Roe v. Intellicorp Records, Inc

Filing 71

Opinion and Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 12/12/12 denying defendant's motion for Protective Order. The Court will, upon future motion, consider the sealing of an individual document as set forth in this entry. (Related Doc. 70 ) (M,G)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
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JANE ROE,
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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INTELLICORP RECORDS, INC.,
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Defendants.
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CASE NO. 1:12-CV-2288

OPINION & ORDER
[Resolving Doc. No. 70]

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
The defendant in this Fair Credit Reporting Act case moves for a protective order covering
documents that it says could cause commercial or competitive harm if disclosed. [Doc. 70.] The
motion is unopposed. Granting a protective order motion is within the trial court’s discretion, but
that discretion “‘is circumscribed by a long-established legal tradition’ which values public access
to court proceedings.” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir.
1996) (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177
(6th Cir. 1983)). Unwarranted restriction of court documents hampers the public’s ability to act as
an important check on judicial integrity. See Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179; see also
Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570 (11th Cir. 1985) (observing that “trials are public
proceedings” and that access to court records preserves “the rights of the public, an absent third
party”). Thus, in the Sixth Circuit, courts approach protective order motions with a presumption in
favor of public access to judicial records. See, e.g., In re Perrigo Co., 128 F.3d 430, 447 (6th Cir.
1997).

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Case No. 1:12-CV-2288
Gwin, J.
Moreover, the fact that the protective order is unopposed does not overcome this
presumption. See Proctor & Gamble Co., 78 F.3d at 227 (warning district courts against
“abdicat[ing their] responsibility to oversee the discovery process and to determine whether filings
should be made available to the public” and against “turn[ing] this function over to the parties,”
which would be “a violation not only of Rule 26(c) but of the principles so painstakingly discussed
in Brown & Williamson”).
A successful protective order motion must show specifically that disclosure of particular
information would cause serious harm. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179-80. Here,
the movant fails to meet this standard. Instead, it provides a non-exhaustive list of documents that
it claims “carr[y] the potential to harm Intellicorp both commercially and competitively by providing
confidential information to Intellicorp’s competitors as well as to competing customers.” [Doc. 70,
at 3.] Further, the movant asks for blanket authority to designate documents as confidential that they
themselves deem warrant such status. [Id.] However, Intellicorp has failed to show that public
disclosure of any information might cause serious harm or is otherwise warranted.
The movant may move to seal individual documents provided that the requisite particularized
showing is made. For example, upon a proper motion, the Court will consider limiting public
disclosure of information that is highly sensitive or considered a trade secret. However, the Court
will not simply grant the movant blanket authorization to cloak the entire case under a veil. The

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Case No. 1:12-CV-2288
Gwin, J.
Court thus DENIES the motion for a protective order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/

Dated: December 12, 2012

James S. Gwin

JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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