Chhay et al v. Bokor et al
Filing
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Memorandum Opinion and Order granting 2 Motion to proceed in forma pauperis and this action is dismissed under section 1915(e). Further, the court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Dan A. Polster (C,KA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
SOKLYNA CHHAY, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DAVID B. BOKOR, et al.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 1:12 CV 2024
JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER
On August 6, 2012, pro se plaintiffs Soklyna Chhay, Hong Kim Chhay, and Borath Hang
filed this in forma pauperis action against David B. Bokor, Timothy J. McGinty, and John and Jane
Does. Plaintiffs allege that a foreclosure action against them in the Cuyahoga County Court of
Common Pleas is a result of a conspiracy, and violates their civil rights.1 In particular, plaintiffs
emphasize that Mr. Bokor, the attorney representing Wells Fargo Bank in the foreclosure case, has
filed papers continuing to show Timothy J. McGinty as the presiding judge, even though the
presiding judge is now Judge Annette G. Butler.
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to
dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
1
See, Wells Fargo Bank v. Chhay, Cuy. Cty. Comm. Pls. Case No. CV-11-768418,
http://cpdocket.cp.cuyahogacounty.us.
granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.2 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989);
Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197
(6th Cir. 1996).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual allegations,”
but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Id. A
pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Id. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of
further factual enhancement. Id. It must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id.
Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id.
Even liberally construed, the complaint does not contain allegations reasonably suggesting
plaintiffs might have a valid claim. See, Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ,, 76 F.3d 716 (6th
Cir. 1996)(court not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted legal conclusions in
determining whether complaint states a claim for relief).
Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted and this action is
2
A claim may be dismissed sua sponte, without prior notice to the plaintiff and without
service of process on the defendant, if the court explicitly states that it is invoking section
1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons
set forth in the statute. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997);
Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054
(1986); Harris v. Johnson, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986); Brooks v. Seiter, 779 F.2d
1177, 1179 (6th Cir. 1985).
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dismissed under section 1915(e). Further, the court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3),
that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Dan Aaron Polster 8/17/12
DAN AARON POLSTER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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