Brown v. Carmeuse Lime & Stone, Inc. et al

Filing 69

Memorandum and Opinion. American Steamship's Motion for Summary Judgment 43 is GRANTED as to the unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure claims, and DENIED as to the Jones Act claim. Judge Donald C. Nugent on 7/18/16. (G,CA)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL BROWN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CARMEUSE LIME & STONE, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 1:14-CV-2037
JUDGE DONALD C. NUGENT

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION

This matter is before the Court upon a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendant, American Steamship Company (hereafter “American Steamship”). (ECF #43).
Plaintiff filed a Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #67), and Co-Defendant,
O-N Minerals (Michigan) Company, (hereafter “ONM”), filed a Brief in Opposition to the
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #55). American Steamship filed its Reply Brief in Support
of its Motion for Summary Judgment, also asking this Court to disregard ONM’s Motion for lack
of standing (ECF #68).1 This matter is fully briefed and ripe for review.
For the reasons more fully set forth below, American Steamship’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

1

To date, the Sixth Circuit has not addressed the issue of whether one CoDefendant has standing to oppose another Co-Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
absent cross-claims between the Defendants. See Stone v. Marten Transport, LLC, 2014 WL
1666420 (M.D. Tenn, Apr. 25, 2014) at *4. Therefore, this Court makes its ruling based upon
the motions filed by Plaintiff and American Steamship.

I.

FACTS2
This action is based upon personal injuries Plaintiff sustained on August 16, 2014, while

working as an employee of American Steamship. Plaintiff was a deckhand aboard the “M/V
American Courage,” responsible for mooring the vessel when it reached the Cleveland Bulk
Terminal dock (hereafter “CBT dock”), located in Cleveland, Ohio. Defendant ONM owns and
operates the CBT dock. Plaintiff had safely disembarked from the vessel and was standing on
the dock when he slipped and fell on iron-ore pellets left on the dock.
Plaintiff sets forth three claims against American Steamship: (1) unseaworthiness under
general maritime law; (2) maintenance and cure under general maritime law; and (3) negligence
under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. §30104. Plaintiff has admitted that American Steamship has
met its obligation regarding maintenance and cure, and therefore, summary judgment is granted
in American Steamship’s favor on that claim.3
II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s unseaworthiness and Jones Act causes of action are separate claims comprised

of different elements. Syzmanski v. Columbia Transp. Co., a Div. of Oglebay-Norton Co., 154
F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 1998)(citing Cook, 53 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1995). A Jones Act cause of
action is based upon the shipowner’s negligence, whereas an unseaworthiness cause of action
has no negligence element. Id.
A.

UNSEAWORTHINESS

The admiralty doctrine of unseaworthiness imposes an absolute, nondelegable duty on

2

The factual summary is based upon the parties’ statements of fact. Those material
facts which are controverted and supported by deposition testimony, affidavit or other evidence
are stated in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party.
3

See ECF #67, p. 16.

shipowners to provide a vessel with equipment, appurtenances, and crew reasonably suited for
their intended purpose. Cook v. American S.S. Co., 53 F.3d at 741(citation omitted). The term
“appurtenances” has been defined as items that are “specifically identifiable,” must be “destined
for use aboard a specifically identifiable vessel” and “essential to the vessel’s navigation,
operation or mission.” Gonzalez v. M/V Destiny Panama, 102 F.Supp.2d 1352, 1354-57
(S.D.Fla.2000). Unseaworthiness can arise from defective gear, an unfit or understaffed crew,
use of an improper method of storing or unloading cargo, or misuse of properly-functioning
equipment when so directed by a superior. Taylor v. TECO Barge Line, Inc., 517 F.3d 372, 383
(6th Cir. 2008).
In order to determine whether American Steamship’s vessel was unseaworthy at the time
of Plaintiff’s injury, it must be determined whether the CBT dock upon which Plaintiff was
standing is considered an appurtenance. Numerous courts have held that piers and docks are
considered extensions of land, and are therefore, not appurtenances of a vessel. See, e.g., Victory
Carriers, Inc., v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 92 S.Ct. 418, 422, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971)(finding that a
gangway attached to a vessel is an appurtenance, while a dock is not). It has also been found
that the doctrine of seaworthiness does not apply to a dock owner who does not occupy the
position of owner or operator of a vessel. See, e.g., Florida Fuels, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.,
6 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that because he was holding a mooring line attached to the vessel when
he fell, this “rendered the vessel unseaworthy.” See ECF #67, p. 16. However, the fact that
Plaintiff was holding onto a mooring line does not convert the dock to an appurtenance. See,
e.g., Davis v. W. Bruns & Co., 476 F.2d 246, 248 (5th Cir. 1973)(“the temporary affixing of
steadying wires” from a vessel to conveyer belt on a dock does not render the conveyer belt an

