PNC Bank, National Association v. First American Title Insurance Company

Filing 29

Opinion and Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 9/26/13 denying the parties' proposed confidentiality agreement. (Related Doc. 27 ) (M,G)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
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PNC BANK, N.A.,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
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vs.
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FIRST AMERICAN TITLE
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INSURANCE COMPANY
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Defendant.
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:
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CASE NO. 1:13-CV-882

OPINION & ORDER
[Resolving Doc. No. 27]

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
The parties in this breach of contract case involving insurance on home equity loans and lines
of credit jointly propose a stipulated protective order allowing them to limit public disclosure of
information they designate as confidential.1/
Granting a protective order motion is within the trial court’s discretion, but that discretion
“‘is circumscribed by a long-established legal tradition’ which values public access to court
proceedings.”2/ Unwarranted restriction of court documents hampers the public’s ability to act as
an important check on judicial integrity.3/ Thus, in the Sixth Circuit, courts approach protective

1/

Doc. 27.

2/

Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983)).
3/

See Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179; see also Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570 (11th
Cir. 1985) (observing that “trials are public proceedings” and that access to court records preserves “the rights of the
public, an absent third party”).

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Case No. 1: 13-CV-882
Gwin, J.
order motions with a presumption in favor of public access to judicial records.4/ The fact that all
parties jointly seek a protective order does not overcome this presumption.5/ A successful protective
order motion must show specifically that disclosure of particular information would cause serious
competitive or financial harm.6/
Here, the movants completely fail to meet this standard. The proposed confidentiality
agreement is exceedingly broad and unspecific. The movants ask for blanket authority to designate
documents as confidential that they mark as “CONFIDENTIAL” based on their own determination
that the documents “contain information protected from disclosure . . . or that should be protected
from disclosure.”7/ However, they have failed to show that public disclosure of any information
might cause serious harm or that a protective order is otherwise warranted.
The parties are, of course, free to privately contract to limit disclosure of documents and
information. And, any party may move to seal individual documents provided that it makes the
requisite particularized showing. For example, upon a proper motion, the Court will consider
limiting public disclosure of information that would constitute a trade secret or that is otherwise
highly sensitive. However, the Court will not simply grant the parties blanket authorization to cloak
the entire case under a veil.

4/

See, e.g., In re Perrigo Co., 128 F.3d 430, 447 (6th Cir. 1997) (Moore, J. concurring in part and dissenting

in part).
5/

See Proctor & Gamble Co., 78 F.3d at 227 (warning district courts against “abdicat[ing their] responsibility
to oversee the discovery process and to determine whether filings should be made available to the public” and against
“turn[ing] this function over to the parties,” which would be “a violation not only of Rule 26(c) but of the principles so
painstakingly discussed in Brown & Williamson”).
6/

See, e.g., Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179-80.

7/

Doc. 27 at 2.

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Case No. 1: 13-CV-882
Gwin, J.
The Court thus DENIES the proposed confidentiality agreement.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: September 26, 2013

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