Akin-Olugbade v. City of Cleveland

Filing 3

Opinion and Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 1/7/15 granting plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis and setting forth the grounds for dismissal of the complaint. (Related Docs. 1 , 2 ) (M,G)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
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DEMILADE AKIN-OLUGBADE,
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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CITY OF CLEVELAND,
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Defendant.
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CASE NO. 1:14-CV-01828

OPINION & ORDER
[Resolving Doc. No. 1]

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Pro se Plaintiff Demilade Akin-Olugbade filed this action against the City of Cleveland,
Ohio. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges one of his Cleveland properties was demolished and
the Defendant did not notify him of its destruction. He seeks monetary damages and reopening
of Case No. 1:12 CV 464 (N.D. Ohio May 22, 2012)(Gwin, J.) in which he asserted the same
claim pertaining to his property at 2176 E. 83rd Street, Cleveland, Ohio.
Plaintiff also filed an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (Doc. No. 2). That
Application is granted.
I. Background
The Complaint is very brief. Plaintiff lists his address as a post office box in Boston,
Massachusetts. He states he came to Cleveland on January 29, 2014 to view his properties to

make certain they were still boarded up. He contends he returned to Cleveland again in August
2014 and discovered one of his vacant structures had been demolished. He claims he was not
notified by mail or telephone of the demolition. He states he would like to be compensated for
the value of his property.
II. Legal Standard
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is
required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v.
City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or
fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
“plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A
pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the
pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The
Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A

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pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a Complaint, the Court must construe the
pleading in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151
F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).
III. Analysis
As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not give the Court any indication of the legal claim or
claims he intended to assert in this action. He simply states, “the federal court is in charge of
misconduct and violating the laws of the federal government regarding housing for minorities.”
Although the standard of review is liberal, it requires more than bare assertions of legal
conclusions. Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726-27 (6th Cir. 1996). The
Complaint must “give the defendants ‘fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.’ ” Id. at 726. This Complaint fails to contain sufficient factual allegations
to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.
It is possible Plaintiff may be attempting to assert a claim for denial of due process. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. In addition to setting the
procedural minimum for deprivations of life, liberty, or property, the Due Process Clause bars
“certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). It does not prohibit every deprivation by
the state of a person’s life, liberty or property. Harris v. City of Akron, 20 F.3d 1396, 1401 (6th
Cir. 1994). Only those deprivations which are conducted without due process are subject to suit

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
To state a claim for the denial of procedural due process, Plaintiff must plead and prove
either that he was deprived of liberty or property as a result of an established state procedure that
itself violates due process rights; or that the Defendant deprived him of liberty or property
pursuant to a random and unauthorized act and available state remedies would not be adequate
to redress the deprivation. Macene v. MJW, Inc., 951 F.2d 700, 706 (6th Cir. 1991); see Vicory
v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1064 (6th Cir. 1983). At this point in the inquiry, the Court is left to
guess at basic elements of the claim. First, Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting the City
of Cleveland was responsible for the demolition of the structure in question. He does not allege
what interactions, if any, he had with the City of Cleveland concerning this property. He simply
states that the structure on his property was intact when he left town in January 2014 and was
gone when he returned in August. He concludes, without explanation, that the City of Cleveland
is liable. He states that his properties were boarded up, suggesting he owns more than one
property in Cleveland, and that those properties were vacant and uninhabitable. He briefly
mentions some required renovations but he does not explain which renovations, if any, were
ordered to be performed, who ordered them to be performed, or by when the renovations were to
be completed. Procedural due process claims do not focus on the end result or the egregiousness
of the deprivation itself, but only question whether the process accorded to the deprivation was
constitutionally sufficient. Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1350 (6th Cir. 1996). Without
any factual allegations concerning his interactions with the City of Cleveland, Plaintiff does not
satisfy the basic pleading requirements under Federal Civil Procedure Rule 8 to state a claim for

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denial of due process.
To the extent Plaintiff intended to assert some other claim, he failed to do so. Principles
requiring generous construction of pro se pleadings are not without limits. See Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir.
1985). A Complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the
material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements.
See Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). District
courts are not required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct
full blown claims from sentence fragments. Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278. To do so would
“require ...[the courts] to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, ... [and]
would...transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Id. at
1278. Moreover, Plaintiff’s failure to identify a particular legal theory in his Complaint places
an unfair burden on the Defendants to speculate on the potential claims that Plaintiff may be
raising against them and the defenses they might assert in response to each of these possible
causes of action. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d at 594. Even liberally construed, the Complaint
does not sufficiently state the federal claim or claims upon which Plaintiff intends to base his
this action.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. No. 2) is
granted and this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court certifies,

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good
faith.1
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 7, 2015

1

s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides:
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that it is not
taken in good faith.
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