Mowder v. Permanent General Assurance Corporation of Ohio et al
Filing
46
Opinion and Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 10/31/13. The Court denies defendants' motions to dismiss, for judgment on the pleadings and to disqualify the Trustee's counsel. The Trustee's motion to deny the motion to dismiss is denied as moot. (Related Docs. 21 , 27 , 29 , 30 ) (M,G)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
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DAVID MOWDER,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
PERMANENT GENERAL ASSURANCE. :
CORPORATION OF OHIO, et al.,
:
:
Defendant.
:
:
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CASE NO. 1:13-CV-00082
OPINION & ORDER
[Resolving Docs. 21, 27, 29, 30]
JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
This case is a copyright action that has been complicated by a bankruptcy. Plaintiff David
Mowder says that he owns the copyright to a cartoon character—“the General”1/—and that
Defendants2/ have used the character in their advertisements without his authorization or
permission.3/ After Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case, Mowder reopened a previously
closed bankruptcy petition, which triggered an automatic stay of this case.4/ Mowder’s bankruptcy
trustee, Ron Satija, has intervened as a real party in interest.5/ Before the Court now are Defendants’
motions to dismiss, for judgment on the pleadings, and to disqualify the Trustee’s counsel as well
1/
See, e.g., Karate Commercial # video # The General Auto Insurance, www.thegeneral.com/commercials/karateblackbelt/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2013)
2/
The complete list of Defendants is Permanent General Companies, Inc., Permanent General Assurance
Corporation of Ohio, Permanent General Assurance Corporation, PGA Service Corporation, PGC Holdings Corp.,
General Automobile Insurance Company, Inc., General Automobile Insurance Services of Ohio, Inc., General
Automobile Insurance Services, Inc., General Automobile Insurance Services of Texas, Inc., General Automobile
Insurance Services of Louisiana, Inc., and General Automobile Insurance Services of Georgia, Inc. The Court will refer
to them collectively as Defendants or Permanent General.
3/
Doc. 1.
4/
Docs. 24, 25.
5/
Doc. 28.
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Gwin, J.
as the Trustee’s motion to deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss.6/ For the reasons that follow, the
Court DENIES Defendants’ motions to dismiss, for judgment on the pleadings, and to disqualify
the Trustee’s counsel and DENIES AS MOOT the Trustee’s motion to deny the motion to dismiss.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff David Mowder says that in 1998 and while living in Northeast Ohio, he created the
cartoon character “the General” while acting as an independent contractor for Defendants Permanent
General.7/ He says he created the character for the limited purpose of helping Permanent General
promote their 1998 summer picnic.8/ However, he says that after 1998 and without his permission
or authorization, Permanent General began to use the character in their advertisements.9/ Defendant
Permanent General generally says Mowder did not create the character and that Mowder assigned
any right he had in the design to the advertising agency that hired Mowder.10/
On July 31, 2012, after moving to the Western District of Texas, Plaintiff and his wife filed
for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.11/ The bankruptcy court appointed Ron
Satija the trustee of their estate.12/ In their bankruptcy petition, Plaintiff did not say that he owned
any copyrights or other intellectual property.13/ On November 2, 2012, the case was closed.14/
On October 31, 2012—while Plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition was still pending—Plaintiff
6/
Docs. 21, 27, 29, 30.
7/
Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 5, 25.
8/
Id. at ¶ 30.
9/
Id. at ¶¶ 29, 31-35.
10/
Doc. 22 at ¶¶ 21-28 (Counterclaim).
11/
Doc. 24 at 1.
12/
Id.
Doc. 21-2 at 19.
13/
14/
Doc. 24 at 1.
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Gwin, J.
submitted a copyright registration application for “the General” through counsel.15/ On November
5, 2012, the Copyright Office approved the registration of the copyright.16/
On January 11, 2013, less than six months after Mowder failed to schedule the copyright to
the bankruptcy court, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Permanent General.17/ He seeks actual
damages and disgorgement of profits, an injunction against Defendants’ future use of the character,
and destruction of all infringing material bearing the character.18/ The same counsel who submitted
Plaintiff’s copyright registration represented Plaintiff in this case.19/
On February 11, 2013, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).20/ With that motion, Defendants say that Plaintiff should be judicially
estopped from pursuing this claim because he did not list the copyright or this lawsuit in his and his
wife’s bankruptcy petition.21/ Permanent General also filed an answer and counterclaim; they seek
a declaratory judgment that Mowder does not own the copyright to the character.22/
On March 1, 2013, Plaintiff notified the Court that he and his wife had moved on February
22, 2013, to reopen their bankruptcy petition.23/ On February 27, 2013, the bankruptcy court
reopened the petition and reappointed Satija as trustee of the estate.24/
On August 20, 2013, Trustee Satija moved to reopen the case and to substitute himself as the
15/
Doc. 1-2.
