Horn v. City of Cleveland
Filing
9
Opinion and Order. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Related doc # 5 ) is denied. Judge Christopher A. Boyko on 4/8/2014. (H,CM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
TONI HORN,
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Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF CLEVELAND,
Defendant.
CASE NO. 1:13CV2155
JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
OPINION AND ORDER
CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO, J.:
This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion (ECF DKT #5) of Defendant,
City of Cleveland, to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. For the following reasons, the Motion is
denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Toni Horn, filed her Complaint against the City of Cleveland on September
30, 2013, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. She alleges two Counts against her municipal
employer, Gender Discrimination and Retaliation.
On November 27, 2013, Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint, contending that,
“the Complaint contains only generalized allegations of unlawful conduct with no specific,
factually enhanced allegations to make out [] prima facie case against the Defendant.” (ECF
DKT #5 at 2). Additionally, Defendant argues that the City is protected by statutory
immunity; and that, by failing to attach a right-to-sue letter to her pleading, Plaintiff did not
exhaust her administrative remedies. Plaintiff filed her Memorandum in Opposition (ECF
DKT #6) on December 27, 2013, and submitted a copy of her EEOC right-to-sue letter (dated
July 2, 2013) as an exhibit.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Civil Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept
as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 93-94 (2007). The court need not, however, accept conclusions of law as true:
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As
the Court held in [Bell Atlantic v.] Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955
[(2007)], the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed
factual allegations,” but it demands more than an unadorned,
the-Defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Id. at 555. A pleading that
offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
A claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the Defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The plausibility standard is not akin to a
“probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
Defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are
“merely consistent with” a Defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 557.
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
According to the Sixth Circuit, the standard described in Twombly and Iqbal “obliges
a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such
amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.” Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499
F.3d 538, 541 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2nd Cir.2007)).
The Court should disregard conclusory allegations, including legal conclusions
couched as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; J & J Sports Prods. v. Kennedy,
No. 1:10CV2740, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154644, *4 (N.D.Ohio Nov. 3, 2011).
In her Complaint, Plaintiff recites that, since 1989, she has been employed by the City
of Cleveland in the Department of Public Works, Division of Waste Collection and Disposal.
She alleges that she is the only female manager in that Division. In Count One, Plaintiff
claims that she was illegally disciplined, that she was deprived of promotions to which she
was entitled, and that Defendant’s actions were motivated by gender discrimination.
Consequently, she pursued a union grievance and filed a charge of sex discrimination with the
EEOC. In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that she received a 15-day suspension in retaliation
for filing a grievance and for filing the EEOC charge. Plaintiff adds that, in further
retaliation, Defendant has unjustifiably refused to process her grievances.
Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies has
been countered by Plaintiff’s submission of the right-to-sue letter. (ECF DKT #6, Exhibit A).
Defendant contends that Ohio Revised Code Section 2744.02 provides the City with
general immunity from claims arising out of the performance of a governmental function.
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However, Defendant has not shown, as a matter of law, that immunity bars Plaintiff’s civil
rights action brought pursuant to Title VII.
Finally, Defendant argues that the Complaint is a generalized medley of allegations,
without facts to support a prima facie case of employment discrimination. Although the
Court agrees that the Complaint is sparse, Plaintiff provides dates on which she was
disciplined, on which she pursued her grievances, and on which she filed her EEOC charge.
Allegedly, all the City’s actions, including denying promotions and issuing suspensions, were
motivated by gender discrimination. Plaintiff is not required to make out a prima facie case
of employment discrimination at the Complaint stage. The prima facie standard under the
McDonnell Douglas framework is an evidentiary standard, and not a pleading requirement.
Serrano v. Cintas Corporation, 699 F.3d 884, 897-98 (6th Cir.2012) (quoting Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)).
III. CONCLUSION
Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the applicable law, the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s Complaint is sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
Therefore, the Motion (ECF DKT 35) of Defendant to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint is
denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Christopher A. Boyko
CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
United States District Judge
Dated: April 8, 2014
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