Moore v. Delta Global Services
Filing
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Memorandum of Opinion and Order. Plaintiff Corey Moore's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Related doc # 2 ) is granted. Complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e), but without prejudice to any state law claims he may seek to assert. The Court certifies that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Christopher A. Boyko on 9/21/2012. (H,CM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
CORY MOORE
Plaintiff,
v.
DELTA GLOBAL SERVICE., et al.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 1:12 CV 2227
JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Cory Moore filed the above-captioned in forma pauperis Complaint against
his employer Delta Global Services (DGS) and the Director of Human Resources at DGS in Atlanta,
Georgia.1 Alleging discrimination and retaliation, Mr. Moore asserts this Court’s jurisdiction
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The day after filing his original Complaint,
Mr. Moore filed a “Supplement Complaint” to provide details in support of his claims. In his prayer
for relief, he seeks to recover lost wages for pain and suffering.
Background
The relevant events giving rise to this Complaint began in May 2010, when Mr. Moore
allegedly made several requests to his supervisor, Frank Rosario, and Human Resources
1
The Court presumes the HR Director in Atlanta, Georgia is at the corporate level since Mr.
Moore was employed at DGS in Cleveland, Ohio.
representative Lasharn Carrington for a job transfer to Florida. Mr. Rosario advised Mr. Moore that
there was no possibility for him to transfer. Ms. Carrington, however, allegedly advised Mr. Moore
to contact the office in Orlando, Florida to speak with the station manager.
After telephoning station manager Marlon Moultrie in Florida, Mr. Moore arranged to meet
with him in Orlando, Florida. Upon his arrival at the airport in Orlando, Mr. Moore was met by Mr.
Moultrie “with surprise” that he actually traveled that distance for a meeting. The two spoke briefly,
with Mr. Moultrie asking a few questions; including, how soon Mr. Moore could start working in
Florida. At that point Mr. Moore telephoned Mr. Rosario in Cleveland to solicit his approval for the
transfer. Mr. Rosario advised him to first return to Cleveland where they would discuss his request
at that time.
When Mr. Moore returned to work in Cleveland, he telephoned Ms. Carol at DGS’s corporate
Human Resources office on June 21, 2010 and requested information about the company’s transfer
policy. She explained that an employee needed to work at DGS at least 6 months and that signatures
of both the transferor and transferee station managers were required to agree to the transfer.
The following day Mr. Moore was called to a meeting with Mr. Rosario and Ms. Carrington.
Mr. Rosario demanded to know why Mr. Moore telephoned DGS’s corporate office. Moreover, he
considered the action “disrespectful.” When Mr. Moore attempted to explain his rationale, Mr.
Rosario allegedly interrupted, shouted that he did not care about Mr. Moore’s personal life and
threatened to take him off the schedule for the remainder of the month. At that point, Mr. Moore felt
he was being disrespected as a “young black organized man”and explained he would not remain in
the room to treated poorly and left. (Pet.’s Supp. Compl. at 2.)
The day after the meeting, Mr. Moore telephoned Ms. Carol to complain that Mr. Rosario
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used “intimidation and discrimination” to verbally abuse him by speaking to him like a child. She
responded that she would speak with Mr. Rosario and Ms. Carrington, and quickly hung up the
telephone.
Shortly afterward, Mr. Rosario called Mr. Moore into his office, along with Ms. Carrington.
He instructed Mr. Moore to “take this little sheet of paper and call this [sic] numbers in Orlando[,]
Florida and that they were filling a P.C.S. and that my last day was Sunday June 27.” 2 (Pl.’s Supp.
Compl. at 3). A great deal of confusion ensued after this statement. Mr. Moore responded that he
already had the telephone numbers, but did not understand why June 27 was his last day. Mr.
Rosario then challenged why Mr. Moore contacted the corporate office a second time. During this
exchange, Ms. Carrington allegedly attempted to quiet Mr. Rosario, while promising Mr. Moore that
she would “call and speak with someone.” In the interim, she suggested he return to work, while
Mr. Rosario warned Mr. Moore “don’t leave out [sic] the office or I will take your badge and your
parking pass for being in [sic] cooperative.”
(Pl.'s Supp. Compl. at 3).
Bewildered by Mr.
Rosario’s comments, Mr. Moore telephoned his father for advice.
Two days after meeting with Mr. Rosario, Mr. Moore alleges he was advised by Ms. Carol
to “take my badge and leave and come back to work on Friday, June 25.” The day before she
suggested he return, Mr. Moore again telephoned Ms. Carol regarding the status of his employment.
She explained he was suspended for two weeks “for being in [sic] cooperative and on the phone.”
(Pl.'s Supp. Compl. at 3). When he asked for documentation of his suspension, Ms. Carol stated
there was no documentation and asked that he stop telephoning her. Mr. Moore then telephoned Mr.
Rosario to ask what the status of his employment was and why his badge did not work. Initially, Mr.
2
Mr. Moore does not explain the meaning of the acronym “P.C.S.”
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Rosario stated “it was because of my transfer.” Id. After Mr. Moore disclosed that he had already
spoken with Human Resources, Mr. Rosario advised “he was suspended and . . . no longer work[ed]
there.” Id.
A letter from the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.),
Cleveland Field Office, dated May 30, 2012, reveals Mr. Moore filed a charge against DGS with the
Commission. The letter is notice of the E.E.O.C.’s dismissal of Mr. Moore’s race discrimination
charge against DGS for denying his request for transfer. The E.E.O.C. investigation revealed DGS
granted Mr. Moore a transfer, but he declined based on personal reasons. The underlying issue
became a dispute over how long DGS delayed his transfer request, which the E.E.O.C. noted was
not considered an adverse employment action. Also, the E.E.O.C. confirmed Mr. Moore was
suspended after a verbal confrontation with his supervisor, but was not terminated from his position
at DGS. The E.E.O.C. attached a copy of its Dismissal and Notice of Suit Rights, dated May 30,
2012, to its letter.
Standard of Review
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), a district court is required to
dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989);
Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197
(6th Cir. 1996). For the reasons stated below, this action is dismissed pursuant to section 1915(e).
Title VII Discrimination
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., provides
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["i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... race...." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1). While Mr. Moore identifies his race as Black, that singular fact does bring his
claims under the protection of Title VII.
Without question, pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S.
364, 365 (1982); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, generous construction
of pro se pleadings is not without limits. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989);
Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985).
Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain a "short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED . R. CIV . P.
8(a)(2). The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require "detailed factual allegations,"
but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions"
or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. Id. It must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face." Id.
When a plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, a claim has facial plausibility.
Id. The plausibility standard requires more than a scant possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's
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liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.' "
Id.
Mr. Moore alleges his supervisor spoke to him harshly and refused to immediately
approve his transfer because he is Black. Other than identifying himself as a member of the
protected class under Title VII, Mr. Moore fails to allege that the Defendants treated Mr. Moore
poorly or less favorably based solely on his race. Moreover, Mr. Moore does not suggest other
employees outside of his protected class were treated more favorably. While a plaintiff is not
required to state a prima facie case as this stage, see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506
(2002), he must still state plausible claims of employment discrimination based on race in
violation of Title VII. This Court cannot draw a reasonable inference that DGS is liable under
federal law for the misconduct alleged. Accordingly, Mr. Moore has failed to state a claim for
relief under Title VII.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Moore’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is granted
and the Complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e), but without prejudice to any
state law claims he may seek to assert. Further, the Court certifies that an appeal from this
decision could not be taken in good faith.3
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Christopher A. Boyko
DATED: September 21, 2012
CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides: “An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial
court certifies that it is not taken in good faith.”
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