Winn v. Cuyahoga County Sheriff's Dept. et al

Filing 10

Memorandum Opinion and Order: Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis is granted (Doc. No. 3 ), Motion for Appointment of Counsel is denied as moot (Doc. No. 4 ) and the Complaint is dismissed for failing to state a claim for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Patricia A. Gaughan on 9/16/14. (LC,S)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

ANTOINE WINN,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CUYAHOGA COUNTY SHERIFF, et al., )
)
Defendants.
)

CASE NO. 1:14cv0249
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Antoine Winn (“Plaintiff” or “Winn”) filed the above-captioned in forma
pauperis civil rights action against the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Bob
Reid, Ohio Department of Rehabilitations and Corrections (ODRC), ODRC Director, Cleveland
Department of Public Safety, and Cleveland Mayor Frank Jackson. The Complaint was
accompanied by a Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. No. 4.) Two weeks after filing this
action, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint and Supplements adding the Warden at Lorain
Correctional Institution as a Defendant. (Doc. Nos. 5, 6, 7.)
Plaintiff, who was held in detention at Cuyahoga County Jail when he filed this action,1

1

On April 3, 2014, Plaintiff advised the Court that he was released to an in patient treatment
(continued...)

complains he was held 413 days before his state trial commenced. He believes, inter alia, that
the Defendants failed to properly credit him for this time and, thus, was falsely imprisoned. He
seeks compensatory and punitive damages. For the reasons set forth below, this action is
dismissed.

Background
It is difficult to discern the substance of Plaintiff’s handwritten narrative without relying
on his criminal case dockets. A review of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
website indicates Plaintiff was indicted in Common Pleas Court on May 17, 2010 and charged
with three drug trafficking offenses. See Ohio v. Winn, No. CR-10-537728-A (Cuyahoga
County Ct. Com. Pl.) Winn requested, through counsel, five pre-trial conference extensions in
order to complete the discovery process. After the fifth request, Winn filed a pro se Motion to
Deny Consent to Any [Further] Continuances.
On July 22, 2010, the State issued an arrest warrant for Winn following his indictment on
charges of kidnapping, disorderly conduct and disrupting public service. See Ohio vs. Winn, No.
CR-10-540147-A (Cuyahoga County Ct. Com. Pl.). Initially, he pleaded not guilty to the
charges and was referred to the Court Psychiatric Clinic for evaluation. On October 5, 2010,
Winn’s case was transferred to the Mental Health Court Docket and reassigned to the docket of
Judge John D. Sutula.
On November 15, 2010, Magistrate Judge George J. Limbert granted a Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus ad Prosequendum in United States v. Winn, No.1:02-cr-00391 (N.D. Ohio

1

(...continued)
facility in Cleveland, Ohio.
-2-

filed Sept. 18, 2002)(Gwin, J.). Winn was summoned to appear in federal court to address
charges that he violated the supervised release term imposed by Judge James S. Gwin on January
14, 2003.2
After Winn’s appearance in federal court, he was returned to the State for his jury trial in
Case No. CR-10-537728-A. The jury found him guilty of drug trafficking offenses in violation
of Ohio Revised Code §2925.03 (A)(2) and drug possession in violation of Ohio Revised Code §
2925.11. See Winn, No. CR-10-537728-A. On March 1, 2012, Judge Sutula imposed a
sentence of 8 months in prison at Lorain Correctional Institution, with post release control for up
to 3 years. The judge granted Winn jail time credit for 385 days and declared his sentence
complete on the date it was imposed and ordered his immediate release from state custody.
On the same date Winn’s sentence was imposed in Case No. CR-10-537728-A, he
pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct in Case No. CR-10-540147-A. He was sentenced to 6
months in prison, but received jail credit for 385 days and was released for time served.
Winn appeared in federal court on March 20, 2012 and admitted to violations of his
supervised release. He was ordered detained and remanded to the custody of the U.S. Marshal,
pending sentencing before Judge Gwin. On April 18, 2012, Judge Gwin adopted the
Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation finding Winn violated the conditions of his supervised
release. He also committed Winn to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) for a term of 14 months with
credit for time served. (Doc. No. 55).
The State court dockets reveal Plaintiff filed a pro se Notice “For The Adjustment in the

2

In 2002, Winn pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18
U.S.C. §922(g)(1). See Winn, No.1:02-cr-00391. On January 14, 2003, Judge James S. Gwin
sentenced him to serve 77 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release.
-3-

Journal Entry of Corrected Jail Time Credit” in each of his criminal cases on June 6, 2012. The
docket does not show any ruling on these pleadings.
On August 3, 2012, Winn’s attorney filed a Motion for Clarification of Sentence in
federal court. See Winn, No.1:02-cr-00391 (Doc. No. 57). Judge Gwin granted the Motion,
finding:
After hearing arguments from Counsel, this Honorable Court
agreed with Counsel for the Defendant and imposed a sentence of
14 months with credit for all state time served that he was not
given credit for. Essentially, the Defendant should have been
released shortly after his sentencing hearing.
(Doc. No. 58). BOP records confirm Winn was released from prison on August16, 2012.
Winn now seeks damages for prison time he served that he claims was beyond the
sentences imposed by the State of Ohio. Although it is difficult to discern the substance of
Winn’s other civil rights claims, it is abundantly clear he believes he has a Constitutional claim
based on false imprisonment.

