Transue v. Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation et al

Filing 53

Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for summary judgment (Related Doc # 43 ). Signed by Magistrate Judge Kenneth S. McHargh on 4/28/16.(M,De)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

MARY TRANSUE,

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Plaintiff,
v.

CURTISS-WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL
CORPORATION, et al.
Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:14-CV-1135

MAGISTRATE JUDGE McHARGH
OPINION & ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Mary Transue filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. alleging that Defendants
Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation, et al., terminated her employment in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. (Doc. No. 1).

Specifically, Plaintiff alleged Defendants

discriminated against her on the basis of disability by refusing to provide a reasonable
accommodation. (Id.). The matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 43-3), Defendants’ Response in Opposition to the Motion (Doc. No. 49),
and Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of the Motion. (Doc. No. 51).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment.
I.

FACTS

Plaintiff began working for Defendant as a CNC machinist in 2006. While performing
her job, Plaintiff would come into contact with chemical coolant. In late summer of 2011,
Defendant changed the coolant used in all of its machines, including the one operated by
Plaintiff, to TRIM Microsol. In March of 2012, Plaintiff developed contact dermatitis, including
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a rash and pustule lesions, on her hands and forearms.

Plaintiff filed an Ohio Workers’

Compensation claim on May 10, 2012, and underwent treatment and testing with Dr. Helen
Torok, a dermatologist, to determine the cause of her dermatitis. Dr. Torok performed standard
allergen testing that was not specific to the chemicals Plaintiff worked with as a machinist.
Plaintiff was temporarily transferred to Defendant’s Quality Assurance department on June 18,
2012, and her condition improved while working in this position. On July 10, 2012, Dr. Torok
emailed Defendant instructing that Plaintiff should continue to work in the Quality Control
department due to her allergies. A week later, Dr. Torok informed Defendant that Plaintiff could
return to her machining job with the use of gloves, but her contact dermatitis returned, and
Plaintiff again sought medical treatment at Concentra.
Defendant provided Plaintiff with potential barriers to wear while she attempted to
continue working at her usual position, including gloves made of various materials, sleeves, and
barrier creams. After several months of use with nitrile gloves, the allergic reaction spread to
Plaintiff’s forearms, and it was determined she was also allergic to the nitrile gloves. Latex
gloves and vinyl sleeves were then tried; it appeared the vinyl sleeves protected her arms, but the
latex gloves did not provide an adequate chemical barrier, and the conditioned worsened on her
hands.

Butyl gloves were provided to Plaintiff, but had to be removed during the CNC process

for manipulation of the parts, and thus did not provide adequate protection. Defendant purchased
vinyl gloves, but Plaintiff was not given an opportunity to try them while working.
Plaintiff changed her Workers’ Compensation treating source from Concentra Medical
Center to Dr. Kevin L. Trangle, an Occupational Environmental Medicine specialist, in August
of 2012. At this point it was still not determined what specifically was causing the contact
dermatitis. Dr. Trangle sent multiple emails to Defendant, first explaining what testing needed

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performed in order to determine the cause of Plaintiff’s dermatitis, and that, once the cause was
determined, the process by which Plaintiff worked as a CNC operator might be altered to allow
her to continue working at that position. Testing eventually showed her condition was a result of
Plaintiff experiencing an allergic reaction to the new coolant.
Defendant scheduled Plaintiff for allergy testing with Dr. Torok, and informed her of the
scheduled testing three days before it was to take place. Plaintiff did not participate in the
testing, and was placed on unpaid leave. Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter informing her that the
testing was rescheduled for October 24, 2012, and failure to participate would lead to her
termination. Plaintiff attended the scheduled testing, which revealed Plaintiff was allergic to the
new coolant (TRIM Microsol) used in her machine. Defendant placed Plaintiff on paid leave.
Defendant further sent a letter to Dr. Trangle including Plaintiff’s test results showing allergy to
the coolant, and requested his opinion as to whether Plaintiff was able to return to work as a
machinist. Before receiving a response from Dr. Trangle, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter
converting her paid leave to unpaid leave, stating the change was due to Dr. Tangle’s failure to
respond to the November 11, 2012 letter.
Dr. Trangle sent multiple correspondence to Defendant offering various suggestions of
potential accommodations to allow Plaintiff to continue working with the company. In a letter
sent from Dr. Trangle to Hazel Pauley, dated October 16, 2012, Dr. Trangle stated as follows:

