Johnson v. Bureau of Workers Compensation

Filing 6

Opinion and Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 8/5/13. The Court denies plaintiff's motion to amend and grants defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's claims against 1-888-OHIOCOMP are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the claims against Ohio Bureau of Workers Compensation are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Related Docs. 1 , 4 , 5 ) (M,G)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
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ERIC JOHNSON,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
vs.
:
:
BUREAU OF
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WORKERS COMPENSATION, et al.,
:
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Defendants.
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:
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CASE NO. 1:13-CV-00899

OPINION & ORDER
[Resolving Doc. No. 1, 4, 5]

:

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Pro se plaintiff Eric Johnson filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Ohio
Bureau of Workers Compensation (“BWC”), and “1-888-OHIOCOMP”1. In the complaint,
plaintiff alleges he was told his workers compensation claim was denied but no order was ever
written. He seeks monetary damages in the amount of $ 11,941.11.
I. Background
Plaintiff contends he was injured at his place of employment on May 19, 1998. He
indicates he filed a claim with the BWC in 1998 and “entered into an agreement” with them. He
lists the date of the agreement also as May 19, 1998. (Doc. No. 1 at 2). He states he entered
1

“1-888-OHIOCOMP” is a Managed Care Organization (MCO). An MCO is a private
company that an employer contracts to medically manage the workers’ compensation claims for
injured employees. MCOs are part of the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation’s Health
Partnership Program (HPP). The Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (BWC) and certified
private-sector MCOs work together to provide comprehensive claims-management and
medical-management services to the employers and employees of Ohio.
See
http://www.1-888-ohiocomp.com

