Allah-Bey v. Sloan et al
Filing
5
Opinion and Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 6/4/14 setting forth the dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Related Doc. 1 ) (M,G)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
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RA HORAKHTY RA’EL ALLAH-BEY
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aka ANTHONY WILLIAMS, JR.,
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Petitioner,
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vs.
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BRIGHAM SLOAN,
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Respondant.
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CASE NO. 1:14-CV-00199
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OPINION & ORDER
[Resolving Doc. No. 1]
JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Pro se Petitioner Horakhty Ra’el Allah-Bey, aka Anthony Williams, Jr., filed this
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner is currently
incarcerated in the Lake Erie Correctional Institution, having pled no contest in the Lorain
County Court of Common Pleas on July 13, 2012 to two counts of having a weapon under
disability.
He asserts two grounds for relief in his Petition: (1) the Lorain County Court of Common
Pleas “fraudulently claimed authority from this Executors Office to administrate Ra Horakty
Ra’el Allah-Bey’s property by illegally using Anthony Williams, Jr. as an account to participate
in [a] security-note-bond operation” (Doc. No. 1 at 13); and (2) the trial court lacked personal
and subject matter jurisdiction over him because he is a “Moorish American National.” (Doc.
No. 1 at 5). For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is denied and this action is dismissed.
I. Background
Petitioner provides very few factual allegations. The entire Petition is composed largely
of incomprehensible legal rhetoric. He indicates he and his family were at a friend’s apartment
when police came to the door to investigate an odor of marijuana emanating from one of the
units. While they were questioning the resident of the apartment, the officers noticed shell
casings from firearms and inquired about weapons on the premises. The apartment resident
produced a firearm and Petitioner led the officers to another. The officers requested
identification from the occupants of the apartment and discovered Petitioner was a convicted
felon. He was arrested and charged with two counts of having a weapon under disability. He
entered a plea of no contest to the charges and was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison.
He appealed his conviction; however, he did not properly file his brief and the appeal was
dismissed on October 24, 2013.
Petitioner has now filed this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241. He asserts two grounds for relief. First, he states he is a “Moorish American National”
which is a “nation within a nation because of the fact that our Ancestral lineage makes us the
natural people of the land existing before the ‘De facto’ corporation of the United States.” He
asserts that all crimes are commercial, and his crime is a registered bond of the United States
Treasury. He contends the State of Ohio fraudulently claimed authority from his Executors
Office to use him as an account in its security-note-bond operation. In his second ground for
relief, Petitioner asks the Court to vacate his conviction, stating that it is void for lack of
personal and subject matter jurisdiction because he is a Moorish American National. He cites to
“the Organic United States Republic Constitution,” the Moroccan Treaty of Peace and
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Friendship,” the Divine Constitution, and the Zodiac Constitution as legal authority for his
assertion. (Doc. No. 1 at 15). He requests that the Court view him as a “Master of a Public
Vessel” as the superior property holder. (Doc. No. 1 at 16).
II. Legal Standard
Although Petitioner filed this action under 28 U.S.C. §2241, he must comply with the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because he is challenging his state court conviction. A state
prisoner may bring an action pursuant to § 2241, but this change of statute does not change the
nature of the action:
[W]hen a prisoner begins in the district court, § 2254 and all
associated statutory requirements apply no matter what statutory
label the prisoner has given the case. (Roughly speaking, this
makes § 2254 the exclusive vehicle for prisoners in custody
pursuant to a state court judgment who wish to challenge anything
affecting that custody, because it makes clear that bringing an
action under § 2241 will not permit the prisoner to evade the
requirements of § 2254.) . . ..
Greene v. Tennessee Dep’t of Corrections, 265 F.3d 369, 371-72 (6th Cir. 2001); see James v.