It may be that going to an all-glove policy could solve the problem in
regards to Ms. Transue. There are a few issues, however, that need to be
considered if this is the approach the company wished to take. …[I]t is
not unusual in my experience…that there is enough aerosolization of the
liquid that even with an all-glove policy it is quite possible the individual
will indeed have skin exposure to the droplets and micro particles in the
air…. In an allergic individual, such aerosolization is enough to
precipitate a dermatitis reaction. The only way to determine if this is

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indeed going to be the problem or the case would be to put her back in the
workplace and see if she has a reaction despite an all-glove policy.
…
One must keep in mind, however, that with her atopic skin, even if the
glove does provide a measure of protection, increased moisture and
maceration of the skin in the glove in her particular instance may be a
problem for her. Once again, this would have to be tested and seen.
Furthermore, there is usually aerosolization of coolant and/oil products in
the course of the industrial process. As such even with gloving it is
possible that enough of the particulates are airborne that she may well
have a reaction….
(Affidavit of Kevin Trangle, M.D., Ex. C).
Further, On March 15, 2013, Plaintiff’s attorney responded to a letter from Defendant
inquiring as to whether Plaintiff had obtained other employment and intended to resign from her
position with Curtiss-Wright.

Plaintiff’s response indicated she had repeatedly requested

accommodations, stated she did not wish to resign, and reiterated her requests for
accommodations. In May of 2013, Defendant sent a letter to Plaintiff stating it was terminating
her employment for not providing FMLA certification paperwork to MetLife.

Defendant

further stated Plaintiff was terminated due to the company’s inability to protect her from
exposure to the coolant, metals, and nitrile gloves which caused her positive allergic response,
and that there were no other positions available for which she was qualified and would isolate
her from the contaminants. (Affidavit of Daryl Gagliargi, Ex. B).
Prior to her termination, Plaintiff applied for various vacant Quality Control positions
with Defendant company, but was not selected to fill the vacancies. Further, when she heard of
openings in the Quality Control department, Plaintiff sent emails to Defendant requesting a
transfer to these positions. Plaintiff subsequently obtained a job working as an inspector for
another machining company, Jerpbak-Bayless. At Jerpbak-Bayless, she was again exposed to

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TRIM Microsol and developed dermatitis. Plaintiff terminated her employment after a few
weeks, and the condition resolved after she was no longer exposed to the coolant. Plaintiff began
working at Pet Supplies Plus. Plaintiff does not allege any current problems relating to contact
dermatitis.
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact”
and the moving party “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
moving party bears the initial burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It can discharge this burden in two ways: by
producing evidence to indicate there is no genuine issue of material fact, or by demonstrating
that the nonmoving party fails to show sufficient evidence to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case. Id.
If the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party “may not rest upon its mere
allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleadings, but rather must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 374
(6th Cir. 2009) (citing Rule 56 and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586 (1986)). The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving
party’s position will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477
U.S. 242, 252 (1986). There must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the
nonmoving party. Id.
When reviewing summary judgment motions, a court must view the evidence, and the
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

Cases proceed to trial, even if a party’s evidence is

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inconsistent, because in reviewing a motion for summary judgment, weighing the evidence and
making credibility determinations are prohibited. Amerson v. Waterford Twp., 562 F. App’x 484,
488 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Coble v. City of White House, Tenn., 634 F.3d 865, 870 (6th Cir.
2011)). Even so, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt
that version of the facts for the purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). However, “[t]he blatantly contradictory standard is a difficult
one to meet and requires opposing evidence that is largely irrefutable.” Amerson, 562 F. App’x at
489. “Facts that are not blatantly contradicted by [evidence such as a video] recording remain
entitled to an interpretation most favorable to the non-moving party.” Coble, 634 F.3d at 870.
III.

