Cummings v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority et al
Filing
71
Opinion & Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 11/8/16 denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration for the reasons set forth in this order. (Related Doc. 65 ) (D,MA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
------------------------------------------------------:
NOEL A. CUMMINGS,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
GREATER CLEVELAND REGIONAL
:
TRANSIT AUTHROITY, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
:
-------------------------------------------------------
CASE NO.: 1:14-CV-01729
OPINION AND ORDER
[Resolving Doc. 65]
JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
On February 4, 2015, Plaintiff Noel A. Cummings and Defendant Greater Cleveland
Regional Transit Authority (“GCRTA”) settled this employment discrimination case.1 On August
29, 2016, Plaintiff Cummings moved to vacate the settlement agreement and reinstate her
complaint.2 On September 28, 2016, this Court denied Plaintiff’s motion.3
On October 22, 2016, Plaintiff Cummings filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s
denial of her motion to vacate.4 For the reasons below, this Court DENIES Plaintiff Cummings’
motion.
I.
Background
On August 5, 2016, Plaintiff Cummings filed a motion to review her settlement agreement
with Defendant Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (“GCRTA”), arguing that its terms
conflict with the definition of “earnable salary” under Ohio Revised Code § 145.01 (R)(2)(h).5 The
Court denied the motion, citing lack of an actual case or controversy as well as a lack of
1
Doc. 43.
Doc. 60.
3
Doc. 64.
4
Doc. 65. Plaintiff Cummings’ former counsel, Harvey Abens Iosue Co., LPA, and Defendants both oppose the
motion. Docs. 66, 68. Plaintiff has also appealed this Court’s denial of her motion to vacate the settlement. Doc. 67.
5
Doc. 55.
2
Case No. 1:14-CV-01729
Gwin, J.
jurisdiction.6 Since then, the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System (“OPERS”) has
determined that Cummings should not receive OPERS credit for a period of suspension agreed to
in the settlement agreement, Ohio Rev. Code § 145.01 and Ohio Admin. Code § 145-1-26(H)(1).7
After the OPERS determination, Plaintiff Cummings moved to vacate the settlement
agreement and reinstate her complaint.8 The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion because it (1) was
untimely under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and (c)(1); and (2) failed on the merits.9
Plaintiff Cummings now moves the Court to reconsider its decision.10 She argues that
reconsideration is appropriate because her counsel and Defendants fraudulently induced her to
enter the settlement agreement, the parties made a mutual mistake in entering the agreement, and
enforcement of the agreement would no longer be equitable.11
II.
Legal Standard
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not describe motions to reconsider. The Sixth
Circuit, however, has held that a motion to vacate and reconsider may be treated under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) as a motion to alter or amend a judgment.12 Orders granting
motions for reconsideration are extraordinary and are seldom granted because they contradict
notions of finality and repose.13
A court may grant a motion to amend or alter a judgment “to correct a clear error of law;
account for newly discovered evidence or an intervening change in the controlling law; or
6
Doc. 59.
Doc. 60-1.
8
Doc. 60.
9
Doc. 64.
10
Doc. 65.
11
Id.
12
Basinger v. CSX Transp., Inc., 91 F.3d 143, 1996 WL 400182, at *2 (6th Cir. July 16, 1996) (unpublished table
opinion); Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 62 (6th Cir. 1979).
13
See Plaskon Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 644, 669 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
7
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Gwin, J.
otherwise prevent manifest injustice.”14 “It is not the function of a motion to reconsider either to
renew arguments already considered and rejected by a court or ‘to proffer a new legal theory or
new evidence to support a prior argument when the legal theory or argument could, with due
diligence, have been discovered and offered during the initial consideration of the issue.’”15
III.
Discussion
The Court declines to reconsider its September 28, 2016 decision denying Plaintiff
Cummings’ request to vacate the settlement agreement under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
60(b)(1).16 Cummings does not show a clear error of law, present new evidence, 17 or
demonstrate manifest injustice if the Court’s order remains intact. Instead, she presents largely
the same arguments included in her original motion.18
At bottom, Plaintiff Cummings argues that the settlement agreement was based on a
mutual mistake —a belief by both parties that a work suspension agreed to in the settlement
agreement would satisfy Ohio law’s definition of “earnable salary.”19 However, Plaintiff
Cummings defeats her own argument within her motion to reconsider.
Plaintiff Cummings argues that both her counsel and Defendant GCRTA fraudulently
induced her into entering the settlement agreement.20 She says that her lawyer and Defendant
Heil Co. v. Evanston Ins. Co., 690 F.3d 722, 728 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing GenCorp, Inc. v. Am. Int’l Underwriters,
178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999)).
15
McConocha v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio, 930 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (quoting In re
August 1993 Regular Grand Jury, 854 F. Supp. 1403, 1408 (S.D. Ind. 1994)).
16
Plaintiff Cummings argues that her original motion to vacate the settlement should have been considered under
Fed. Rule Civ. P 60(b)(5-6), such that the one-year time bar under Fed. Rule Civ. P. 60(c)(1) would not apply. See
Doc. 65 at 9. But, as the Court stated in its September 28, 2016 order, her argument is based on a mistake of law.
Doc. 64 at n. 13. Therefore, Fed. Rule Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and the accompanying one-year time bar apply, thereby
making Plaintiff’s original motion untimely. And, regardless of the motion’s timeliness, it fails on the merits.
17
Plaintiff Cummings cites various emails in her motion to reconsider as evidence of her fraud claim. Doc. 65 at 24. As these emails were attached to her initial motion to review the settlement agreement, Doc. 55-1, they are not
“newly discovered evidence” and do not support reconsideration. See Doc. 65 at 2 n.1.
18
Compare Doc. 60 with Doc. 65.
19
See Doc. 65.
20
Doc. 65 at 6.
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Case No. 1:14-CV-01729
Gwin, J.
“were both well-aware at the time of the offer, that certain of its terms were non-compliant with
the [Ohio Revised Code] with respect to earnable salary.”21
The settlement agreement was not contingent on a favorable determination from OPERS.
GCRTA made no promises to Cummings about how OPERS would treat the wages. Defendant
Greater Cleveland RTA did not represent or warrant that OPERS would deem the settlement to
be “earnable salary” under OPERS. Cummings does not show a mutual mistake.
Even assuming that Cummings’ lawyer and Defendant GCRTA had both known that the
agreement did not comply with Ohio law, no mutual mistake occurred. Instead, only Plaintiff
Cummings was mistaken as to the settlement agreement’s validity. A unilateral mistake does not
support Rule 60(b)(1) relief.22
Because Plaintiff Cummings renews an argument already rejected by this Court in its
original order, reconsideration is not appropriate. Therefore, for the reasons above, this Court
DENIES Plaintiff Cumming’s motion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 8, 2016
s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
21
Id.
Brown v. Cty. of Genesee, 872 F.2d 169, 174 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Hill v. Ohio State Univ., 870 F. Supp. 2d
526, 533 (S.D. Ohio 2012).
22
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