Baker v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 24

Memorandum of Opinion and Order: This matter is before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation ("R&R") of Magistrate Judge Kenneth S. McHargh (Doc. 21 ), recommending that the decision of the Commissioner be VACATED and that t his matter be REMANDED to defendant for further consideration. The R&R is ACCEPTED and is incorporated by reference as if fully rewritten herein. The decision of the Commissioner is VACATED and this matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Judge Patricia A. Gaughan on 8/25/15. (LC,S)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

Hope Baker,
Plaintiff,
Vs.
Carolyn W. Colvin,
Defendant.

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CASE NO. 1:14 CV 777
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

Memorandum of Opinion and Order

INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of
Magistrate Judge Kenneth S. McHargh (Doc. 21), recommending that the decision of the
Commissioner be VACATED and that this matter be REMANDED to defendant for further
consideration. The government filed objections to the R&R. For the reasons that follow, the
R&R is ACCEPTED. The decision of the Commissioner is VACATED and this matter is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
ANALYSIS
The facts and medical evidence are aptly set forth in the R&R and need not be repeated
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herein. The government objects to the R&R on two grounds. According to the government, the
R&R erroneously concludes that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in failing to
consider at Step Two whether plaintiff’s diagnosis of thalamic pain syndrome is a severe
impairment. The Court rejects the government’s argument. The government concedes that
thalamic pain syndrome is “a condition in which one becomes hypersensitive to pain as a result
of damage to the thalamus... resulting from stroke or other injury to the thalamus.” It is
undisputed that the ALJ did not determine at Step Two that thalamic pain syndrome is a severe
impairment. It is well-established, however, that the ALJ’s failure constitutes harmless error
provided the ALJ found at least one severe impairment at Step Two and went on to consider the
limitations arising from thalamic pain syndrome at subsequent steps in the disability analysis.
See, Maziarz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 837 F.2d 240, 244 (6th Cir. 1987).
Here, the ALJ concluded at Step Two that plaintiff suffers from a number of severe
impairments. The ALJ did not, however, address the primary limitation of the syndrome, i.e.,
hypersensitivity to pain. The government argus that the ALJ did in fact consider the limitations
and points out the ALJ addressed plaintiff’s “mild right-sided weakness and some right-sided
paresthsia.” The ALJ noted that these symptoms appeared to improve with medication. The
ALJ noted that plaintiff’s physician opined that plaintiff is able to grasp, provided grasping is not
performed continuously or frequently. The government also argues that the ALJ concluded that
plaintiff was able to use her arms, hands, and legs in a satisfactory manner. The Court finds,
however, that none of these statements address plaintiff’s hypersensitivity to pain. As such, the
Magistrate Judge correctly determined that the ALJ failed to consider thalamic pain syndrome to
be a severe impairment at Step Two and that the error is not harmless because the ALJ did not

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consider the limitations imposed by the syndrome at later steps in the disability analysis. The
government’s objection is not well-taken.
The government also argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in recommending that the
ALJ failed to assess whether plaintiff meets or equals Listings 1.04 and 11.04. According to the
government, sufficient evidence in the record demonstrates that, although the ALJ did not
evaluate the evidence in comparison to the Listings, the ALJ properly weighed the evidence in
determining that plaintiff is not disabled. Upon review, the Court finds that it need not address
whether the ALJ’s failure at Step Three, standing alone, warrants remand. Because this Court
determined that remand is required at Step Two, the Court directs defendant to assess the
Listings on remand in order to allow for meaningful judicial review.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the R&R is ACCEPTED and is incorporated by reference as if
fully rewritten herein. The decision of the Commissioner is VACATED and this matter is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 8/25/15

/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge

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