LAW & ANALYSIS

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) makes it unlawful for an employer to
“discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of a disability.” 42. U.S.C. 12112(a).
The statute defines “discriminate” to include “not making reasonable accommodation to the
known physical…limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C.
12112(b)(5)(A). An “otherwise qualified individual” is an individual who “with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position.” 42
U.S.C. 12111(8). An employer does not violate the statute where it “can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship” on the employer. 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)(A).
Courts utilize a burden-shifting analysis for claims under the ADA. Rorrer v. City of
Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1038 (6th Cir. 2014). A Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case for
discrimination by showing “‘that he is disabled and otherwise qualified for the position, either
with or without reasonable accommodation.’” Id. (quoting Keith v. Cnty. Of Oakland, 703 F.3d

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918, 923 (6th Cir. 2013)). “Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, ‘the burden
shifts to the defendant to show that accommodating the plaintiff would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of its business.’” Id. at 1039. The employer bears the burden of
proving a proposed accommodation would impose an undue hardship. Id. (quoting Monette v.
Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1183, n. 10, 1186 (6th Cir. 1996) (abrogated on other
grounds by Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 315-16 (6th Cir. 2012) (en
banc)).
A. Disability
Plaintiff now asks this Court to grant summary judgment on the issue of whether she is an
individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA as a matter of law. Defendant asserts
there is an issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff’s contact dermatitis constitutes a
disability under the ADA.
An individual is disabled under the ADA where she has “(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities…; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. 12102(1). A
Physical impairment is “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition…affecting one or more body
systems, such as…immune, circulatory, hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine.” 29 C.F.R.
1630.2(h)(1). A plaintiff has a “record of impairment” where he has a history of impairment that
substantially limited one or more major life activities. Neely v. Benchmark Family Servs., No.
15-3550, 2016 WL 364774, *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 26, 2016). “To establish a ‘record of disability,’ a
‘plaintiff only need to show that “at some point in the past” he had [a substantially limiting
impairment.]’” Id.
“Major life activities” is defined to include, but is not limited to:

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(i) Caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,…working; and (ii) The
operation of a major bodily function, including functions of the immune
system, special sense organs and skin; [and] normal cell growth…. The
operation of a major bodily function includes the operation of an
individual organ within a body system.
29 C.F.R. 1630.2(h)(2)(i)(1). “The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits
a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating
measures such as …medication.” Verhoff v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 299 Fed. App’x 488, 492,
fn. 3 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 3(4)(E)(i),
122 Stat. 3553 (2008)); see Black v. Roadway Express, 297 F.3d 445, 452 (6th Cir. 2002)
(finding consideration that plaintiff was able to work at other truck driving company that
provided cruise control device that made plaintiff able to drive not appropriate under ADA
analysis because “workplace accommodation of an individual’s impairment cannot be taken into
account in assessing whether that individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of
working.”) (citing Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 786 (3rd Cir. 1998)).
“‘Substantially limits’ is not meant to be a demanding standard” and “shall be construed
broadly in favor of expansive coverage.” 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(1). Recognizing Congressional
intent for broad coverage, the Sixth Circuit determined the Amendments “reject the narrow
interpretation of what constitutes a disability as set forth in [previous ruling case law] Sutton v.
United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 144 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1999), and Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 122 S. Ct. 681, 151 L. Ed. 2d
615 (2002).” Robbins v. Saturn Corp., 532 Fed. App’x 623, 628 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008)); see Jenkins

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v. Nat’l Bd. Of Med. Examiners, No. 08-5371, 2009 WL 331638, *1-3 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2009)
(“Congress overturned the definition of ‘substantially limits’ put forward in Toyota and directed
the courts to interpret the term in a more inclusive manner.”). Further, the ADA Amendments
Act “directs that ‘[a]n impairment that substantially limits one major life activity need not limit
other major life activities in order to be considered a disability.’” Id.
“In order to demonstrate a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working, [a
plaintiff] need only demonstrate that he is ‘significantly restricted in the ability to perform either
a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person
having comparable training, skills and abilities.’” Black, 297 F.3d at 452 (quoting 29 C.F.R.
1630.2(j)(3)(i)). Relying on a pre-Amendments case, the court in Black determined that “a
plaintiff was significantly restricted in his ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of
jobs in various classes where his injury precluded him from performing at least fifty percent of
the jobs previously available to him. Id. at 453 (citing Burns v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 222
F.3d 247, 255-56 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Testimony of a vocational expert that is “merely conclusory” may not constitute
sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact that a plaintiff is substantially limited
in the major life activity of working. Black, 297 F.3d at 454-55 (citing Doren v. Battle Creek
Health Sys., 187 F.3d 595, 598-99 (6th Cir. 1999)). Testimony may be considered “merely
conclusory” where, based on a review of a doctor’s affidavit and report of a plaintiff’s
impairment, the VE concludes the plaintiff is significantly restricted from a class of jobs, as well
as a broad range of jobs, and does not provide evidence regarding the number of jobs from which
the plaintiff is disqualified due to his impairment. Id. However, demonstration of the number
and types of jobs does not require “an onerous evidentiary showing,” but at least “require[s] the

