Black v. Farrow et al

Filing 3

Memorandum Opinion and Order: This action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Patricia A. Gaughan on 2/6/14. (LC,S) re 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

Chardon J. Black,
Plaintiff,
v.
Corporal Farrow, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 1:13 CV 2409
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

Memorandum of Opinion and Order

INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Chardon J. Black filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Cuyahoga County Jail Corporal Farrow and Cuyahoga County Jail Corrections Officer Hall. In
the Complaint, Plaintiff claims Defendants failed to address his cellmate’s lack of medication,
leaving Plaintiff open to an assault. He seeks monetary damages and requests a referral to a
private physician for treatment of his injuries.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff claims he was incarcerated in the Cuyahoga County Jail on December 21, 2012.
He states that on that date, his cellmate informed him that he was about to “spaz out” because he
had not received his medication. (ECF No. 1 at 3). Plaintiff alleges at 10:00 a.m., he told
Officer Hall what he had heard from his cellmate and the officer promised to check on the
situation. Plaintiff claims he spoke to Officer Hall again after lunch and was told the officer had
“checked on it and something would be done.” (ECF No. 1 at 4). He claims that when jail

officials did not intervene by 6:00 p.m., he asked to speak with Corporal Farrow. Plaintiff
alleges that Farrow asked him if he felt threatened by his cellmate and Plaintiff indicated that he
did. He states that the officer laughed, but denied he was laughing at Plaintiff. Farrow
questioned Plaintiff’s cellmate and then left the cell. The two inmates were locked down, and
Plaintiff’s cellmate pushed Plaintiff into the wall and punched him in the eye. Plaintiff
informed another corrections officer of the altercation, and he was given a conduct report for
fighting.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is
required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v.
City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). An action has no arguable basis in law
when a defendant is immune from suit or when a plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest
which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis
when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.”
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199.
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
“plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A
pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in
the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the
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assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555.
The Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than
“an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A
pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a Complaint, the Court must construe the
pleading in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151
F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not identify a particular legal cause of action he
intends to assert in his Complaint. Based on his allegations, it is possible Plaintiff is attempting
to assert a claim for failure to protect under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.
The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment protects convicted
prisoners from the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Baker v. Goodrich, 649 F.3d
428, 434 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). Those
protections are extended to pretrial detainees through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). Although they
arise under the Fourteenth Amendment, claims pertaining to conditions of confinement asserted
by pretrial detainees are analyzed under the same rubric as Eighth Amendment claims brought
by prisoners. See Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720, 723 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)). While Plaintiff does not indicate whether he is a pretrial
detainee, or whether he has been convicted and is serving his sentence in the county jail, his
claim will be reviewed under the Eighth Amendment.
The Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), set forth a framework
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for courts to use when deciding whether certain conditions of confinement constitute cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff must first plead facts
which, if true, establish that a sufficiently serious deprivation has occurred. Id. Seriousness is
measured in response to “contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.
1, 8 (1992). Routine discomforts of prison life do not suffice. Id. Only deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs or extreme deprivations regarding the conditions of confinement will
implicate the protections of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 9. Plaintiff must also establish a
subjective element showing the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.
Id. Deliberate indifference is characterized by obduracy or wantonness, not inadvertence or
good faith error. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). A prison official violates the
Eighth Amendment only when both the objective and subjective requirements are met. Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
While Plaintiff arguably satisfies the objective component of the claim, he fails to satisfy
the subjective requirement. The subjective component requires a showing that prison officials
knew of, and acted with deliberate indifference to, an inmate’s health or safety. Wilson, 501
U.S. at 302-03. Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Plaintiff must show that the prison or jail officials had a sufficiently
culpable state of mind. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834). This standard is met if “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk
to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
In this case, Plaintiff does not allege facts which suggest Hall acted with a sufficiently
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culpable state of mind. He claims he spoke to Hall on two occasions about his cellmate’s
comment. During the second conversation, Hall indicated to Plaintiff that he had “checked on
it” and that “something would be done.” (ECF No. 1 at 4). These allegations suggest Hall acted
on Plaintiff’s concerns by reporting them to an individual he assumed would address the
situation. At best, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest Hall was negligent in failing to follow up with
the individual with whom he spoke to assure that the situation had been resolved. These
allegations do not suggest Hall was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety.
Similarly, Plaintiff does not allege facts to suggest Corporal Farrow acted with
deliberate indifference. He states that Farrow came to his cell at his request and questioned both
Plaintiff and his cellmate. While Plaintiff alleges that the officer laughed at one of his
responses, he does not suggest Farrow actually drew the inference that Plaintiff was in danger of
an impending attack, and deliberately disregarded that risk when he left the cell. Plaintiff also
does not suggest that Farrow left the cell without intending to investigate the situation. The
cellmate attacked Plaintiff shortly after the corporal departed from the inmates. Plaintiff has not
established the subjective element of an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim.
Finally, even if Plaintiff did not intend to assert a claim under the Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendments for failure to protect, his Complaint would still be dismissed for failing to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. Principles requiring generous construction of pro se
pleadings are not without limits. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989);
Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). A Complaint must contain
either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements of some viable legal
theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. See Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy
Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). District courts are not required to conjure up
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questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full blown claims from sentence
fragments. Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278. To do so would “require ...[the courts] to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, ... [and] would...transform the district
court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the
strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Id. at 1278. Moreover,
Plaintiff’s failure to identify a particular legal theory in his Complaint places an unfair burden
on the Defendants to speculate on the potential claims that Plaintiff may be raising against them
and the defenses they might assert in response to each of these possible causes of action. See
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d at 594. Even liberally construed, the Complaint does not sufficiently
state a federal constitutional claim, other than one under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments,
upon which Plaintiff may be attempting to base his § 1983 action.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court
certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be
taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge
Dated: 2/6/14

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