Moody v. Lorain Metropolitan Housing Authority et al

Filing 55

Memorandum Opinion denying defendant's Motion for summary judgment (Related Doc # 37 ). Case remains set for jury trial at 8:30 a.m. on 2/16/16. Judge Donald C. Nugent 1/5/16(C,KA)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

BARBARA MOODY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LORAIN METROPOLITAN HOUSING
AUTHORITY, et. al,

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CASE NO. 14-CV-2063
JUDGE DONALD C. NUGENT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants.
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant’s, Lorain Metropolitan Housing
Authority’s, (hereafter “LMHA”), Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #37). Plaintiff, Barbara
Moody, (hereafter “Moody”), filed a Complaint against LMHA alleging violations of the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601 et seq., (hereafter referred to as “the FHA”) and Ohio Revised
Code §4112.02(H).1 Moody filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment, (ECF #43), and Defendant filed a Response Brief. (ECF #50). Therefore, the issues
have been fully briefed and are ripe for review. For the reasons set forth herein, LMHA’s Motion
for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the court is satisfied “that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if its resolution will affect the outcome of

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Plaintiff’s Complaint also set forth a claim of conversion against Defendants
Harry and Heather Gongloff and Gongloff Properties. This Court granted a Joint
Motion to Dismiss these Defendants on September 17, 2015.

the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Accordingly, proper
summary judgment analysis entails “the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need
for a trial – whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be
resolved only by a finder of fact because they many reasonably be resolved in favor of either
party.” Id. at 250. It is with these standards in mind that the instant Motion must be decided.
At all times relevant herein, Moody was a tenant in a house located at 2363 Kelly Place,
Lorain, Ohio (hereafter “Kelly Place”). This house was owned by Gongloff Properties and
Moody’s rent was partially paid through the LMHA’s housing choice voucher program. Plaintiff
claims that she is considered handicapped under the FHA, and provided medical documentation to
LMHA indicating several medical conditions, including advanced osteoarthritis in her hips.
Plaintiff alleges that she was improperly denied reasonable accommodations by LMHA when she
was not provided with a single-story residence as necessitated by her condition.
Defendant argues that Moody cannot prove that she was denied reasonable
accommodations because she cannot satisfy the “necessity-causality” element under the FHA.
(ECF #37, p. 16). Defendant claims that the Kelly Place property was used by Plaintiff as a
single-story unit, and therefore, should be considered reasonable. (Id. at p. 15). Defendant also
alleges that Plaintiff’s “request to move was not motivated by her alleged handicap, but rather,
was prompted by her unfounded fear that the bedbug infestation at the Kelly Place Property had
not been eradicated.” (Id. at p. 18).
Based upon a thorough review of the briefs submitted by the parties, as well as the
materials submitted in support thereof, the Court finds that both parties have established that there
is some evidence to support their respective positions in this lawsuit. Plaintiff has provided some

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evidence to meet the required elements of an FHA discrimination claim against LMHA for failing
to provide reasonable accommodations, and LMHA has provided some evidence that supports its
defense that it acted in a non-discriminatory manner. Therefore, genuine issues of material fact
exist which make summary judgment inappropriate in this case. Accordingly, Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #37) is DENIED. This case remains set for jury trial at 8:30
a.m. on February 16, 2016.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Donald C. Nugent
DONALD C. NUGENT
United States District Judge

DATED: January 5, 2016

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