Walsh, 308 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2002). This Petition is still subject to the restrictions
imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) for obtaining habeas
relief from a state conviction under §2254. See Rittenberry v. Morgan, 468 F.3d 331, 337 (6th
Cir.2006); Greene, 265 F.3d at 371.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which amended
28 U.S.C. § 2254, was signed into law on April 24, 1996 and applies to habeas corpus petitions
filed after that effective date. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); see Woodford v.
Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210 (2003); Barker v. Yukins, 199 F.3d 867, 871 (6th Cir. 1999). The
AEDPA was enacted “to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences,
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and ‘to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.’” Woodford, 538 U.S. at 206
(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 436 (2000)). Consistent with this goal, when
reviewing an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be
presumed to be correct. Wilkins v. Timmerman-Cooper, 512 F.3d 768, 774-76 (6th Cir. 2008).
The Petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and
convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A federal court, therefore, may not grant habeas
relief on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in any state court unless the adjudication
of the claim either: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);
Wilkins, 512 F.3d 768, 774-76 (6th Cir. 2008).
A decision is contrary to clearly established federal law under §2254(d)(1) when it is
“diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, or mutually opposed” to federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405
(2000). In order to have an “unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law,” the
state-court decision must be “objectively unreasonable,” not merely erroneous or incorrect. Id.
at 409. Furthermore, it must be contrary to holdings of the Supreme Court, as opposed to dicta.
Id. at 415.
A state court’s determination of fact will be unreasonable under §2254(d)(2) only if it
represents a “clear factual error.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 528-29 (2003). In other
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words, a state court’s determination of facts is unreasonable if its finding conflicts with clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Id. “This standard requires the federal courts to give
considerable deference to state-court decisions.” Ferensic v. Birkett, 501 F.3d 469, 472 (6th Cir.
2007). AEDPA essentially requires federal courts to leave a state court judgment alone unless
the judgment in place is “based on an error grave enough to be called ‘unreasonable.’” Herbert
v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 1998).
III.
Procedural Barriers to Habeas Review
Before a federal court will review the merits of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a
petitioner must overcome several procedural hurdles. Specifically, the petitioner must surmount
the barriers of exhaustion, and procedural default.
As a general rule, a state prisoner must exhaust all possible state remedies or have no
remaining state remedies before a federal court will review a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c); see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004). Exhaustion is fulfilled
once a state supreme court provides a convicted defendant a full and fair opportunity to review
his or her claims on the merits. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999); Rust v. Zent, 17
F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994); Manning v. Alexander, 912 F.2d 878, 881 (6th Cir. 1990).
To be properly exhausted, each claim must have been “fairly presented” to the state
courts. See e.g. Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir. 2009); Frazier v. Huffman, 343
F.3d 780, 797 (6th Cir. 2003). Fair presentation requires that the state courts be given the
opportunity to see both the factual and legal basis for each claim. Wagner, 581 F.3d at 414.
Specifically, in determining whether a petitioner “fairly presented” a federal constitutional claim
to the state courts, courts should consider whether the petitioner (1) phrased the federal claim in
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terms of the pertinent constitutional law or in terms sufficiently particular to allege a denial of
the specific constitutional right in question; (2) relied upon federal cases employing the
constitutional analysis in question; (3) relied upon state cases employing the federal
constitutional analysis in question; or (4) alleged “facts well within the mainstream of [the
pertinent] constitutional law.” See Hicks v. Straub, 377 F.3d 538, 553 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting
McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 681 (6th Cir. 2000)). For the claim to be exhausted, it must
be presented to the state courts as a federal constitutional issue, not merely as an issue arising
under state law. Koontz v. Glossa, 731 F.2d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 1984). Moreover, the claim must
be presented to the state courts under the same legal theory in which it is later presented in
federal court. Wong v. Money, 142 F.3d 313, 322 (6th Cir. 1998). It cannot rest on a legal
theory which is separate and distinct from the one previously considered and rejected in state
court. Id. This does not mean that the petitioner must recite “chapter and verse” of
constitutional law, but the petitioner is required to make a specific showing of the alleged claim.