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presentation of evidence of general employment demographics and/or of recognized
occupational classifications that indicate the approximate number of jobs (e.g., ‘few,’ ‘many,’
‘most’) from which an individual would be excluded because of an impairment.” Id. at 454, fn.
13 (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. 1630.2(j)).
Parties do not dispute that Plaintiff developed contact dermatitis that manifested in
painful pustule blistering and allergic rash on Plaintiff’s hands and arms, resulting from contact
with the coolant used in her CNC machine. Plaintiff asserts she is disabled as a matter of law
due to this condition substantially limiting her ability to perform the major life activities of
working, performing manual tasks, and lifting, as well as interference with the operation of the
bodily function of her skin. However, Defendant argues Plaintiff is not disabled because she
does not currently suffer from contact dermatitis, and that evidence does not show she is limited
in a major life activity. This Court finds no merit to Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s
allergic reaction does not fall under the scope of the ADA because it cleared up after she stopped
working with the coolant, as it would undoubtedly return should she return to her job working as
a machinist with Defendant, without an accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. 12102(4)(D) (“An
impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major
life activity when active.”). However, Plaintiff has not met its burden to show that there exists
no issue of material fact as to whether her allergic reaction to the coolant substantially limits her
ability to perform one or more major life activities.
While Plaintiff points to specific evidence and testimony in support of her position that
her condition substantially limits her ability to work in a broad class of machining jobs,
Defendant sufficiently raises a question of fact on this issue so as to avoid summary judgment.
Although the 2008 Amendments lowered the threshold to establish disability, a plaintiff must

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still establish she is substantially limited in a major life activity. Neely, 2016 WL 364774 at *4
(“Though the 2008 Amendments undoubtedly eased the burden required for plaintiffs to
establish disability…[a] lesser burden is a burden nonetheless.”). Plaintiff argues that, not only
is she incapable of performing as a machinist at Curtis-Wright because of their use of the TRIM
coolant, but that, due to her allergy, she is effectively barred from working in any machining job.
In support, Plaintiff points to the deposition testimony of Paul Ferdenzi, who stated that the
“cracking and fissures on her hands” qualify as a disability under the ADA (Depo. Paul Ferdenzi,
Esq. p. 33), and Defendant’s maintenance supervisor, Don Nielson, who testified that
manufacturing depends heavily on machining and coolants.

(Depo. Don Nielson p. 7).

Additionally, Plaintiff cites to testimony of vocational expert Barbara Burk, who stated that her
dermatitis would require a reasonable accommodation, and such necessity would be a “red flag”
for other hiring companies, rendering her unemployable for all machining positions. (Affidavit
of Barbara E. Burk, C.R.C., L.P.C.).
However, while it is clear from the evidence that Plaintiff is unable to perform her work
as a machinist using Defendant’s machines utilizing the TRIM coolant due to her allergy,
Defendant raises a legitimate dispute as to whether her contact dermatitis blocks her from the
broad class of machining jobs. Although Plaintiff provides the testimony of a vocational expert
in support, Defendant challenges the probative value of the testimony, and argues it is
undermined by the undisputed fact that Plaintiff was hired at another machining position months
after working at Curtis-Wright. Plaintiff again asserts the testimony of Ms. Burk in her Reply
Brief as a counter-argument to Defendant’s position; however, it is not appropriate for the Court
to weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations at the summary judgment stage.1

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Without ruling on the probative value of her testimony, the undersigned notes that the report of Ms. Burk does not
appear on its face to fall under the designation of “merely conclusory” as established in Black v. Roadway Express,

