Grills v. Hewlett-Packard Company
Filing
23
Memorandum of Opinion and Order: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Judge Patricia A. Gaughan on 8/24/15. (LC,S) re 14
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Timothy Grills,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Hewlett-Packard Company,
Defendant.
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CASE NO. 1:14 CV 1307
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
Memorandum of Opinion and Order
Introduction
This matter is before the Court upon defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
14). This case alleges failure to pay overtime compensation. For the following reasons, the
motion is GRANTED.
Facts
Plaintiff Timothy Grills filed his Complaint against defendant Hewlett-Packard Company
alleging a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Plaintiff alleges that defendant
failed to pay him overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times his regular rate of
pay for all of the hours he worked over 40 in a workweek. Plaintiff contends that he has been
employed by defendant for 32 years and that in his current position of “Technical Consultant
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III,” defendant misclassified him as “exempt” from the FLSA’s overtime requirements.
Evidence before this Court shows the following. Defendant manufactures and sells PCs
and printers. Defendant offers customers technology support services, including network
support services. Plaintiff is employed by defendant as a Technical Solutions Consultant III,
also known as a Level II engineer, offering “troubleshooting solutions” to customers who
purchase network support services and who contact the customer service center. According to
plaintiff’s declaration, about 70% of the troubleshooting calls he takes, and 70% of the time he
spends troubleshooting customers’ problems, are for small to medium sized companies and
institutions, and not for customers such as hospitals, large universities, or Fortune 500
corporations.
Plaintiff testified at deposition to the following. The majority of customers calling into
the Level II queue are “major companies” and “larger customers” with more complex issues and
that have invested millions of dollars in their networks. Plaintiff provides support to customers
experiencing network, server, and storage issues, including, for example, “network
misconfigurations” and outages. Plaintiff is viewed as a “technical leader” and provides “expert
advice to clients” in highly complex cases. In the Level II group, plaintiff handles “some of the
more complex and difficult cases because of the breadth of [his] experience.”
Plaintiff has obtained five technical certifications. He achieved ASE and ATP
certification as well as Cisco and Avaya certifications. These certifications involved tests which
required “quite a bit of study” in order to pass. Finally, the MASE (Master ASE), is the most
complex and highest level exam. The MASE is a network infrastructure certification which
would help plaintiff effectively troubleshoot his client’s problems. The MASE certification is not
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required and plaintiff chose to complete that certification. The MASE certification is not held by
all Level II engineers and only MASE certified engineers can troubleshoot calls in the queue
involving this system. Customers “pay money to have a MASE on the phone immediately,” and
plaintiff is one such certified engineer who has met the “technical and operational excellence and
expertise requirements” to pass this exam.
Plaintiff does not perform duties such as manually installing hardware and cables for
networks, installing hardware on workstations, configuring desktops, manually checking cables,
or manually going to a customer site and replacing hardware. Plaintiff receives his cases through
the queue system, generally selecting the cases he wishes to handle, and manages the process to
resolution. Because plaintiff’s cases are complex in nature, they “take time to close,” within two
weeks or perhaps longer. Plaintiff generally works from home and is “independent” in the sense
that no one tells him how he needs to do his job. Plaintiff’s responsibilities include interfacing
with customers, gathering data on networking issues, analyzing the data, troubleshooting and
testing issues, communicating with the customer, and making proposed solutions and
recommendations.
Generally, plaintiff’s cases are those which the Level I engineers are unable to resolve.
In addition to the queue, plaintiff has several customers who contact him directly “when they
have tough issues” because they consider him an expert. Plaintiff uses his discretion as to how to
troubleshoot an issue and to recommend a solution. Plaintiff acknowledges there are no “canned
answers” to the problems presented, and he has to be creative, analyze the issue, and come up
with a solution. In fact, although he may refer to a manual, he uses his expert judgment to
resolve an issue and determine what tests need to be run to analyze the customer’s particular
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problem in the customer’s unique network. Plaintiff decides how he will organize his tasks and
what he will do in a particular day. Plaintiff’s work significantly affects his customers’
businesses. Given the “major assignments” he handles and the unique nature of each case,
plaintiff has discretion in resolving his cases to achieve the “best interests” of his client. Plaintiff
spends about 90% of his work time actively troubleshooting network issues for customers.