appurtenance.) Moreover, it has been found that the fact that a seaman is sent to work on a dock
does not make the dock a part of the vessel or an extension of the vessel. See Klump v. Oglebay
Norton Marine Services Co., LLC, 2009 WL 1456285 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 1, 2009), at *12
(quoting Henry v. S.S. Mount Evans, 227 F.Supp. 408 (D.C.Md. 1964). Similarly, when an
injury is caused by cargo not yet loaded from the dock onto the vessel, or caused by equipment
located solely on a dock, then the injury is not caused by an appurtenance of the vessel. See
Oliver v. Omega Protein, Inc., 2010 WL 2976522 (E.D.Va. July 19, 2010)(citations omitted).
In this case, the CBT dock is not considered an appurtenance of American Steamship’s
vessel, and therefore, American Steamship is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the
unseaworthiness claim.
Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that the vessel’s officers were “incompetent in the exercise
of their supervision under the circumstances” when they failed to use the vessel’s spotlights to
illuminate the dock area where Plaintiff fell. See ECF #67 pp.14-15. Plaintiff does not allege
that the spotlights were defective or in disrepair. Plaintiff sets forth no evidence in the record to
support the contention that any of American Steamship’s employees were improperly trained,
incompetent, or “played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury, and
that the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the
unseaworthiness.” Smith v. Basic Marine Services, Inc., 964 F.Supp.2d 597 (E.D.La. Aug. 7,
2013)(citations omitted). See also Salamon v. Motor Vessel Polling Bros. No. 11, Inc., 751
F.Supp. 343 (E.D.N.Y 1991)(finding that vessel employee’s failure to use spotlight to illuminate
dock stairwell owned and operated by another defendant was not sufficient to show liability for
unseaworthiness).
Therefore, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim of unseaworthiness fails and Defendant

American Steamship is entitled to Summary Judgment on this claim.
B.

JONES ACT

Under the Jones Act, an employer has a duty to provide a safe work place for its
employees. Rannals v. Diamond Jo Casino, 265 F.3d 442, 449 (6th Cir.2001). A plaintiff must
show that his employer breached this duty by failing to “protect against foreseeable risks of
harm.” Perkins v. Am. Elec. Power Fuel Supply, Inc., 246 F.3d 593, 599 (6th Cir.2001).
Therefore, there must be “some evidence from which the trier of fact can infer that the owner
either knew, or in the exercise of due care, should have known of the unsafe condition.” Id. In
light of this very low evidentiary threshold, the Sixth Circuit has expressed its reluctance to
dispose of Jones Act claims through summary judgment, and even marginal claims are properly
left for jury determination. Daughenbaugh v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 891 F.2d 1199, 1207 (6th
Cir.1989)(citations omitted).
In this matter, American Steamship entered into an “Iron Ore Handling Services
Agreement” with ONM, which governed the use, operations, and maintenance of the CBT dock.
(ECF #67-1). However, American Steamship has argued that because it did not own or control
the CBT dock, and because it notified ONM of its impending arrival at the dock on August 16,
2014, that it discharged its “legal obligation to provide [Plaintiff] with a reasonably safe
workplace.” (ECF #43, pp. 16-17.) This argument is contrary to current case law, which finds
that a Jones Act employer can be held responsible for injuries caused by the negligence of its
agent, in this case, ONM. Rannals v. Diamond Jo Casino, 265 F.3d at 451. This finding
supports the non-delegable duty of an employer to provide a safe work place for its employees
under the Jones Act. Id.
Plaintiff has raised several issues of fact regarding American Steamship and its

employees’ potential negligence under the Jones Act surrounding the accident of August 16,
2014. Plaintiff has alleged that spotlights could have illuminated the dock area and that his
crewmates knew about and failed to warn him of the dark, slippery and hazardous condition of
the dock. (See ECF #67, p.3). Defendant counters that Plaintiff’s crewmates had “no
opportunity” to correct the conditions on the dock, and that it was ONM who had the duty to
“clean up the taconite, fix the dysfunctional lights [and] correct [any] hazards.” (ECF #68, pp. 78). Plaintiff also argues that he was not properly or formally trained by his employer, American
Steamship. (Id. at p. 5). Defendant counters that it conducted appropriate “on-board and on-thejob training” as well as required safety briefings with Plaintiff and crewmates. (ECF #68, p.4).
These are factual issues that may or may not impute negligence to American Steamship for
Plaintiff’s injuries under the Jones Act, and these questions of fact should be decided by a jury.
Rannals, 265 F.3d at 451.
Therefore, this Court denies summary judgment on the Jones Act claim against American
Steamship.
III.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, American Steamship’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF

#43) is GRANTED as to the unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure claims, and DENIED as
to the Jones Act claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Donald C. Nugent
DONALD C. NUGENT
United States District Judge

DATED: July 18, 2016