Williams-Belhouane v. County of Cuyahoga
Filing
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Memorandum Opinion and Order For the reasons stated in the Order, Defendant's 7 Motion for summary judgment is granted. Signed by Judge Donald C. Nugent on 10/31/2012. (K,K)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
INEZ WILLIAMS-BELHOUANE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CUYAHOGA COUNTY,
Defendant.
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CASE NO. 1:12 CV 1021
JUDGE DONALD C. NUGENT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
This case is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF #7).
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant, Cuyahoga County (“the
County”), has petitioned the Court for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff, Inez
Williams–Belhouane’s claims, which stem from allegations of discrimination based on
disability. Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF
#12), and Defendant filed a Reply in support. (ECF #13). Having reviewed all of the parties’
submissions and the relevant law, and for the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is
GRANTED.
Factual and Procedural Background1
Plaintiff Inez Williams-Belhouane (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action against her former
employer, Cuyahoga County in April of 2012. In the Complaint (“Complaint”), Ms. WilliamsBelhouane claims that she was fired from her position at the County in violation of Title I of the
Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. and the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. 701, et. seq., and in violation of Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code. She also
asserted a claim for termination in violation of public policy under Ohio law. Plaintiff is seeking
reinstatement, as well as back pay and lost benefits.
The parties do not dispute that Ms. Williams-Belhouane was in the position of “Social
Service Aide” (“Aide”) in the Visitation Department of the County’s Department of Children
and Family Services. They do not dispute that this job generally requires the Aides to spend
50% of their time driving and picking up children, and 50% of their time on other aspects of the
position including monitoring or supervising various aspects of supervised visitation. Further
the parties agree that Ms. Williams-Belhouane is no longer physically capable of driving or
lifting children, due the effects of a long standing illness. Prior to January of 2009, when a new
Director was appointed to oversee the Department, Ms. Williams-Belhouane, along with other
employees hired as Aides who for various reasons were either temporarily or permanently
precluded from driving, was allowed to remain in her job without driving or lifting children.
Plaintiff, and other employees, were allowed to perform only the non-driving/lifting functions of
the job and other employees were asked to fill in for them, or trade assignments, when they
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Any facts set forth in this section are based upon the parties’ statements of facts. Those
material facts which are contested and supported by deposition testimony, affidavit, or
other evidence are stated in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party.
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would otherwise have been scheduled to drive. In January of 2009, the new director put an end
to these reassignment of duties, and instituted an across-the-board policy that required workers
to fulfill all of the stated duties of their job, or face termination.
The Defendant contends that Ms. Williams-Belhouane cannot recover under any of the
alleged theories because she was not qualified to perform the essential functions of her job (i.e.
driving and lifting), either with or without accommodations, at the time of her termination.
Plaintiff claims that she could, and in fact, had been, performing many aspects of her position,
and that it was unreasonable not to allow her to continue in the job doing those tasks that she was
physically capable of performing. The sole question before the Court is whether driving and/or
lifting children was an essential function of the employment position that Ms. WilliamsBelhouane held at the time of her termination.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the court is satisfied “that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The burden of showing the absence of any such “genuine issue”
rests with the moving party:
[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions
of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrates the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). A fact is “material”
only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
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U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Determination of whether a factual issue is “genuine” requires
consideration of the applicable evidentiary standards. The court will view the summary
judgment motion in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Summary judgment should be granted if a party who bears the burden of proof at trial
does not establish an essential element of their case. Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d
937, 941 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). Accordingly, “[t]he mere existence of
a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Copeland v. Machulis, 57
F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). Moreover, if the evidence
presented is “merely colorable” and not “significantly probative,” the court may decide the legal
issue and grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted). In most
civil cases involving summary judgment, the court must decide “whether reasonable jurors could
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the [non-moving party] is entitled to a verdict.” Id.
at 252.
Once the moving party has satisfied its burden of proof, the burden then shifts to the
nonmover. The nonmoving party may not simply rely on its pleadings, but must “produce
evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be solved by a jury.” Cox v. Kentucky Dep’t
of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1995). FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e) states:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the
adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.
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The Federal Rules identify the penalty for the lack of such a response by the nonmoving party as
an automatic grant of summary judgment, where otherwise appropriate. Id.
In sum, proper summary judgment analysis entails “the threshold inquiry of determining
whether there is the need for a trial--whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues
that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in
favor of either party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
Analysis
To establish a prima facie case for failure to accommodate under the ADA, an employee
must show that: (1) she is an individual with a disability; (2) she is otherwise qualified to
perform the job requirements, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) she was
discriminated against solely on the basis of her disability. Baker v. Windsor Republic Doors,
No. 08-6200, 414 Fed. Appx. 764, 770, 2011 WL 805768 (6th Cir. Mar. 8, 2011); Talley v.
Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1105 (6th Cir. 2008); 42 U.S.C. §12101(2).
An employee’s disability claim should be dismissed if the employee failed to identify and
request a reasonable accommodation. Tubbs v. Formica Corp., 107 Fed.Appx. 485 (6th Cir.
2004); Hankins v. The Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 802 (6th Cir. 1996)(citing 29 C.F.R. §1630.9(d)).
Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, an employer who receives Federal
financial assistance is prohibited from discriminating against an “otherwise qualified individual
with a disability... solely by reason of her or his disability.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The same
analysis made under the ADA applies to claims made under the Rehabilitation Act and claims
made pursuant to the Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02. Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d
195, 201 (6th Cir. 2010); Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 872 (6th Cir. 2007);
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Doe v. Woodford Cty. Bd. Of Educ., 213 F.3d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 2000).
To be qualified for a position under the ADA, an individual must be able to perform the
essential functions of the employment position, with or without accommodation. 42 U.S.C. §
12111(8). Essential functions are “fundamental job duties of the employment position the
individual with a disability holds.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). The Code of Federal Regulations
states that a job function may be “essential” for any of several reasons including (1) the reason
the position exists is to perform the function, and (2) there are a limited number of employees
available among whom the job can be distributed. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(n)(2).
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that she is a “qualified individual with a disability” as
defined in 42 U.S.C. §1211(8) and Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code. However, all of the
evidence, and Plaintiff’s own testimony establish that driving and lifting children and/or car seats
is an essential function of the job that she cannot perform either with or without an
accommodation. The ADA states that consideration “shall be given to the employer’s judgment
as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description
before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered
evidence of the essential functions of the job.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Roetter v. Michigan Dept.
Of Corrections, No. 10-1952, 456 Fed. Appx. 566, 570, 2012 WL 181387 (6th Cir. Jan. 23,
2012). Other considerations include: the amount of time spent on the job performing the
function, the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement; the work experience of past incumbents; and the current work
experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
Plaintiff herself explained that in her original position as a case aide she helped the
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County’s social workers by picking up children for visitations or appointments and transporting
them to different places. (Pl. Depo. at 47). When that position was merged with the general
visitation unit and became a “Social Service Aide,” the aides no longer worked for the social
workers but the job was still “basically picking up children and bringing them to the county for
visits and or taking them to another site for a visit....” (Pl. Depo. at 57-60). At Old Brooklyn,
one of the two locations for Social Service Aides, seven aides had rotating duties which were
half driving and half monitoring visits. “You were one week monitor, one week driver.” (Pl.
Depo. at 66-67). Ms. Williams-Belhouane reaffirmed this understanding in her sworn statement
to the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System when she attested “[m]y job duties required
me to regularly lift and carry children to and from a county transport vehicle. . . As a Social
Service aide (2), 50% of my job was driving or handling of children.” (Init. Discl. pg. 12). In
addition to Ms. Williams-Belhouane’s own testimony, the written job description for this
position described the transporting of children as one of the most important job duties,
comprising 50% of the work for the position. Further, the Director of the Department,
expressing the employer’s judgment as to the essential functions of the job stated that being able
to transport children to visitation, including the driving and lifting of children, was an essential
function of this job.
Plaintiff argues that there would have been no significant negative consequences if she
were allowed to forego the driving and lifting requirements of her position because other
workers would be willing and/or able to fill in to accomplish those duties. She, however,
presents no evidence that any of the other considerations weigh against a finding that the driving
and lifting requirements are essential functions of the job. Further, the County has provided
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testimony that indicates the consequences of allowing Aides to opt out of the driving
requirement would negatively affect the County’s ability to staff the position and ensure that
driver’s would be available when needed to facilitate visitation for the children.
Ms. Williams-Belhouane’s requested “accommodation” would not allow her to perform
the essential functions of the job, it would allow her to avoid having to perform them, and would
require the County to either eliminate or reallocate those duties. The ADA does not require it to
eliminate or reallocate essential job functions in order to accommodate an employee with a
disability. Otto v. City of Victoria, 685 F.3d 755, 759 (8th Cir. 2012); Hoskins v. Oakland Cty.
Sheriff’s Dept. , 227 F.3d 719, 729-31 (6th Cir. 2000). Therefore, eliminating the driving and
lifting duties was not a reasonable accommodation for a Social Services Aide. In so far as all
parties agree that she is incapable of driving or lifting children due to her disability and that there
is no accommodation that could have been offered that would have allowed her to perform those
duties, she is not qualified to perform the function of Social Services Aide with or without a
“reasonable” accommodation.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #7) is
GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Donald C. Nugent
DONALD C. NUGENT
United States District Judge
DATED: October 31, 2012
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