Plaintiff was selected to be on the “advanced solution team”due to his higher level of
skills and expertise. “Most of the time,” the issues that he resolves as part of this team are more
complex than the issues faced by the other Level II engineers. On one occasion, “because of
[his] expertise and ability to handle complex networking issues,” plaintiff was selected to go to
FedEx to assist with a problem. Plaintiff “had to analyze their network and also their call
manager and pretty much rebuild everything.” On another occasion, plaintiff assisted a hospital
that had a network outage which plaintiff agreed could have resulted in “dire consequences.”
In addition to plaintiff’s deposition testimony, Mark Lowenberg, plaintiff’s supervisor,
testified that cases unable to be resolved by Level II engineers, such as plaintiff, are elevated to
Level III and Level IV engineers.
It is not disputed that plaintiff has worked over 40 hours for the weeks during the relevant
time period.
This matter is now before the Court upon defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Standard of Review
Summary Judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-23 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); see also LaPointe v. UAW, Local 600, 8 F.3d 376,
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378 (6th Cir. 1993). The burden of showing the absence of any such genuine issues of material
facts rests with the moving party:
[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its
motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with affidavits,” if any, which it believes demonstrates the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). A fact is “material only if its resolution
will affect the outcome of the lawsuit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Accordingly, the nonmoving party must present “significant probative evidence” to demonstrate
that “there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Moore v. Philip
Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 340 (6th Cir.1993). The nonmoving party may not simply rely on
its pleading, but must “produce evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be solved by
a jury.” Cox v. Kentucky Dep’t. of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995).
The evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may permissibly be drawn from the facts
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs.,
Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992). However, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Summary judgment should be granted if a party who bears the burden of proof at trial
does not establish an essential element of his case. Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d
937, 941 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). Moreover, if the evidence is “merely
colorable” and not “significantly probative,” the court may decide the legal issue and grant
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summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citation omitted).
Discussion
Among other requirements, the FLSA obligates employers to compensate employees for
hours in excess of 40 per week at a rate of 1 1/2 times the employees' regular wages. 29 U.S.C. §
207(a). An employer may avoid this requirement with respect to employees properly classified
as exempt executives, administrators, or professionals. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). The employer
bears the burden of proof as to the application of the exemption as well as the burden on each
element of the claimed exemption. Bacon v. Eaton Corp., 565 Fed.Appx. 437 (6th Cir. 2014).
Here, defendant asserts that plaintiff was properly classified as exempt under the FLSA’s
computer (professional), administrative, and combination exemptions based on his salary and
duties.
Under the FLSA, “any employee who is a computer systems analyst, computer
programmer, software engineer, or other similarly skilled worker” is exempt from coverage
when his primary duties fall within those enumerated by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (17).
According to the Code of Federal Regulations, a computer-related employee (“computer systems
analysts, computer programmers, software engineers or other similarly skilled workers in the
computer field”) earning at least $455 per week and whose primary duties consist of the
following “are eligible for exemption as professionals”:
(1) the application of systems analysis techniques and procedures, including consulting
with users, to determine hardware, software or system functional specifications;
(2) the design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing or modification of
computer systems or programs, including prototypes, based on and related to user or
system design specifications;
(3) the design, documentation, testing, creation or modification of computer programs
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related to machine operating systems; or
(4) a combination of the aforementioned duties, the performance of which
requires the same level of skills.
29 CFR § 541.400. The regulations define “primary duty” as “the principal, main, major, or
most important duty that the employee performs. Determination of an employee’s primary duty
must be based on all the facts in a particular case, with the major emphasis on the character of
the employee’s job as a whole.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.700.
It is not disputed that plaintiff’s annual salary of $83,736 satisfies the minimum of $455
per week. Plaintiff, however, contends that none of his primary duties fall within the classes of
jobs enumerated in (1) through (3) above, and he does not perform a combination of these duties
as set forth in (4) above and, therefore, he is not exempt. “At the very least,” plaintiff states,
there is an issue of fact as to whether his position falls within the computer exemption.