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Further, although Plaintiff supports her argument by demonstrating that two or three other
companies use the TRIM coolant, this Court agrees with Defendant that a question exists as to
whether her allergy to this specific coolant keeps her from working in any machining position, as
the record shows that there are thousands of different coolants available that may be used by
other machining companies.
Further, Defendant points out that Plaintiff does not provide any factual support for her
assertion that the allergy substantially limits her ability to perform manual tasks or lifting.
Although this Court recognizes that Plaintiff has a very low threshold to prove, she still must
support her allegations with more than mere assertions. Plaintiff makes no reference to actual
facts or evidence to support that she was unable or limited in performing manual tasks or lifting.
Further, Plaintiff’s own motion suggests otherwise, as she was able to continue to work in
Quality Assurance inspecting parts, despite her condition. Accordingly, summary judgment on
the issue of whether Plaintiff was disabled is not appropriate.
B. Reasonable Accommodation
Failure to provide a reasonable accommodation for a disabled but otherwise qualified
individual may amount to unlawful discrimination under the ADA. “Discriminate” includes “not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability…unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such
covered entity.” 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)(A). “[T]he plaintiff generally must identify the specific
job he seeks and demonstrate that he is qualified for that position” to overcome summary
judgment. Rorrer, 743 F.3d at 1040. Once a Plaintiff has established a prima facie case that he
297 F.3d 445, 454-55 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Doren v. Battle Creek Health Sys., 187 F.3d 595, 598-99 (6th Cir.
1999)).

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is disabled and otherwise qualified for a position, with or without accommodation, “the burden
shifts to the defendant to show that accommodating the plaintiff would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of its business.” Keith, 703 F.3d at 923. An accommodation imposes
an undue hardship if it causes significant difficulty or expense for the employer. 42 U.S.C.
12111(10).
The Sixth Circuit has recognized “[t]he law places a significant burden on employers to
accommodate an employee’s injuries.” Rorrer, 743 F.3d at 1044 (citing Keith, 703 F.3d at 92627). Accommodations may include “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or
to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily
performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential
functions of that position.” 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). Further, an employer may provide a
reasonable accommodation by reassigning an employee to a vacant position with different
responsibilities. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). Absent undue hardship, an employer is required to
provide a reasonable accommodation for an employee “who meets the definition of disability
under the ‘actual disability’ prong…or ‘record of’ prong,” but not for an employee “who meets
the definition of disability solely under the ‘regarded as’ prong.” 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o)(4).
Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff meets her burden of showing she is disabled under the
ADA, Defendant has sufficiently demonstrated a question of fact as to whether they were in
violation of the ADA by failing to provide Plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation for her
contact dermatitis. The facts show Plaintiff requested two possible accommodations from
Defendant to allow her to continue her work as a machinist: barrier protection from the coolant,
or a change in the machining chemicals and/or process. According to Plaintiff, Defendant
violated the ADA when it did not allow her to try vinyl gloves it had purchased, and that it did

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not legitimately consider changing the coolant or machining process. Defendant argues that it
acted in accordance with the requirements of the ADA, but that it was unable to provide an
adequate accommodation that would allow her to continue her work as a machinist.
Defendant points to sufficient evidence to overcome summary judgment on the issue of
reasonable accommodation to allow Plaintiff to continue working in her machining position.
There is no dispute that Plaintiff was provided various barrier methods, including gloves,
sleeves, and barrier creams, all of which were ineffective in protecting her completely from the
coolant which caused her allergic reaction. In support of its decision to abandon its efforts to
protect Plaintiff through the use of gloves or other barriers, Defendant points specifically to the
previous failure of gloves and sleeves, as well as to the opinion of Dr. Trangle that barrier
methods would not provide complete protection for Plaintiff due to the probable aerosolization
of the coolant. (Def. Brief in Opp. p. 3-4). Although Plaintiff argues she should have been
allowed to try the vinyl gloves because the vinyl sleeves had provided some protection, and that
Defendant’s reliance on the opinion of Dr. Trangle was based on a mischaracterization of his
statements, Defendant has established a sufficient question of fact as to the reasonableness of
their decision to discontinue its attempts to find a reasonable accommodation that would allow
Plaintiff to continue working at a machining position.
The Court further finds that Plaintiff does not establish sufficient facts to show summary
judgment is proper on whether Defendant considered changing the engineering process,
including use of the original, or an alternative, coolant, as a reasonable accommodation.
Although Plaintiff points to evidence showing Defendant’s Human Resources Department made
inquiries as to the engineering process as late as 2014 (Pl. Brief, Mtn. Summary Judgment, p. 21
(citing Depo. Tim Hall, p. 6)), Defendant cites to testimony indicating at least some discussion