into an agreement with 1-888-OHIOCOMP in 2008. Plaintiff does not provide any details of
these agreements.
Plaintiff claims he filed for temporary disability on January 17, 2013 with the BWC
using a Form C84. He alleges the BWC responded to his claim by stating he needed to file a
Form MEDCO-14 along with his Form C84. He indicates his physician completed MEDCO-14
and he filed it with the BWC on February 27, 2013. He states 1-888-OHIOCOMP sent him a
copy of the MEDCO-14 he had filed. When he had not received a determination on his claim
within twenty-one days of submitting the MEDCO-14 form, he sent a letter to the BWC on
March 20, 2013. The letter stated in its entirety: “To Whom it May Concern: I Eric Johnson
claim number 98-407094 never received a response to the MEDCO-14 that was filed by me and
my physician.” (ECF No. 1-6 at 1).
Plaintiff contends that while following up on his letter, he was told by an unnamed BWC
employee that his MEDCO-14 was denied. He filed an appeal of the denial of benefits to the
Ohio Industrial Commission, but was told by an Industrial Commission representative that they
did not receive a denial order from the BWC pertaining to his Form C84 or his Form MEDCO14. They had no record that a decision had been made.
Plaintiff then filed this action on April 22, 2013. Aside from indicating that his action is
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he does not assert any legal claims. He states that as a direct and
proximate cause of the defendants’ actions of not responding to his request for temporary
disability benefits, he suffered financial and emotional distress. He seeks monetary damages.
On June 6, 2013, the BWC filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Civil Rule
12(b)(6). In the Motion, the Defendant contends the BWC, as an arm of the State of Ohio, is not
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a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. The Defendant further contends that if the review of Plaintiff’s worker’s
compensation claim has not been completed, he must wait for that determination before he can
appeal to the industrial commission. If he has received a determination, but has not been able to
get the industrial commission to review his case, he should pursue remedies provided for him in
the state court which are adequate to address his situation. The Defendant asserts Plaintiff failed
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
II. Legal Standard
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Civil Rule 12(b)(6), the function of
the Court is to test the legal sufficiency of the Complaint. See Mayer v. Mulod, 988 F.2d 635,
638 (6th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) and recently in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-678 (2009) clarified the law
regarding what the Plaintiff must plead in order to survive a Motion to Dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6).
When determining whether the Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the Court must construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,
accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the Complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The
Plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.
Although a Complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, its “factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the
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allegations in the Complaint are true.” Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
The Court in Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-678 , further explains the “plausibility” requirement,
stating that “a claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, “the plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted
unlawfully.” Id. This determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
The Sixth Circuit has held that a court may consider allegations contained in the
Complaint, as well as exhibits attached to or otherwise incorporated in the Complaint, all
without converting a Motion to Dismiss to a Motion for Summary Judgment. FED. R. CIV. P.
10(c); Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997).
Furthermore, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454
U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district
court may dismiss an action sua sponte, without reference to a Motion to Dismiss, if the
complaint is so “implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer
open to discussion” as to deprive the court of jurisdiction. Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479
(6th Cir. 1999)(citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)). Federal courts are
always “under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction,” FW/PBS, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231(1990) and may not entertain an action over which jurisdiction
is lacking. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
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694, 701 (1982). The plaintiff has the burden of alleging sufficient information to establish a
basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121, 1130
(6th Cir.1996). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable, fatal defect which can be
raised by the Court at any time. Von Dunser v. Aronoff, 915 F.2d 1071, 1074 (6th Cir.1990).
III. Analysis
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, unlike state trial courts, they do not
have general jurisdiction to review all questions of law. See Ohio ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 549
F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir.2008). Instead, they have only the authority to decide cases that the
Constitution and Congress have empowered them to resolve. Id. Consequently, “[i]t is to be
presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the
contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
511 U.S. 375, 377(1994) (internal citation omitted).
Generally speaking, the Constitution and Congress have given federal courts authority to
hear a case only when the case raises a federal question or when diversity of citizenship exists
between the parties. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Diversity of
citizenship does not exist in this case. Plaintiff alleges he is a resident of the State of Ohio. For
jurisdiction to be based on diversity of citizenship, neither of the defendants can also be
residents of the State of Ohio. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999).
The State of Ohio, however, is one of the defendants. The other defendant is a private
corporation with its principle place of business in Ohio. Jurisdiction cannot be premised on
diversity of citizenship.
If federal jurisdiction exists in this case, it must be based on a claimed violation of
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federal law. In determining whether a claim arises under federal law, the Court looks only to the
“well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint and ignores potential defenses” defendant may raise.
Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir.2007). Although the
well-pleaded-complaint rule focuses on what plaintiff alleges, it allows the Court to look past
the words of the Complaint to determine whether the allegations ultimately involve a federal
question. Ohio ex rel. Skaggs, 549 F.3d at 475. In addition to causes of action expressly created
by federal law, federal-question jurisdiction also reaches ostensible state-law claims that: (1)
necessarily depend on a substantial and disputed federal issue, (2) are completely preempted by
federal law or (3) are truly federal-law claims in disguise. See Mikulski, 501 F.3d at 560; City of
Warren v. City of Detroit, 495 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir.2007).
Here, plaintiff is proceeding pro se and pro se plaintiffs enjoy the benefit of a liberal
construction of their pleadings and filings. Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir.1999).
Indeed, this standard of liberal construction”requires active interpretation ... to construe a pro se
petition ‘to encompass any allegation stating federal relief.’” Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even
with that liberal construction, however, plaintiff failed to properly identify a federal question in
this case.
Plaintiff indicates that he is filing his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a
prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must assert that a person acting under color of
state law deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). Plaintiff, however, does not
identify a single right secured by the United States Constitution which he believes the
defendants violated and none is apparent on the face of the Complaint. He indicates only that as
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a result of the defendant’s failure to issue an order to the Industrial Commission, he suffered
financial and emotional distress. Claims of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional
distress arise under state tort law, not federal law, and cannot provide a basis for a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not stated a plausible federal claim to support federal question
jurisdiction.
Moreover, even if plaintiff had identified a Constitutional right he believed the
defendants violated, he has not stated a viable claim against either defendant. The BWC is an
Ohio agency. As the BWC asserts in its Motion to Dismiss, it cannot be sued under § 1983 and
is absolutely immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment
is an absolute bar to the imposition of liability upon state agencies for claims. Latham v. Office
of Atty. Gen. of State of Ohio, 395 F.3d 261, 270 (6th Cir. 2005).
Furthermore, the only allegation in the Complaint against 1-888-OHIOCOMP is that
someone working for that organization sent him a copy of this MEDCO-14 form after he filed it
with the BWC. Plaintiff gives no indication of how that action could possibly result in a
Constitutional violation or a violation of federal law.
Finally, Plaintiff responded to the Motion to Dismiss by asserting that his pleading has
merit, and asking the Court to allow him to amend his complaint if the Court determines that the
pleading is subject to dismissal. He does not indicate how he would amend the complaint and
the Court can see no way for him to amend his pleading to state a claim under federal law
against these Defendants. He may have some state-law claim against these defendants or, more
likely, may have some right to seek state review of his workers compensation claim, but he does
not have a federal claim. His request for leave to amend his complaint is denied.
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IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 4) is granted, Plaintiff’s Motion
to Amend contained in his Response (Doc. No. 5) is denied, Plaintiff’s claims against “1-888OHIOCOMP” are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Plaintiff’s claims against
the Ohio Bureau of Workers Compensation are dismissed pursuant to Federal Civil Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court certifies,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good
faith.2
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: August 5, 2013

2

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides:
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that it is not
taken in good faith.
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