Standard of Review
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), a district court must
dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.3 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989);

3

A claim may be dismissed sua sponte, without prior notice to the plaintiff and without
service of process on the defendant, if the court explicitly states that it is invoking section
1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons set
forth in the statute. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997); Spruytte v.
Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); Harris v.
Johnson, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986); Brooks v. Seiter, 779 F.2d 1177, 1179 (6th Cir.
(continued...)
-4-

Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194,
197 (6th Cir. 1996). For the reasons stated below, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1915(e).
Discussion
The Complaint and supplements reveal Plaintiff is alleging his rights to due process and
equal protection were violated and he was denied access to the courts.
The due process allegations are based on his claim that the State failed to respond to his
requests for jail credit. Even though the docket reflects that the State granted him jail credit,
Winn still believes he was falsely imprisoned and is entitled to recover damages for the “99
days” he was unable to engage in his business as a street vendor, at a rate of $175.00 per day.
Winn advances his equal protection claim based on the theory that the Defendants
willfully miscalculate jail credit for African American inmates at a disproportionately higher
level compared to Caucasian inmates. He argues further that the living conditions in the County
jail violate fire code regulations because there are no sprinklers or smoke detectors within each
prisoner’s cell. He does not allege he suffered any injury resulting from these alleged
deficiencies, but asserts the Director of the ODRC and County Sheriff are liable for false
imprisonment under hazardous conditions.
Finally, Winn argues he was denied access to the courts on September 23, 2010. A
parcel of legal mail was delivered to his cell on that date, which he later discovered did not
belong to him. Beyond these facts, it is difficult to apprehend the underlying basis for his

3

(...continued)
1985).
-5-

remaining arguments.
To prevail in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove
that the defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by
the Constitution and law of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981),
overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Section 1983 alone
creates no substantive rights; rather it is the means through which a plaintiff may seek redress
for deprivations of rights established in the Constitution or federal laws. Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979). The statute applies only if there is a deprivation of a constitutional
right. See e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699-701(1976); Baker, 443 U.S. at 146-47. Thus,
“[t]he first inquiry in any § 1983 suit ... is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right
'secured by the Constitution and laws’” of the United States. Baker, 443 U.S. at 140.
A. Due Process Violation
The Fifth Amendment, in relevant part, prohibits the “deprivation of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. The Fourteenth Amendment
requires states to grant individuals due process of law. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
Winn appears to claim the state court ignored a Notice he filed pro se in State court “For The
Adjustment in the Journal Entry of Corrected Jail Time Credit.” At the time he filed the Notice,
he was no longer in exclusive state custody, however.
Whenever a prisoner challenges the “legality or duration” of his confinement, that claim
must be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973). As with any habeas petition, the petitioner must be held “in custody” at the time the
petition is filed. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998).

-6-

If Plaintiff believes he was held illegally, he needed to challenge that detention in a
habeas petition. Even if the Court liberally construed the jail time credit Notice he filed in State
court as a habeas petition, he filed it after he was already released from State custody. Thus, any
argument that the State was holding him illegally was negated by the fact that he was not in state
custody when he filed the Notice. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484,
494-95(1973) (“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but
upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.”).
Although pro se parties are entitled to greater leniency, they are still required to satisfy
basic pleading standards. “Arguably, hanging the legal hat on the correct peg is such a standard,
and ‘[l]iberal construction does not require a court to conjure allegations on a litigant's behalf.”
Id. (quoting Erwin v. Edwards, 22 Fed. Appx. 579, 580 (6th Cir.2001) (dismissing a § 1983 suit
brought as a § 2254 petition.)). Winn cannot argue the Defendants violated his Constitutional
right to due process without establishing that he was deprived of a liberty interest. Any pleading
filed after his release from prison which challenges the length of his confinement, does not
encompass a federal issue over which this Court has jurisdiction.
B. Equal Protection and Access to the Courts
Winn's allegations that his Equal Protection rights were violated, along with his right
to access the courts, do not have merit. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination by
government actors which either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or
intentionally treats one differently than others similarly situated without any rational basis for the
difference. Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Township of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 681 -682 (6th Cir. 2011);
Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 312 (6th Cir.2005). The threshold element of

-7-

an equal protection claim is disparate treatment. Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470
F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir.2006).
The Court has already noted that Plaintiff failed to establish he was denied jail credit
prior to filing this action. Because he uses this conclusion to support his claim of disparate
treatment in violation of the Equal Protection clause, the allegation cannot survive because his
claimed injury is speculative. The Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to actual
“Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 2, cl. 1. To satisfy this
“case-or-controversy” requirement, a plaintiff must establish a concrete injury, that is related to
the conduct at issue and that the injury would be redressed by a favorable decision from the
court. Blachy v. Butcher, 221 F.3d 896, 909 (6th Cir.2000). Without a justiciable injury, Winn’s
claim cannot survive. Accordingly, he cannot support a claim that the Defendants violated his
right to equal protection under the Constitution.
The facts supporting Winn's access to the courts claim fail to state a claim. To set forth a
valid claim, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d
468, 470-71 (6th Cir.2010)(“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Winn
recites brief conclusory statements that do not set forth a federal claim for relief. These legal
conclusions are simply not sufficient to present a valid claim. Morgan v. Church's Fried
Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987). Moreover, this Court is not required to accept
unwarranted factual inferences. Id.; see Place v. Shepherd, 446 F.2d 1239, 1244 (6th Cir. 1971)

-8-

(A pleading will not be sufficient to state cause of action under Civil Rights Act if its allegations
are but conclusions).
Finally, principles requiring generous construction of pro se pleadings are not without
limits. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). District courts are not
required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full blown
claims from sentence fragments. Id. at 1278. To do so would “require ...[the courts] to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, ... [and] would...transform the district court
from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest
arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Id. at 1278. It is not the role of this Court
to create a cause of action on behalf of a litigant. Id.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis is
granted (Doc. No. 3), Motion for Appointment of Counsel is denied as moot (Doc. No. 4) and
the Complaint is dismissed for failing to state a claim for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could
not be taken in good faith.4
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/16/14

/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge

4

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides: “An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the
trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.”
-9-