Carlisle v. Thompson et al

Filing 15

Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) without prejudice to any claims Plaintiff may have under state law. The court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Signed by Judge Solomon Oliver, Jr on 2/20/2014. (D,M)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLIE CARLISLE, III,
Plaintiff,
v.
S.A. THOMPSON, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:13 CV 2144

JUDGE SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Charlie Carlisle filed this action against Mansfield Correctional Institution
(“MANCI”) Contract Nurse S. A. Thompson, MANCI Correctional Officer Russell Slanczka,
MANCI Correctional Officer Homer, and MANCI Correctional Officer Bryan. In the Complaint,
Plaintiff alleges he was inadvertently given another inmate’s medication and experienced dizziness.
He asserts the Defendants were negligent and seeks monetary damages.

Background
On January 17, 2013, Nurse Thompson was dispensing medication on “pill call” in the
segregation unit of MANCI. Officer Homer accompanied her on her rounds. Plaintiff contends he
was locked in his cell and attempted to get the nurse’s attention to request an aspirin for a headache.
He claims Officer Homer heard his request and told him to place his hand under the cell door to
receive the pill. Nurse Thompson continued on with her duties and called out to Plaintiff’s cellmate
to dispense his cellmate’s prescription medication. Plaintiff placed his hand under the cell door and

Nurse Thompson, believing the hand belonged to Plaintiff’s cellmate, dispensed three green pills
and a one red and white pill to Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges the light was off in his cell, so he believed
the pills to be the requested aspirin and took the medication. He indicates that he later discovered
the green pills were each 10 mg of Risperdal. He cannot recall the second medication or the dosage.
Plaintiff states he discovered the error when Officer Homer came back to his cell a few minutes later
and asked Plaintiff to return the medication. He states he began to feel dizzy and fell inside of his
cell. He was taken to the clinic for treatment. He contends he suffered a head injury which caused
him to experience headaches. The MANCI medical department’s records indicate Plaintiff had no
physical injuries, and his vital signs were normal. Plaintiff received a conduct report for giving false
information and for misuse of medication. He was found not guilty of the charges. Plaintiff asserts
the Defendants were negligent.

Standard of Review
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to
dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319
(1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d
194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). An action has no arguable basis in law when a defendant is immune from
suit or when a plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke,
490 U .S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise
to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992);
Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199.

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When determining whether the Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted,
the Court must construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, accept all factual
allegations as true, and determine whether the Complaint contains “enough fact to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The
Plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. Although a
Complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, its “factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the
Complaint are true.” Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
The Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009), further explains the
“plausibility” requirement, stating that “ a claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, “the plausibility standard is not akin
to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted
unlawfully.” Id. This determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

Analysis
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, unlike state trial courts, they do not have
general jurisdiction to review all questions of law. See Ohio ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 549 F.3d
468, 474 (6th Cir. 2008). Instead, they have only the authority to decide cases that the Constitution
and Congress have empowered them to resolve. Id. Consequently, “[i]t is to be presumed that a

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cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the
party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377(1994)
(internal citation omitted).
Generally speaking, the Constitution and Congress have given federal courts authority to
hear a case only when diversity of citizenship exists between the parties, or when the case raises a
federal question. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). The first type of federal
jurisdiction, diversity of citizenship, is applicable to cases of sufficient value between “citizens of
different states.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). To establish diversity of citizenship, the Plaintiff must
establish that he is a citizen of one state and all of the Defendants are citizens of other states. The
citizenship of a natural person equates to his domicile. Von Dunser v. Aronoff, 915 F.2d 1071, 1072
(6th Cir.1990). The second type of federal jurisdiction relies on the presence of a federal question.
This type of jurisdiction arises where a “well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law
creates the cause of action or that the Plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of
a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,
463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983).
Diversity of citizenship does not exist in this case. Plaintiff is incarcerated in the Southern
Ohio Correctional Facility serving a ten year sentence which expires in August 2019.1 He does not
list any other address for himself. All of the Defendants are listed as employees of MANCI, with
addresses at the Ohio prison. A plaintiff in federal court has the burden of pleading sufficient facts
to support the existence of the court’s jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. In a diversity action, the plaintiff