Defendant asserts that plaintiff is exempt because he is a skilled computer professional
whose primary duty involves analyzing, testing, documenting, and modifying computer
networking systems. As such, defendant maintains that plaintiff falls within subparagraphs (1)
and (2). For the following reasons, this Court agrees.
Noting that applicable 29 CFR § 541.400 was effective August 23, 20041, and that no
Sixth Circuit decision is available involving this regulation, defendant points to district court
decisions outside this Circuit which found that troubleshooting is exempt under the computer
professional exemption provisions where it involved, as plaintiff’s duties do here, escalated or
1
The Complaint herein was filed in 2014 and it is undisputed that the relevant three
year statute of limitations would require this Court to look at the years from that
date to 2011.Therefore, the current regulations apply.
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advanced problem solving, such as analyzing system data or testing to determine the root cause
of complex issues and recommending solutions from alternatives.
In Clarke v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2010 WL 1379778 (S.D.N.Y. March 26,
2010), decided on a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff’s FLSA claim failed because he
was found to be exempt as a computer employee. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s
“primary duty” consisted of a combination of the computer functions described in described in
subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3) above. The court pointed to plaintiff’s technical certifications
which enabled him to “solve advanced company-wide support problems and high-level network
problems.” Plaintiff responded to incidents that had originated at the help desk but were
escalated to his attention if neither the help desk nor an intermediate support team could resolve
them. Plaintiff regularly resolved the most serious incidents which involved the highest number
of users and the potential for the most financial loss. In doing so, plaintiff would “find the ‘root
cause’ of a problem and then figure out how to address it.” Plaintiff had to be “creative” in
performing his duties because he encountered issues for which there was no documentation or
known solution.
The Court agrees with defendant that, like the plaintiff in Clark, the primary duties of
plaintiff herein involve those covered in the subparagraphs above. Similar to the plaintiff in
Clarke, plaintiff testified that he regularly handled the most serious and complex issues escalated
to the Level II team and which could have had a potential significant impact on the client’s
business. Plaintiff herein also used his discretion as to how to troubleshoot issues.
Acknowledging that there were no “canned answers” to the problems presented, he had to be
creative, analyze the issue, determine what tests needed to be run, and recommend a solution.
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Customers sought him out due to the high level of skill and expertise. Based on plaintiff’s
deposition testimony, his duties involve the “application of systems analysis techniques and
procedures, including consulting with users, to determine hardware, software or system
functional specifications” as set forth in subparagraph (1) of the regulations. Plaintiff interfaces
with customers, gathers data on networking issues, analyzes the data, troubleshoots and tests
issues, develops a solution, and communicates the proposed solution to the customer.
In Curry v. Matividad Medical Center, 2013 WL 2338110 (N.D.Cal. May 28, 2013),
similarly decided on a motion for summary judgment, plaintiff was also found to be an exempt
computer employee given that his primary duties included a combination of those enumerated in
the statute. The court concluded that plaintiff’s duties which included “network analysis, testing,
configuration, and modification” had been found by other courts to be the types of duties that
characterize exempt computer employees under the FLSA. Plaintiff provided “help desk
personnel with escalation support, which entails providing guidance and support to lower level
network technicians for user issues exceeding the competency of the lower level technicians.”
The court noted that like the plaintiffs in other cases found to be exempt, plaintiff was consulted
on critical projects and “was more than a help desk staffer and instead was a skilled employee as
described under the computer employee exemption.”
Again, as demonstrated in the facts, plaintiff herein is responsible for advanced network
analysis, testing, configuration, and modification of computer systems on issues exceeding the
competencies of lower level technicians. Plaintiff testified that he handled complex cases, ran
tests to troubleshoot the issue, determined the “root cause” of the problems, and resolved
customer issues which had been elevated to his group. Plaintiff’s job duties involved network
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analysis and on one occasion he assisted a hospital which had a network outage which could
have resulted in dire consequences. In his efforts to fix the outage, plaintiff ran tests in the lab to
try to recreate the problem. Plaintiff was also selected to go onsite to FedEx where he had to
analyze their network and “pretty much rebuild everything.” Plaintiff testified that he worked
with his peer engineers on network configurations and his work involves “misconfiguration
issues” and identifying “bugs” in networking hardware and software. Plaintiff had obtained
multiple technical certifications reflecting his high level of competence. On this basis, plaintiff’s
duties involve, at least, some combination of those enumerated in subparagraphs (1) and (2)
above.