Wagner, 581 F.3d at 414.
The procedural default doctrine serves to bar review of federal claims that a state court
has declined to address because the petitioner did not comply with a state procedural
requirement. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). In these cases, the state judgment is
not based on a resolution of federal constitutional law, but instead “rests on independent and
adequate state procedural grounds.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991). When
the last explained state court decision rests upon procedural default as an “alternative ground,” a
federal district court is not required to reach the merits of a habeas petition. McBee v.
Abramajtys, 929 F.2d 264, 265 (6th Cir. 1991). In determining whether a state court has
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addressed the merits of a petitioner’s claim, federal courts must rely upon the presumption that
there is no independent and adequate state procedural grounds for a state court decision absent a
clear statement to the contrary. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735.
A claim that is procedurally defaulted in state court will not be reviewed by a federal
habeas court unless a petitioner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a
result of the alleged violation of federal law, or can demonstrate that failure to consider the
claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 751. “Cause” is
a legitimate excuse for the default, and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged
constitutional violation. See Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). If a
petitioner fails to show cause for his procedural default, the Court need not address the issue of
prejudice. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
Simply stated, a federal court may review only federal claims that were evaluated on the
merits by a state court. Claims that were not so evaluated, either because they were never
presented to the state courts (i.e., exhausted) or because they were not properly presented to the
state courts (i.e., were procedurally defaulted), are generally not cognizable on federal habeas
review.
IV. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies
In this case, Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted. He filed an appeal of his conviction,
but he did not comply with the Ohio Appellate Rules when submitting his brief, and the appeal
was dismissed on procedural grounds. There is no indication in his Petition that he attempted to
re-open his appeal, or raise these claims in an appropriate post judgment motion.
As explained above, a petitioner cannot obtain federal habeas relief unless he has
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completely exhausted his available state court remedies to the state’s highest court. Buell v.
Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 349 (6th Cir. 2001); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The United States
Supreme Court has emphasized that the “interests of comity and federalism dictate that state
courts must have the first opportunity to decide a petitioner’s claim,” since “it would be
unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court
conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation.”
Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273-74 (2005)(citations omitted). Accordingly, where a habeas
petition contains unexhausted claims, there is a “strong presumption” in favor of requiring a
petitioner to pursue his available state remedies. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131 (1987);
see also O’Guinn v. Dutton, 88 F.3d 1409, 1412 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that “the Supreme
Court has been quite clear that exhaustion is the preferred avenue and that exceptions are to be
for narrow purposes only”).
Nevertheless, a habeas court need not wait for a petitioner’s claims to be exhausted if it
determines that a return to state court would be futile, or if the federal constitutional claims are
plainly meritless and it would be a waste of time and judicial resources to require exhaustion.
Cain v. Redman, 947 F.2d 817, 820 (6th Cir. 1991). Petitioner’s grounds for relief are wholly
without merit. Return to state court to exhaust these claims would be futile.
V. Analysis
It is extremely difficult to discern any legal claim from Petitioner’s pleading. He appears
to be making a political statement rather than asserting actual legal claims for relief. He does
not raise any discernable challenge to his conviction nor does he assert that some part of his
criminal proceedings or sentence violated the United States Constitution. At best, he appears to
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claim his conviction should be vacated because he is a descendant of the Moroccan people. He
cites to the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the Divine Constitution, and the Zodiac Constitution
to support this assertion. Habeas relief under §2241 or §2254 is available only to the extent
Petitioner claims he is being held in violation of the United States Constitution. Absent any
claim that his conviction or sentence violated the United States Constitution, Petitioner is not
entitled to relief in habeas corpus.
VI. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied and this action is
dismissed pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Further, this Court
CERTIFIES pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3) an appeal from this decision could not be taken
in good faith, and there is no basis upon which to issue a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253; Fed.R.App.P. 22(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 4, 2014
s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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