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occurred between departments relating to this issue. (Def. Brief in Opp. p. 4 (citing Depo. Lisa
Sozzi p. 114-15)). Further, other employee testimony on the record indicates that Defendant
discussed continuing to use the old coolant while exploring potential options to allow Plaintiff to
return to work on her original machine. (Pl. Brief, Mtn. Summary Judgment, p. 20 (citing Depo.
Carl Ondraka, p. 32-33)). Although Defendant’s Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment provides little evidence in rebuttal, this Court finds that Plaintiff failed to
provide clear evidence as to this factor so as to warrant summary judgment.
Plaintiff further requested as a reasonable accommodation a transfer to an alternative
position where she would not be exposed to the coolant. At the summary judgment stage, a
plaintiff must identify the specific job she seeks as a reasonable accommodation, and
demonstrate that she is qualified for that position. Kleiber v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 485
F.3d 862, 870 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 452 (6th
Cir. 2004)). Plaintiff requested a transfer to the Quality Assurance department, and applied for
vacancies within that department on multiple occasions. Plaintiff again offers testimony from
VE Burk, as well as from various witnesses employed by Defendant, in addition to providing her
work experience and training. (Pl. Brief, Mtn. Summary Judgment p. 26-35). Specifically, in
support of her assertion that she was qualified to work in that department, Plaintiff points out that
Defendant transferred her to a quality inspection position temporarily after she developed her
allergy, and she was able to perform the essential functions of the job. (Id. at p. 27-28). Further,
she cites testimony of the Quality Assurance department leader, Michael Przybysz, who stated
she was able to transfer to this position temporarily because it involved the same skills as
machining. (Id.). Plaintiff also points to the job description itself, allowing for Level 2 or Level
3 skills, her own testimony that she believes she has Level 2 (but not Level 3) knowledge and

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abilities, and deposition testimony of Defendant that Plaintiff contends does not adequately
establish she did not have the requisite skills to perform the essential job functions. (Id. at p. 2931).
However, despite Plaintiff’s arguments, Defendant points to sufficient evidence to show
that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff was qualified to perform the
essential functions required for the relevant positions in Quality Assurance. Defendant asserts
that, despite Plaintiff’s determination that she can perform the Quality Assurance jobs, her
applications were denied because she did not meet the minimum qualifications. Defendant
points to deposition testimony of Plaintiff where she admitted lacking experience in that
department other than inspecting her own machined parts, and that she did not meet all the
written requirements in the job description, specifically as to essential functions of the position.
(Def. Brief in Opp. p. 4-5 (citing Depo. Mary Transue p. 95-96)). Further, Defendant offers in
support the testimony of Quality Assurance Manager Don Henderson, who testified that Plaintiff
did not have the requisite skill set, as depicted in her application, including the ability to run
specialized equipment. (Id. at p. 5 (citing Depo. Don Henderson p. 69-75)).

Accordingly, there

is a genuine dispute between the parties as to whether there was a vacancy in Quality Assurance
where Plaintiff would not be exposed to the coolant for which she was qualified.
C. Interactive Process
An employer is required to engage in an individualized inquiry with a disabled employee
when necessary to determine an appropriate reasonable accommodation. Rorrer, 743 F.3d at
1040 (citing Keith, 703 F.3d at 923); 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o)(3). “The individualized inquiry is an
‘interactive process’ in which ‘both parties have a duty to participate in good faith.’” Id.
(quoting Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871). “If this process fails to lead to reasonable accommodation of