Finally, plaintiff testified that he does not perform duties such as manually installing
hardware and cables for networks, installing hardware on workstations, configuring desktops,
manually checking cables, or manually going to a customer site and replacing hardware. In
Martin v. Indiana Michigan Power Company, 381 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2004), which applied the
earlier regulations2, the Sixth Circuit determined that plaintiff was not an exempt computer
2
As stated earlier, the current regulations were effective in 2004. The current
exemption in § 213(a)(17) “broadened” the coverage of computer services
personnel from that included in the prior computer professional exemption and
the regulations “in three significant ways.” Clarke, surpa (citing Bobadilla v.
MDRC, 2005 WL 2044938 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.24, 2005). Notably, the current
exemption “ eliminated the requirement that the employee's work require the
exercise of independent judgment and discretion... It also eliminated any
reference to educational requirements, and dispensed with the requirement that
the employee must have achieved a level of proficiency in the theoretical and
practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge in computer
systems analysis, programming, and software engineering.”Additionally, the
minimum salary requirement was increased from $250 per week. Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
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employee because his duties did not involve (the statute’s former requirement) “theoretical and
practical application of highly specialized knowledge in computer systems analysis,
programming and software engineering.” Rather, plaintiff’s tasks involved “installing and
upgrading hardware and software on workstations, configuring desktops, checking cables,
replacing parts, and troubleshooting.” The court found that these duties did not fall within the
exemption because “[m]aintaining the computer system within the predetermined parameters
does not require ‘theoretical and practical application of highly-specialized knowledge in
computer systems analysis, programming, and software engineering.’ ” The fact that plaintiff
herein does not perform these “lower level” duties supports the finding that he is a “skilled
worker in the computer field.”
Plaintiff does not dispute the facts set forth above, but asserts that “the vast majority of
[his] work time is spent acting as a help desk troubleshooter for HP customers who experience
problems or issues with their computer network.” (Doc. 18 at 4) Plaintiff contends that his
primary duties do not fulfill the FSLA’s computer exemption because he is not a systems
analyst, network designer, or programmer. Although plaintiff asserts that defendant’s citations
to district court cases outside this Circuit “should be viewed with caution,” he does not address
them. Rather, plaintiff relies on Hunter v. Sprint Corp., 453 F.Supp.2d 44 (D.D.C. 2006) and
Turner v. Human Genome Science, Inc., 292 F.Supp2d 738 (D.Md. 2003) (also both notably
outside this Circuit), a 2006 United States Department of Labor (DOL) opinion letter, and
Martin, supra.3
3
As to Martin, plaintiff states that defendant “makes no mention of the controlling
Sixth Circuit case in this area.” But, defendant did refer to the case in a footnote.
In its reply, as discussed below, defendant points out that the case was decided
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In Hunter, the court found that plaintiff’s job functions did not demonstrate that he fell
within the computer professional exemption:
[Defendant] asserts that [plaintiff’s] primary job duties fell within the scope of section
213(a)(17) because [plaintiff] had to analyze problems that were “varied and unique,” he
had to “interface with the customer or vendor” and conduct tests in trying to solve
problems, and he did not follow a manual or have a supervisor watching over his
shoulder. The Court cannot agree. The responsibilities described in the
computer-professional exemption require a substantially higher degree of skill than what
[plaintiff] described in his deposition ... [Plaintiff’s] job, based on the evidence presently
before the Court, did not involve “determin[ing] hardware, software, or system functional
specifications” or the “design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing, or
modification of computer systems or programs” based on such specifications. Nor did the
limited “modifications” he would make to computer software (i.e., uploading code
provided by vendors) “relate [ ] to machine operating systems.” Rather, it appears that
[plaintiff] functioned as a technically proficient help-desk employee whose primary duty
was customer service. The mere fact that some of the tasks [plaintiff] performed can be
described as “consulting,” “analysis,” or “testing” relating to computers does not mean
that [plaintiff] falls within the ambit of a provision that is designed to exempt computer
programmers, network designers, and software developers.
