Perez et al v. Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc.

Filing 22

Order denying 7 Plaintiff's Motion to Remand to State Court. Judge John R. Adams on 4/15/13.(L,J)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

William Perez, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
v.
Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc., et al.,

Defendants.

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CASE NO.: 1:13CV50

JUDGE JOHN ADAMS
ORDER

(Resolves Doc. 7)

This matter appears before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion to remand (Doc. 7).
The Court has been advised, having reviewed the motion, response, reply, pleadings, and
applicable law. For the reasons stated herein, the motion is DENIED.
I. Facts
On December 11, 2012, William Perez, dba Belinda’s Bar, filed suit against
Defendant Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc. In his complaint, Perez alleges that he was
driving a 2008 Toyota Highlander when another vehicle “viciously collided” with him.
Perez claims that his front airbag improperly failed to deploy. Perez alleged that “his
injuries are both temporary and permanent partial in nature, that he has suffered great
pain in mind and body, mental anguish, and has suffered a diminished enjoyment of life.”
Perez also alleged that he had incurred hospital and medical expenses and would incur
additional such expenses in the future.
On January 9, 2013, Toyota removed the matter to this Court. On January 30,
2013, Perez moved to remand the matter. In his motion, Perez contends that Toyota has

failed to demonstrate that this Court has diversity jurisdiction, specifically arguing that
Toyota has failed to demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. The
Court now reviews the parties’ arguments.
II. Legal Analysis
Following removal, a defendant has the burden of proving the elements of
diversity jurisdiction. McCraw v. Lyons, 863 F.Supp. 430, 432 (W.D.Ky. 1994) (citing
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 612 n. 28 (1979)). Generally,
“[i]n a federal diversity action, the amount alleged in the complaint will suffice unless it
appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff in good faith cannot claim the jurisdictional
amount.” Klepper v. First Am. Bank, 916 F.2d 337, 340 (6th Cir. 1990). However,
where the plaintiff is not required to state a specific amount of damages in the complaint,
as in Ohio, the defendant must prove that it is more likely than not that plaintiff’s claims
meet the federal amount in controversy requirement. See Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997
F.2d 150, 157-58 (6th Cir. 1993).
In support of removal, Toyota relies upon numerous facts. First, Toyota received
a pre-suit demand letter from Perez requesting $50,000 to settle the matter. The letter
also stated: “Based on the severity and continuing nature of Mr. Perez’s injuries, I would
anticipate a much higher demand if this were to be filed in Court.” Perez contends that
these were simply negotiating tactics and cannot support a finding that diversity
jurisdiction has been established by a preponderance of the evidence.
However, even if this Court were to set aside that aspect of the letter in its
entirety, the Court would still find that removal was proper. At the time of removal,
Toyota had knowledge that Perez was claiming roughly $10,000 in damage to his vehicle

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and more than $20,000 in medical expenses. Perez then filed his complaint, seeking
damages for both temporary and permanent partial injuries, pain and suffering, and loss
of enjoyment of life. Additionally, Perez seeks punitive damages. For that matter, in his
motion to remand, Perez admits that a jury could reasonably return a verdict in excess of
$75,000.

Given those facts, the Court finds that Toyota amply demonstrated by a

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
III. Conclusion
Plaintiffs’ motion to remand is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 15, 2013

____/s/ Judge John R. Adams_______
JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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