Cucu et al v. Super

Filing 31

Memorandum of Opinion and Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion to stay. Signed by Judge Patricia A. Gaughan on 7/19/2013.(Related Doc # 27 )(B,B)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

Alex J. Cucu, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Vs.
Tracy Holmes Super,
Administratrix of the Estate of
Emma Margaret Nahas
Defendant.

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CASE NO. 1:12 CV 3093
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

Memorandum of Opinion and Order

INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay Pending Appeal (Doc.
27). This action arises under the admiralty laws. For the reasons that follow, the motion is
DENIED.
FACTS
Plaintiffs, Alex J. Cucu (“Cucu”), and Deerhaven Group Auto and Marine, LLC and
Deerhaven Group, LLC (collectively, “Deerhaven”), bring this action seeking exoneration from
or limitation of liability under the Vessel Owners Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30501
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and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty and Maritime Claims of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. On June 29, 2012, Tracy Holmes Super, administratrix of the Estate of
Emma Margaret Nahas, brought suit against Cucu and Deerhaven in state court after a boating
incident.
Cucu and Deerhaven moved for issuance of notice and a restraining order preventing the
prosecution of the state court case and the commencement or further prosecution of any actions
relating to the occurrence. This Court granted the motion. Super then moved the Court to lift the
restraining order on the grounds that this is a single claimant case and the stipulations filed are
sufficient to protect the interests of Cucu and Deerhaven. The Court granted the motion finding
that Super need not stipulate to “exoneration” from liability.
Cucu and Deerhaven filed a notice of appeal and now move this Court to stay the lifting
of the injunction until such time as the Sixth Circuit can hear the appeal. Super opposes the
motion.
ANALYSIS
As noted by the parties, this Court should analyze traditional stay factors in deciding the
instant motion. Those factors include: likelihood of success on the merits1; irreparable injury;
harm to the parties; and the public interest.
The Court finds that a stay is not warranted in this case. The primary issue in this case is
whether Super is required to stipulate that this Court will decide exoneration of liability in
addition to limitation of liability. This Court held that Super need only stipulate to a limitation

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According to Cucu and Deerhaven, because the harm they will
suffer absent a stay is “great,” they need only show a “substantial
case on the merits.”
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of liability. According to Cucu and Deerhaven, the Sixth Circuit has not yet spoken on this
issue. Therefore, they argue, there is a least a substantial case on the merits. This Court
disagrees. As noted in the Opinion, the Fifth Circuit has thoroughly spoken on this issue and a
number of other federal courts have implicitly addressed the issue. One district court held that it
was likely the Fourth Circuit would follow the Fifth Circuit. On the other hand, Cucu and
Deerhaven point to no persuasive authority supporting their position. Simply because the Sixth
Circuit has not yet had an opportunity to address an issue– especially an issue that rarely arises–
does not mean that there is a substantial likelihood that Cucu and Deerhaven will succeed on
appeal. Nor does it mean that there is a “substantial case on the merits.” Cucu and Deerhaven
point to nothing to convince the Court that a stay is warranted.2
The Court also finds that Super will suffer harm if a stay is entered. This is not a case in
which the appeal will somehow nullify liability. Rather, the present dispute centers simply on
whether a state or federal court must decide exoneration issues. Requiring Super to forego
prosecution of her case, which has already been pending for over a year, will cause yet another
significant delay. Moreover, the Court is not convinced that Cucu and Deerhaven will suffer
irreparable harm absent the issuance of a stay. As an initial matter, the movants do not point to
any irreparable harm until their reply brief. Moreover, at its core, Cucu and Deerhaven argue
that having these issues heard in state court, as opposed to federal court, amounts to irreparable
harm. Yet, movants cite no law in support of this position. Cf., Datcom, Inc. V. Integrated

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Cucu and Deerhaven also argue that this Court erred in refusing to
require Super to stipulate to standing. Again, however, the moving
parties point to no authority requiring a party to stipulate to
standing under the Limitation Act.
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Technology, Inc., 10 F.3d 805 (1 st Cir. 1993)(noting that remand order is not appealable and
mandamus relief not appropriate because preference for federal forum is insufficient to establish
irreparable harm). In all, the Court finds that a stay is not warranted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay Pending Appeal is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date:

7/19/13

/s/Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge

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