16/
Id.
17/
Doc. 1.
18/
Id. at 12.
19/
Id. at 13.
20/
Doc. 21. Neither Plaintiff Mowder nor Trustee Satija have filed an opposition to this motion. However,
Trustee Satija’s subsequent motion to deny the motion to dismiss presents his arguments in opposition to the motion.
21/
Doc. 21-1.
22/
Doc. 22.
Doc. 24.
23/
24/
Id.
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Gwin, J.
real party in interest.25/ Satija also moved for the Court to deny Permanent General’s previously filed
motion to dismiss because he says that he should not be judicially estopped by Mowder’s
representations to the bankruptcy court when the bankruptcy trustee brings or prosecutes the suit.26/
With the bankruptcy court’s approval, Trustee Satija retained Plaintiff Mowder’s counsel as the
estate’s counsel to prosecute this case.27/ Permanent General objected to counsel’s retention on the
grounds that there would be a conflict of interest, but the bankruptcy court overruled their
objection.28/ On September 3, 2013, this Court granted the Trustee’s motion to reopen this case and
to substitute the Trustee as the real party in interest and ordered the Trustee to answer Permanent
General’s counterclaim.29/
On September 6, 2013, Permanent General filed two motions. They first moved to disqualify
the Trustee’s counsel; Defendants say a conflict of interest exists because of counsel’s
representation of Plaintiff Mowder.30/ They also moved for judgment on the pleadings because they
say that the Trustee does not possess a valid copyright registration, a prerequisite to bringing a
copyright infringement claim.31/
These four motions are now ripe for decision.
25/
Doc. 26.
26/
Doc. 27. On September 6, 2013, Permanent General filed a memorandum in opposition. Doc. 31. On
September 16, 2013, Trustee Satija filed a reply in support of his motion. Doc. 32.
27/
Doc. 30-2 at 7, 36-37.
28/
Id. at 13-20, 30-37.
29/
Doc. 28. On September 23, 2013, Trustee Satija filed an answer to the counterclaim. Doc. 33.
Doc. 29. On September 23, 2013, Trustee Satija filed a memorandum in opposition. Doc. 34. On October
3, 2013, Permanent General filed a reply in support of their motion. Doc. 37.
30/
31/
Doc. 30. On October 9, 2013, Trustee Satija filed a memorandum in opposition. Doc. 38. On October 28,
2013, Permanent General filed a reply in support of their motion. Doc. 43.
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Gwin, J.
II. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
A.
Legal Standard
Defendants moved to dismiss this case on the ground of judicial estoppel. “Judicial estoppel
is an equitable doctrine that preserves the integrity of the courts by preventing a party from abusing
the judicial process through cynical gamesmanship, achieving success on one position, then arguing
the opposite to suit an exigency of the moment.”32/ “The doctrine of judicial estoppel bars a party
from (1) asserting a position that is contrary to one that the party has asserted under oath in a prior
proceeding, where (2) the prior court adopted the contrary position ‘either as a preliminary matter
or as part of a final disposition.’”33/ “[T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel ‘is applied with caution to
avoid impinging on the truth-seeking function of the court because the doctrine precludes a
contradictory position without examining the truth of either statement.’”34/
B.
Analysis
Defendants say that Plaintiff Mowder did not claim ownership of the copyright or the right
to bring this lawsuit in his bankruptcy petition.35/ Defendants say that because he took a contrary
position in his bankruptcy petition to the one he takes now, he should be estopped from prosecuting
this lawsuit.36/
Now that Plaintiff Mowder is no longer the real party in interest and the Mowder estate
would recover on any judgment, Defendants’ argument fails. The Sixth Circuit has held that a
32/
Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1217-18 (6th Cir. 1990).
33/
Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 775 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Teledyne, 911 F.3d at 1218).
34/
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Chester, Willcox & Saxbe, 546 F.3d 752, 757 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Teledyne,
911 F.3d at 1218).
35/
Doc. 21-1 at 2-3.
36/
Id. at 5-7.