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Information concerning Ohio
http://www.drc.state.oh.us/OffenderSearch/Search.aspx
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inmates

can

be

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must state the citizenship of all parties so that the existence of complete diversity can be confirmed.
Washington v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., No. 03-3350, 2003 WL 22146143, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 16,
2003). The Complaint, as written, suggests that the Plaintiff and Defendants are all citizens of
Ohio. Federal subject matter jurisdiction cannot be based on diversity of citizenship.
If federal jurisdiction exists in this case, it must be based on a claimed violation of federal
law. In determining whether a claim arises under federal law, the Court looks only to the
“well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint and ignores potential defenses” Defendant may raise.
Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir. 2007). Although the
well-pleaded-complaint rule focuses on what Plaintiff alleges, it allows the Court to look past the
words of the Complaint to determine whether the allegations ultimately involve a federal question.
Ohio ex rel. Skaggs, 549 F.3d at 475. In addition to causes of action expressly created by federal
law, federal-question jurisdiction also reaches ostensible state-law claims that: (1) necessarily
depend on a substantial and disputed federal issue, (2) are completely preempted by federal law or
(3) are truly federal-law claims in disguise. See Mikulski, 501 F.3d at 560; City of Warren v. City
of Detroit, 495 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 2007).
Here, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and pro se plaintiffs enjoy the benefit of a liberal
construction of their pleadings and filings. Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999).
Indeed, this standard of liberal construction “requires active interpretation ... to construe a pro se
petition ‘to encompass any allegation stating federal relief.’” Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even with
that liberal construction, however, Plaintiff failed to properly identify a federal question in this case.
The only claim Plaintiff asserts in this case is one of negligence. Negligence is a cause of
action which arises under state tort law. It does not support the existence of federal question

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jurisdiction. Veljkovic v. First Energy Co., No. 1:07 CV 1991, 2007 WL 2409716, at *2 (N.D. Ohio
Aug. 20, 2007).
Even if this Court reads Plaintiff’s Compliant generously as attempting to assert a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Eighth Amendment, it would fail to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. The Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), set
forth a framework for courts to use when deciding whether certain conditions of confinement
constitute cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. A plaintiff must first
plead facts which, if true, establish that a sufficiently serious deprivation has occurred. Id.
Seriousness is measured in response to “contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1,8 (1992). Routine discomforts of prison life do not suffice. Id. Only deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs or extreme deprivations regarding the conditions of
confinement will implicate the protections of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 9. Plaintiff must also
establish a subjective element showing the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state
of mind. Id. Deliberate indifference is characterized by obduracy or wantonness, not inadvertence
or good faith error. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). A prison official violates the
Eighth Amendment only when both the objective and subjective requirements are met. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
Although Plaintiff arguably satisfied the objective component of his claim, his allegations
fail to satisfy the subjective element of an Eighth Amendment claim. The subjective component
requires Plaintiff to show that the Defendants knew of, and acted with deliberate indifference to his
health or safety. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03. Deliberate indifference “entails something more than
mere negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. This standard is met if “the official knows of and

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disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Farmer, 511
U.S. at 837). Plaintiff alleges that Nurse Thompson dispensed medication to him believing she was
dispensing it to his cellmate. He alleges the light was off in his cell and he took the pills believing
them to be aspirin. Even liberally construed, the Complaint contains no allegations indicating the
Defendants acted with a degree of culpability greater than mere negligence. Negligence does not
support an Eighth Amendment claim.

Conclusion
Accordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) without prejudice to
any claims Plaintiff may have under state law. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.2
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides:
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that it is not
taken in good faith.
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