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the disabled employee’s limitations, responsibility will lie with the party that caused the
breakdown.” Id. (quoting EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th Cir. 2005)).
“Although mandatory, failure to engage in the interactive process is only an independent
violation of the ADA if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie showing that he proposed a
reasonable accommodation.” Id. (citing Keith, 703 F.3d at 929; Breitfelder v. Leis, 151 Fed.
App’x 379, 386 (6th Cir. 2005)).
In Rorrer, the court provided several examples of situations that may indicate a failure of
good faith participation in the interactive process. Id. For instance, “[f]ailure to discuss a
reasonable accommodation in a meeting in which the employer takes an adverse employment
action against an injured employee may demonstrate a lack of good faith.” Id. (citing EEOC v.
Chevron Philips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 622 (5th Cir. 2009)). Another example provides that
“failing to assist an employee in seeking an accommodation may suggest bad faith.” Id. (citing
Canny v. Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 439 F.3d 894, 902 (8th Cir. 2006)). Further,
a “cursory medical examination and summary conclusion that a disabled individual is not fit for
employment violates an employer’s duty to engage in the interactive process in good faith.” Id.
at 1041 (citing Keith, 703 F.3d at 924). Additionally, although “there is nothing wrong with
involving…representatives in the interactive process,” the Sixth Circuit has expressed that failure
of the parties to communicate directly may indicate a less than “model interactive process.”
Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871.
However, a plaintiff must not only show a failure of the interactive process, but must also
provide evidence that her employer was responsible for that failure, in violation of the ADA. In
Kleiber, although the court determined the interactive process was flawed where the parties
conducted the process entirely through the plaintiff’s state vocational rehabilitation

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representative, and did not communicate directly with the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s ADA claim
failed because he “offered no evidence that [his employer was] to blame for these shortcomings.”
Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871-72. Rather, the record indicated the plaintiff’s employer participated in
good faith, and “[t]he record contain[ed] no suggestion that [the plaintiff] attempted to
participate directly,” but rather “chose to conduct the interactive process through proxies, and
[his employer] obliged.” Id. at 872. The court further found that the defendant employer’s
consideration of several positions (despite concluding he was precluded from performing those
jobs) undercut the assertion of bad faith. Finally, the court determined the plaintiff’s assertion
that the defendant’s failure to provide information necessary to identify appropriate jobs had no
basis because “the record contains no evidence that [the plaintiff or his representatives] requested
any information during the interactive process.”
Here, although Plaintiff points to action (or inaction) by Defendant that she suggests
shows a lack of good faith in the interactive process, summary judgment is nonetheless not
proper on this issue. Beyond establishing that both parties have a duty to participate in the
interactive process in good faith, “the interactive process is not described in the statute’s text.”
Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871. Although case law has established certain guidelines for what may or
may not constitute “bad faith,” no bright-line test is drawn from these cases. See, e.g., Rorrer,
743 F.3d at 1040 (citing EEOC v. Chevron Philips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d at 622); Canny, 439
F.3d at 902; Keith, 703 F.3d at 924; Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871.
It is clear from the record that Defendant did participate to some extent in ongoing
communications and an exchange of information with Plaintiff and her representatives in order
to identify a reasonable accommodation following the onset of her dermatitis. For instance, the
record shows communications during the relevant period relating to Plaintiff’s dermatitis,

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including its cause and possible accommodations, between Defendant, Defendant’s third-party
representative Hazel Pauley, and Plaintiff’s doctors and attorneys. Specifically, Lisa Sozzie,
Defendant’s Director of Human Resources, sent a letter to Dr. Trangle dated November 1, 2012,
requesting his opinion and recommendations regarding Plaintiff’s ability to return to her
position. (Affidavit of Christopher G. Wincek, Esq., Ex. B).

Further, documentation and

testimony establish that Defendant allowed Plaintiff to try different barriers in attempts to
continue working at her original position, and that Plaintiff received notice that she was not
qualified for positions in Quality Assurance. Although Plaintiff argues that Defendant should
have done more to provide for a reasonable accommodation, she fails to establish that
Defendant’s actions were so blatantly inadequate so as to definitively demonstrate a failure to
participate in good faith in an interactive process. Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of fact as
to whether Defendant fulfilled its duty to conduct an “individualized inquiry” to determine
whether they could accommodate Plaintiff’s disability, and thus summary judgment is not
appropriate.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 43-3).

/s Kenneth S. McHargh
Kenneth S. McHargh
United States Magistrate Judge
Date: April 28, 2016

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