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bankrupt plaintiff’s “failure to disclose his claims [in his bankruptcy petition] does not bar the trustee
from pursuing them.”37/ The fact that Plaintiff Mowder might receive a portion of any award Trustee
Satija could win initial petition does not mean that this case should be dismissed. Accordingly, the
Court DENIES Permanent General’s motion to dismiss. The Court also DENIES Trustee Satija’s
motion to deny the motion to dismiss because it is moot.
III. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
A.
Legal Standard
“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for
judgment on the pleadings.”38/ On a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(c), the Court uses the same standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).39/
“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’”40/ The
plausibility requirement is not a “probability requirement,” but requires “more than a sheer
possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully.”41/
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides the general standard of pleading and only requires
that a complaint “contain . . . a short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
37/
Stephenson v. Malloy, 700 F.3d 265, 272 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Reed v. City of Arlington, 650 F.3d 571,
572 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“The question before the en banc court is whether judicial estoppel bars a blameless
bankruptcy trustee from pursuing a judgment that the debtor—having concealed the judgment during bankruptcy—is
himself estopped from pursing. We hold that it does not.”)
38/
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
39/
See Tucker v. Middleburg-Legacy Place, 539 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2008).
40/
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
41/
Id.
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Gwin, J.
to relief.”42/ “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading
regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing
more than conclusions.”43/ In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a court should
assume the[ ] veracity” of “well-pleaded factual allegations,” but need not accept a plaintiff's
conclusory allegations as true.44/
B.
Analysis
Permanent General says that neither the Trustee nor Plaintiff holds a valid copyright
registration because Plaintiff stated on his application to the Copyright Office that he owned the
copyright, when his bankruptcy estate owned the copyright.45/ That misstatement, according to
Defendants, is a “material misstatement that invalidates the registration.”46/ Arguing that possession
of a valid copyright registration is a prerequisite to bringing an infringement claim, Defendants say
the case must be dismissed.47/
In support of this argument, Defendants cite Kunkel v. Jasin from the Third Circuit.48/ In
Kunkel, the plaintiff filed copyright registrations during a bankruptcy that listed himself as the
owner, not his bankruptcy estate.49/ The Third Circuit held that each of the registrations was invalid
“[b]ecause the bankruptcy estate, not Kunkel, owned the designs at the time that Kunkel registered
42/
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
43/
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79 (citations omitted).
Id.
44/
45/
Doc. 30-1 at 6.
46/
Id. at 7.
47/
Id. at 8.
48/
420 F. App’x 198 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
49/
Id. at 200.
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them with the Copyright Office.”50/ Without a valid registration, the Third Circuit affirmed the grant
of summary judgment to the defendant for the plaintiff’s infringement claims.51/
Title 17 United States Code section 411(b) states that a copyright registration is valid
“regardless of whether the certificate contains any inaccurate information” unless the applicant knew
that the information was inaccurate and “the inaccuracy of the information, if known, would have
caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse the registration.”52/
First, reading the pleadings most favorably to the Trustee, there is no indication that Mowder
knew that he technically did not own the copyright when he filed his application. Permanent General
does not even suggest in their motion that Plaintiff Mowder knew he did not own the copyright when
he filed his application. Kunkel v. Jasin is, therefore, distinguishable: in that case, the defendant
moved for summary judgment, not a judgment on the pleadings when all inferences are based solely
on the pleadings.53/ Accordingly, under 17 U.S.C. § 411(b), the mistake on the copyright registration
does not invalidate the registration.
Moreover, even if the pleadings did show that Mowder knew he did not own the copyright,
Permanent General makes no showing that this technical misstatement was material. It is unclear
why the Copyright Office would care whether Mowder owned the copyright or his bankruptcy estate
owned the copyright. Although the Third Circuit has held differently, that decision is not binding
on this Court, nor is it persuasive on this issue. The Kunkel Court did not explain why the Copyright
Office would deny a registration if the Copyright Office knew that the estate, not the individual,
50/
Id.
51/
Id. at 200-01.
52/
17 U.S.C. § 411(b).
53/
See 420 F. App’x at 199.
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owned the copyright; the court merely asserted that the error was material.54/ The only support for
this assertion was another Third Circuit decision which held that a misstatement of the type of work
to be copyrighted—such as a song or video—was a material misstatement.55/ This does not show
that the error in this case—naming the individual as the owner instead of his bankruptcy estate—was
material. Therefore, Permanent General has not shown that even if there were a knowing
misstatement, that misstatement was material.