Plaintiff herein asserts that, as in Hunter, plaintiff was a technically proficient help desk
troubleshooter who assists customers with their network problems and is not a programmer,
network designer, or software developer. As to plaintiff’s latter assertion, however, the
exemption is not limited to these three job titles as the Act further states, “or other similarly
skilled worker” who meets the “primary duty” test outlined therein. Additionally, the
regulations refer to “other similarly skilled workers in the computer field.” As to plaintiff’s
former assertion, Hunter is distinguishable.
In Hunter, the court noted that “the only evidence in the record regarding [plaintiff’s] job
functions comes from [plaintiff’s] own deposition- and it is scant at best.” Id. at 51. The court,
under the pre-2004 regulations and argues that it is nonetheless factually
distinguishable.
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in discussing the facts, stated that plaintiff was a customer service representative who responded
to telephone inquiries from clients having technical difficulties with Sprint’s Internet services.
He was a second tier responder- addressing concerns which could not be handled by the person
fielding the initial call. In that role, plaintiff would attempt to diagnose the source of the problem
and assist the client in resolving it. He also updated the employee schedule and provided training
to new employees.
Plaintiff asserts that the facts in Hunter are “extremely similar” to those in this case. The
Court disagrees. Here, plaintiff’s deposition testimony is far from “scant” and describes
plaintiff’s consultation with clients to resolve server, storage, and network issues and the various
techniques he would utilize to resolve complex issues involving computer and networking
systems. Plaintiff also discussed several specific projects wherein he had to resolve complex
issues over a period of time. Although not apparent in Hunter, it appears that the plaintiff in that
case, who took calls to assist with customers experiencing Internet issues, would have resolved
the matter during the phone call. Plaintiff herein took weeks, or longer, to resolve issues.
Turner, decided under the pre-2004 regulations, is also distinguishable. There, the
plaintiffs were systems support technicians who supported defendant’s employees by
troubleshooting and correcting problems with their computer and phone systems. Their primary
duties included troubleshooting hardware and or software problems and network connectivity
issues. Plaintiffs also installed and set up phones for new employees and those moving offices.
In fulfilling these duties, plaintiffs followed a standardized set of procedures that had been
created by the vendor of the phone system.
Clearly, the responsibilities of the plaintiff herein involve issues more complex than
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“network connectivity issues.” Moreover, Turner applied the administrative exemption, and not
the computer professional exemption.
Plaintiff relies on a 2006 DOL opinion which determined that an IT Support Specialist
position would not be considered exempt under the statute. Plaintiff asserts that the duties
identified in that position are similar to plaintiff’s duties. Defendant argues that the opinion is
not persuasive authority because it does not contain a thorough and comprehensive analysis of
the facts relevant to the exemption and does not give a well-reasoned articulation of the bases for
the opinion. Additionally, the facts therein are not shown to be substantially similar to those
herein.
The opinion involved a proposed new position which would involve duties including:
55% [of time spent]-Analyzes, troubleshoots, and resolves complex problems with
business applications, networking, and hardware. Accurately documents all work in
appropriate problem tracking software. Prioritizes tasks based on service level agreement
criteria with limited supervision.
20% [of time spent]-Installs, configures, and tests upgraded and new business computers
and applications based upon user-defined requirements. Assists users in identifying
hardware/software needs and provides advice regarding current options, policies, and
procedures. Creates and troubleshoots network accounts and other business application
user accounts as documented in the employee lifecycle process.
The opinion concluded that the proposed position would not be exempt as a computer
professional because the primary duty of the position “consists of installing, configuring, testing,
and troubleshooting computer applications, networks, and hardware” which does not involve the
duties listed in subparaghs (1), (2), (3), or (4) above. The Court agrees with defendant that
because the opinion does not thoroughly analyze the facts, it need not be binding on this Court.
