Byrd v. State of Ohio et al

Filing 3

Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing the complaint. An appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge John R. Adams on 8/22/14. (K,C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

JAMIE WADDELL BYRD,
Plaintiff,
v.

STATE OF OHIO, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 1:14 CV1552
JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Jamie Waddell Byrd’s in forma pauperis complaint
against the “State of Ohio Co-Trustee to Case and William H. Baughman, Jr. Position of
Trusteeship.” (Doc. No. 1). Mr. Byrd, who is a state prisoner incarcerated at Richland Correctional
in Mansfield, Ohio, believes he is being unlawfully detained. He asserts this court’s jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 2041, 2042 and 1655, as well as 42 U.S.C. §1983. For the reasons
set forth below, the action is dismissed.
Background
The crucial facts in this case cannot be discerned from Mr. Byrd’s complaint. He indicates
that his complaint calls into question “Court Case Nos: CR11548242, CR11548634 and

CR11553439.” (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) These are criminal cases filed against Mr. Byrd in the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas on March 14, 2011, March 26, 2011 and August 12, 2011,
respectively. He is now serving a four year sentence for Possession of Drugs and Criminal Tools,
Drug Trafficking, and Intimidation of a Victim/Witness.
Under the Statement of Facts in his complaint, Mr. Byrd states in total:
1) Petitioner, acting in good faith, tender legal tender, which was not
dishonored, for novation on Penal Contravention under case number
CR11548242, CR11548624, CR11553439.
2)Petitioner to this day has not received any notices that Peitioner’s
act to discharge this Penal Contravention was an act of fraud,
therefore, the fact must stand that case numbers CR11548242,
CR.11548624, CR11553439 by operation of law is [sic] discharged.
(Doc. No. 1 at 12.) From that page forward, Mr. Byrd argues enumerable theories that suggest he
is unlawfully detained.
Standard of Review
A district court is expressly authorized to dismiss any civil action filed by a prisoner seeking
relief from a governmental entity, as soon as possible after docketing, if the court concludes that the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if the plaintiff seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A; Onapolis v. Lamanna,
70 F. Supp.2d 809 (N.D.Ohio 1999)(if prisoner's civil rights complaint fails to pass muster under
screening process of Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), district court should sua sponte dismiss
complaint); see Siller v. Dean, No. 99-5323, 2000 WL 145167 at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 2000); see
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (citing numerous Supreme Court cases for the
proposition that attenuated or unsubstantial claims divest the district court of jurisdiction); In re
Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 300 (6th Cir.1988) (recognizing that federal question jurisdiction
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is divested by unsubstantial claims).
No Right to Habeas Relief
Federal courts are always “under an independent obligation to examine their own
jurisdiction,” FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231(1990) and a federal court may not
entertain an action over which it has no jurisdiction. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982). It is apparent on the face of the
complaint that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
“Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the
province of habeas corpus.” Muhammed v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004). When a prisoner
demonstrates that he “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States,” it is habeas relief that is available. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19,
21(1975). Mr. Byrd repeatedly levels conclusory allegations against the defendants, suggesting they
are confining him illegally. However, legal conclusions are not sufficient to present a valid claim,
and this court is not required to accept unwarranted factual inferences. Morgan v. Church's Fried
Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987); see Place v. Shepherd, 446 F.2d 1239, 1244 (6th Cir.
1971) (A pleading will not be sufficient to state cause of action under Civil Rights Act if its
allegations are but conclusions).
The Sixth Circuit has explained that, while pro se plaintiffs are entitled to greater leniency,
they are still required to satisfy basic pleading standards. “Arguably, hanging the legal hat on the
correct peg is such a standard, and ‘[l]iberal construction does not require a court to conjure
allegations on a litigant's behalf.’ ” Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004)(quoting
Erwin v. Edwards, 22 Fed. Appx. 579, 580 (6th Cir.2001) (dismissing a § 1983 suit brought as a §
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2254 petition.)). Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Byrd has not stated a cogent claim, he
cannot attack his convictions or the duration of his confinement in a civil rights action.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A. The court
certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in
good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
August 22, 2014

/s/ John R. Adams
JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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