There is no basis at this time to find that the copyright registration is invalid. The Court,
therefore, DENIES the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
IV. Defendants’ Motion to Disqualify Trustee’s Counsel
A.
Legal Standard
A conflict of interest between current clients exists if the representation of one client will be
directly adverse to another client or if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s counsel to one client
will be materially limited by responsibilities to another client.56/ If a conflict exists, a lawyer must
not represent either client unless (1) the lawyer will be able to give competent and diligent
representation to each client, (2) both clients give informed consent confirmed in writing, (3) the
representation is not prohibited by law, and (4) the representation does not involve the assertion of
54/
See id. at 200.
55/
Id. (citing Raquel v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 196, F.3d 171, 177 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. granted and judgment
vacated on other grounds, 531 U.S. 952 (2000), (holding that when a registration “identifies the work as an audiovisual
work” rather than “a song,” the misstatement is material)). The court stated earlier in its opinion that only the owner of
a copyright may register the copyright. Id. at 199 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 408(a)). However, this requirement seems to fall
under § 411(b), which saves inaccurate registrations as long as the error was not knowing and material. 17 U.S.C. §
411(b). The fact that another person owns a copyright in many circumstances is clearly material, but when the actual
owner of a copyright is the registrant’s bankruptcy estate, it is far from clear that the error is material.
56/
Ohio Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7(a).
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a claim by one client against another in the same proceeding.57/
B.
Analysis
To show that the Trustee’s counsel should be disqualified because of counsel’s representation
of Plaintiff Mowder, Permanent General must show some sort of adverse interest between the
Trustee and Plaintiff or a substantial risk of materially limited representation to one or the other.
Permanent General identifies four possible sources of such a conflict: the judicial estoppel
question, the copyright registration question, a claim for attorney’s fees, and the “inherent adversity
of interest” between Mowder and Trustee Satija.58/
This Court has already found that Permanent General’s arguments regarding judicial estoppel
and the copyright registration lose. This Court does not need to decide the judicial estoppel question
because Trustee Satija is now the real party in interest. And Permanent General has provided no
evidence to show that Mowder made a knowing and material misstatement on his copyright
application. Therefore, these two issues do not produce a conflict requiring disqualification of
counsel.
Defendants’ claim for attorney’s fees also does not create a conflict of interest between
Mowder and Trustee Satija because the Trustee is prosecuting this lawsuit and any claim for
attorney’s fees will be against the estate.
Finally, the other possible conflicts between Plaintiff and the Trustee are issues for the
bankruptcy court, not concerns for this Court. Trustee Satija and Plaintiff Mowder have different
57/
Id. at R. 1.7(b)-(c). The parties dispute whether Plaintiff Mowder is a current client of counsel or a former
client of counsel. The legal standard for current conflicts is more stringent than the standard for former clients. Compare
id. at R. 1.7, with id. at R. 1.9. Because the Court finds that there is no conflict of interest under the more stringent
current client standard, the Court need not address whether Plaintiff is a current or former client at this time.
58/
Doc. 29-1 at 8-15.
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Gwin, J.
interests. Because unsecured creditors must be made whole before Mowder receives anything,
Mowder will oppose any settlement even where the settlement would fully satisfy unsecured creditor
claims. And because creditors do not share in any recovery beyond their claims, creditors bear all
the risk, and none of the potential reward, in continuing litigation after a settlement is offered.
Mowder’s attorney seems to have obvious divided loyalties.
Despite this apparent conflict, the bankruptcy court approved the Trustee using Mowder’s
counsel. The bankruptcy court has already decided to allow counsel’s representation despite
Permanent General’s objection.59/ While this Court questions this appointment, the bankruptcy court
controls this call.
For these reasons, the purported conflicts that Permanent General identifies are insufficient
for the Court to disqualify the Trustee’s counsel. Therefore, the Court DENIES the motion to
disqualify counsel.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motions to dismiss, for judgment
59/
Doc. 30-2 at 30-37. The bankruptcy court also stated that because Trustee Satija had only been able to retain
present counsel to take the case after a diligent search, “basically, I’m faced with the situation that if I don’t allow
[counsel] to represent the trustee, then the one that could really reap a windfall would be Permanent General, at the
expense of creditors of the estate.” Id. at 34.
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on the pleadings, and to disqualify the Trustee’s counsel and DENIES AS MOOT the Trustee’s
motion to deny the motion to dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED
s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: October 31, 2013
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