Moreover, the Court cannot conclude that the facts are “substantially similar” given that the facts
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in the opinion involved a proposed job position whereas the case before this Court involves
detailed deposition testimony supporting a description of plaintiff’s primary duties.
Finally, plaintiff relies heavily on Martin v. Indiana Michigan Power Company, 381 F.3d
574 (6th Cir. 2004), discussed earlier. Plaintiff calls this case the “controlling Sixth Circuit case
in this area.” However, as noted above, it applied a former, narrower version of the statute. For
the following reasons, the Court finds the case neither “controlling” nor factually similar.
In Martin, plaintiff was employed by a power company as an Information Technology
(IT) Support Specialist which defendant classified as an exempt position under the FLSA.
Plaintiff, along with the IT team, maintained the computer workstation software, and did
troubleshooting and repairing. The computers that plaintiff worked on were workstations
(“PCs”) at individual desks connected to a local area network (“LAN”). When employees had
computer problems, they called the help desk where the help desk employees put the problems
into a database as “help desk tickets,” which plaintiff printed out. Plaintiff responded to the help
desk tickets by going to the location and attempting to determine the nature of the problem, to
“troubleshoot” it to determine how to proceed, and to repair the problem if possible. Plaintiff
installed software, such as Microsoft's Office 97, on individual workstations and troubleshooted
Windows 95 problems. He installed “ provided software patches.” If plaintiff was unable to fix
a problem, he reported it to his supervisor who would then decide whether to request service
from the manufacturer or order a replacement part or unit. Plaintiff did not decide or make
recommendations as to whether a piece of equipment needed to be serviced or replaced. Nor did
he write reports on his troubleshooting or repair activities. Plaintiff also relocated workstations
to trailers and temporary buildings. He spent so much time moving workstations that he was not
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able to carry out his primary job of workstation maintenance during the relevant period.
Additionally, plaintiff was assigned to install hardware and cable for the network, including
network components such as hubs, switches, and routers during an expansion to new buildings.
Plaintiff worked in the wiring closets: terminating the cables (that is, putting connectors on the
ends of the cables), plugging them into the hubs, and verifying that they were connected by
phoning the system administrator to confirm that the hubs had appeared on the network. Plaintiff
was not involved in designing the configuration of either the cables or the hardware he installed,
nor did he install any programs onto the network. Plaintiff cleaned up “wiring closets.” Finally,
after the lawsuit was filed, plaintiff was assigned to “to review a Windows 2000 operating
system” that defendant had just developed. For this assignment, plaintiff was expected to
“review the desktop operating system in [defendant’s] applications to make sure they work as he
uses them in the field. And if not, .. make recommendations for corrections.” It was noted that
plaintiff had no computer certifications and no degree beyond high school, although he had taken
several computer training classes.
Applying the regulations in effect at the time, the court stated that to establish plaintiff as
a “computer professional,” defendant had to demonstrate: (1) Plaintiff’s “primary duty consists
of the performance of work that requires theoretical and practical application of
highly-specialized knowledge in computer systems analysis, programming, and software
engineering, and [plaintiff] is employed and engaged in these activities as a computer systems
analyst, computer programmer, software engineer, or other similarly skilled worker in the
computer software field.” (2) Plaintiff’s primary duty “includes work requiring the consistent
exercise of discretion and judgment.”
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The court initially noted that although plaintiff was “not a systems analyst, programmer,
or software engineer, he could still be exempt from overtime if his work ‘requires theoretical and
practical application of highly-specialized knowledge in computer systems analysis,
programming, and software engineering.’ ” The court concluded that it did not because
[Plaintiff] does not do computer programming or software engineering; nor does he
perform systems analysis, which involves making actual, analytical decisions about how
[defendant’s] computer network should function. Rather, [plaintiff’s] tasks—installing
and upgrading hardware and software on workstations, configuring desktops, checking
cables, replacing parts, and troubleshooting Windows problems—are all performed to
predetermined specifications in the system design created by others. As [plaintiff]
testified, he is provided the standard “desktop” for installation on the computers he
configures, but he is not involved in determining what the desktop should look like.
