagle Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 226, 233 (6th
Cir. 1997) (noting that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over statelaw claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it possessed original jurisdiction).
Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff intends to assert any claims under state law, they are subject to
summary dismissal under § 1915A.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, this action is dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §1915A. The Court
certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken
in good faith.1
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 19, 2012

s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides that “[a]n appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the
trial court certifies that it is not taken in good faith.”
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