Hulec v. J.H. Bennett & Company, Inc. et al
Filing
31
Opinion and Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 5/27/14 granting plaintiff's motion for more definite statement. Defendant Muellauer shall comply within 14 days of the entry of this order. (Related Doc. 29 ) (M,G)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
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MEGHAN HULEC,
:
:
Plaintiff-Counterclaim
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Defendant,
:
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vs.
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J.H. BENNETT & COMPANY, INC, &
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STEVEN SELMANTS,
:
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Defendants,
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and
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STEPHEN MUELLAUER,
:
:
Defendant-Counterclaim
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Plaintiff.
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:
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CASE NO. 1:14-CV-00492
OPINION & ORDER
[Resolving Doc. 29]
JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff Meghan Hulec sues Defendants Stephen Meullauer, J.H. Bennett & Company, Inc.,
and Steven Selmants for sexual harassment, a hostile work environment, disability discrimination,
national origin discrimination, interference with Family Medical Leave Act rights, retaliatory
discharge, post-termination retaliatory conduct, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.1/
Defendant Muellauer counterclaims against Plaintiff Hulec for telecommunication
harassment, menacing by stalking, invasion of privacy, defamation per se, tortious interference with
business relations, and abuse of process.2/
Plaintiff Hulec now moves for a more definite statement of the factual allegations Defendant
1/
Doc. 1.
2/
Doc. 27.
Case No. 1:14-CV-00492
Gwin, J.
Muellauer says gives rise to the defamation per se cause of action.3/ Defendant Muellauer opposes
the motion.4/
For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the motion for a more definite statement.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides the general standard of pleading and only requires
that a complaint “contain . . . a short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.”5/ “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading
regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing
more than conclusions.”6/
If a pleading “is so vague and ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a
response,” the Court may order a more definite statement of the allegations in the complaint.7/
Plaintiff Hulec says that the allegations in Defendant Muellauer’s defamation per se cause
of action are vague and ambiguous because the allegations “fail[] to identify whether he is alleging
that Hulec made these statements outside of her Complaint, or if his Counterclaim is limited to the
statements Hulec has aver[r]ed in her Complaint. Indeed, Muellauer’s Counterclaim explicitly fails
to identify a single person to whom Hulec is alleged to have made defamatory statements to.”8/
Defendant Muellauer responds that the allegations in his complaint are sufficient to satisfy
Rule 8's notice pleading and that discovery will “flesh out whatever concerns or issues counsel has
3/
Doc. 29.
4/
Doc. 30.
5/
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
6/
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citations omitted).
7/
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
8/
Doc. 29 at 3.
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Case No. 1:14-CV-00492
Gwin, J.
with not understanding what is meant by defamation per se in this context.”9/
In his counterclaim, Muellauer alleges that Hulec falsely told “people” that Muellauer had
repeated sexual contacts with Hulec at work and that Muellauer took advantage of Hulec because
of his role as a supervisor and her diminished mental capacity.10/
The Court finds that Defendant Muellauer’s allegations are insufficient to satisfy Rule 8’s
requirement of fair notice. The allegations do not indicate the circumstances under which Plaintiff
Hulec allegedly made these false statements, such as to whom Hulec made the statements and who
might have heard them.
Because publication is an element of a defamation claim,11/ Plaintiff Hulec is entitled to fair
notice of to whom and under what circumstances Defendant Muellauer believes or knows Hulec
made the statement. The fact that discovery may provide Hulec and Muellauer with evidence of
these allegedly false statements—or the lack thereof—does not mean that Hulec is not entitled to fair
notice of the allegations underlying the cause of action, if only to test the allegations by a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.
If later discovery produces evidence of additional publication of the allegedly defamatory
statements, Defendant can amend Defendant’s counterclaim or otherwise use any additional
evidence.
Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for a more definite statement. Defendant
Muellauer must provide a more definite statement of the allegations underlying his defamation per
9/
Doc. 30 at 2.
10/
Doc. 27 at 4 ¶¶ 23-27.
11/
See Burns v. Rice, 813 N.E.2d 25, 32 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (“In Ohio, defamation is a false statement
published by a defendant acting with the required degree of fault that injures a person’s reputation, exposes the person
to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame or disgrace, or adversely affects the person’s profession.”).
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Case No. 1:14-CV-00492
Gwin, J.
se cause of action—including the circumstances under which the false statements were allegedly
made, to whom Hulec allegedly made the statements, and who heard the allegedly false
statements—within 14 days of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: May 27, 2014
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