[Plaintiff’s supervisor] explained ... that IT Support is “a maintenance organization that
takes care of computer systems.”
The court stated that there was no evidence that plaintiff “consults with users, to determine
hardware, software, or system functional specifications.” Instead, he only “ ‘consults with users’
for purposes of repair and user support, not to determine what ‘hardware, software, or system
functional specifications’ the Cook facility will employ, as a systems analyst might.”
Additionally, plaintiff’s only “testing” was to
figure out what is wrong with a workstation, printer, or piece of cable so that he can
restore it to working order. He is not doing the type of testing that is involved in creating
a system, determining the desired settings for a system, or otherwise substantively
affecting the system. Indeed, he is merely ensuring that the particular machine is working
properly according to the specifications designed and tested by other Cook employees.
Maintaining the computer system within the predetermined parameters does not require
‘theoretical and practical application of highly-specialized knowledge in computer
systems analysis, programming, and software engineering.’
Finally, the court noted that plaintiff’s one project that might fall under the category of systems
analysis was the Windows 2000 review, but that single project did not make systems analysis
plaintiff’s primary duty.
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The Court agrees with defendant herein that plaintiff’s duties are distinguishable from
those involved in Martin. Plaintiff herein does not perform the manual duties related to the
workstations that were described in that case. In fact, plaintiff there was spending most of his
time physically moving workstations to temporary buildings. The plaintiff in Martin worked at
the help desk fielding calls from employees having computer issues. If plaintiff could not
resolve it, his supervisor took over. The plaintiff in the case herein handles complex cases
escalated to his team. Nor did the plaintiff in Martin, unlike herein, prepare reports on his
troubleshooting or repair activities. Exhibits attached herein to this plaintiff’s deposition show
that he documented extensively the cases he worked on. Plaintiff herein also testified as to how
he drafted documents describing the troubleshooting methods he used to resolve an issue. The
plaintiff in Martin made no recommendations or decisions. By contrast, plaintiff used his
discretion as to how to troubleshoot issues and recommended solutions. Unlike the plaintiff in
Martin, the plaintiff herein has obtained multiple technical certifications, one of which, the
MASE, reflected a particularly higher level of achievement. Finally, unlike the plaintiff in
Martin, the plaintiff herein testified as to how he analyzed system upgrades for major clients
and, in one case, “pretty much rebuil[t] everything.”
In sum, Martin is inapplicable because it applied prior regulations4 and the facts are
distinguishable. Moreover, other district courts, discussed above, have found those with duties
more similar to plaintiff’s to fall within the computer employee exemption. Plaintiff does not
4
The Court recognizes that the four subparagraphs of the regulations and the
statute, which describe the primary duties, are the same under the prior and
current regulations.
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attempt to distinguish those cases. See Clarke and Curry, above.5 Additionally, Young v. Cerner
Corporation, 2007 WL 2463205 (W.D. Missouri August 28, 2007), is more similar than Martin
to the case herein where the court found a plaintiff exempt under the computer professional
exemption where her primary duties involved “defect analysis” in which she determined “how to
fix a defect” and then fixed it. She “did more than just follow instructions; although she might
have been given some direction, ultimately her job was to apply some of her own analysis and
judgment in resolving defects.”
For these reasons, the Court finds plaintiff was properly classified as exempt under the
computer employee exemption. Because the Court finds plaintiff to be exempt under the
computer employee exemption, the Court need not address the administrative exemption or
combination thereof. See Bernard v. Group Publishing, Inc., 970 F.Supp.2d 1206 (D.Col. 2013)
(“Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff was properly classified as an exempt employee
pursuant to the administrative exemption, the Court will not address Defendant’s argument
regarding the computer professional exemption.”)
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
5
In fact, the Clarke court pointed out that Martin “was decided under the narrower
computer professional exemption.” Clarke also distinguished the plaintiff’s
duties in Martin as involving “classic help desk functions...consist[ing] of
responding to helpdesk tickets, installing software such as Windows Office 97 on
individual workstations, troubleshooting Windows 95 problems, configuring
desktops, checking cables, and replacing parts.” Id. (internal quotations omitted)
19
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 8/24/15
/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge
20
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