International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18 v. Laborers' International Union of North America et al

Filing 109

Opinion and Order. Plaintiff's Motion to Deny, or in the Alternative, Continue Summary Judgment (Related doc # 96 ) is granted. Judge Christopher A. Boyko on 2/16/2016. (H,CM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
)
OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL 18, )
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
LABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL
)
UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, et al., )
Defendants.
)

CASE NO. 1:12CV2797
JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
OPINION AND ORDER

CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO, J.:
This matter comes before the Court upon the Plaintiff’s Motion (ECF DKT #96) to
Deny, or in the Alternative, Continue Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, the
Motion is granted.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18 (“Local 18"), filed this
Complaint on November 8, 2012, pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, claiming breach of an agreement between
labor organizations. Local 18 represents the interests of equipment operators, referred to as
“operating engineers,” working in the State of Ohio. Defendants are the Ohio Laborers’

International, District Council, and nine locals. Local 18 alleges that Defendants breached a
February 3, 1954 Memorandum of Understanding, executed by the International Hod
Carriers’ Building and Common Laborers’ Union of America and the International Union of
Operating Engineers; and describes, in its Complaint, at least seventeen 2012 projects
throughout Ohio, at which laborers allegedly performed work that is designated in the
Memorandum as operating engineers’ work. In its opening, the Memorandum of
Understanding recites:
The International Union of Operating Engineers and the International
Hod Carriers’ Building and Common Laborers’ Union of America, being
desirous of arriving at a clarification regarding disputes that have arisen in the
construction industry between the members of both Organizations and
cognizant of the fact of the development of machinery and equipment in
connection with work in which both Organizations are involved, hereby make
the following clarifications ...
The Memorandum then sets out three numbered provisions, clarifying work to be performed
by operating engineers and work to be performed by laborers, involving forklifts, drilling
operations, and conveyors.
Local 18 claims it is intended to benefit from, and be bound by, the 1954 Agreement,
which clarifies division of work between the crafts. Local 18 also alleges that the 1954
Memorandum has not been repudiated and remains in full force and effect. Defendants,
International, District Council, and local affiliates, allegedly condoned, assigned, and
permitted work to be performed by laborers in disregard of the terms of the Agreement,
directly and proximately causing injury to Local 18. Local 18 seeks compensatory damages
and punitive damages. The punitive damages claim is based upon the allegation that, “given
the nature and purposes of labor organization (sic), one union willfully and purposely

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agreeing with employers to perform work of another union in flagrant violation of written
agreements between the international unions not to engage in such activity, constitutes
extreme and outrageous conduct contravening the remedial purposes of national labor
policy.” (Complaint - Prayer for Relief, ECF DKT #1).
On August 21, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF DKT
#78), arguing that the limitations period was triggered by the Defendants’ abandonment of the
1954 exclusivity agreement in October of 1974, more than fifteen years before the instant
lawsuit was initiated. Plaintiff filed an Opposition Brief on October 5, 2015; but on
November 3, 2015, Plaintiff filed its Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d) Motion, supported by the Affidavit of
Counsel, Timothy R. Fadel. Plaintiff asks the Court to deny Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment or defer consideration until Plaintiff has been afforded necessary
discovery. Specifically, Plaintiff contends it is necessary to depose agents and officials of
Defendants and tender additional discovery requests “in order to gain a full understanding of
Defendants’ actual beliefs and conduct under the 1954 Agreement.” (ECF DKT #96 at 2).
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d) permits the Court to defer or deny a motion for summary judgment
when the party opposing the motion for summary judgment demonstrates by way of affidavit
or declaration the need for discovery in order to properly respond.
When Affidavits Are Unavailable. If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or
declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to
justify its opposition, the court may:
(1) defer considering the motion or deny it;
(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or

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(3) issue any other appropriate order.
Courts have held that a party “must receive ‘a full opportunity to conduct discovery’
to be able to successfully defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Ball v. Union Carbide
Corp., 385 F.3d 713, 719 (6th Cir. 2004), (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242 (1986)). Likewise, it is improper to grant summary judgment if the nonmovant is given
an insufficient opportunity for discovery. White’s Landing Fisheries, Inc. v. Buchholzer, 29
F.3d 229, 231-232 (6th Cir. 1994). The Sixth Circuit applies an abuse of discretion standard
to a district court’s ruling on a Rule 56(f) [now 56(d)] request for discovery. Plott v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 71 F.3d 1190, 1196-97 (6th Cir.1995).
The affidavit or declaration accompanying the motion must “indicate to the district
court [the party's] need for discovery, what material facts it hopes to uncover, and why it has
not previously discovered the information.” Cacevic v. City of Hazel Park, 226 F.3d 483, 488
(6th Cir. 2000)(citing Radich v. Goode, 866 F.2d 1391, 1393–94 (3d Cir.1989)).1
Discovery is ongoing in this case. The current fact discovery cut-off is March 31,
2016. Although the Court feels that Plaintiff should have made this request sooner, rather
than submitting an opposing brief and then asking for needed discovery, Plaintiff is entitled to

1

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended on December 1, 2010 which included
redesignating former Rule 56(f) as 56(d). The amendments have not altered the applicability of
former 56(f) precedent to a present analysis of 56(d).
See Enyart v. Karnes, No. 2:09cv 687, 2011 WL 1070870, *1 (S.D.Ohio March 21, 2011).

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explore facts to determine the validity of Defendants’ claimed abandonment of the 1954
Agreement in 1974. Plaintiff also has the right to probe the credibility of Defendants’ agents
and officials and to cross-examine them as to their understandings and intentions regarding
the Agreement.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, and in the interest of fairness, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion
(ECF DKT #96) and denies Defendants’ Motion (ECF DKT #78) for Summary Judgment,
with leave to re-file after the amended pleadings are filed; after the completion of fact
discovery directed at parties and, as stipulated, certain third parties; and following the
Settlement Conference of April 22, 2016. By virtue of this Order, the Court is making no
determination on the merits of Plaintiff’s or Defendants’ positions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Christopher A. Boyko
CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
United States District Judge
Dated: February 16, 2016

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