Beasley v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 17

Memorandum and Opinion: Based upon a review of the record and law, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed; substantial evidence supports the finding of the Administrative Law Judge that plaintiff cannot perform past relevant work; however, plaintiff is still able to perform other work that exists in substantial numbers in the economy; therefore, plaintiff was not disabled, and she is not entitled to disability insurance benefits (Related document 1 ). Signed by Magistrate Judge George J. Limbert on 5/15/15. (S,AA) Modified docket text on 5/15/2015 (S,AA).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

BRONETTA S. BEASLEY
Plaintiff
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Defendant.

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CASE NO. 1:14CV2118
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
GEORGE J. LIMBERT
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION

Plaintiff requests judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying Bronetta S. Beasley Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB). The Plaintiff asserts that the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in her May 22, 2013 decision in finding that Plaintiff was not
disabled. The ALJ determined that she is unable to perform her past relevant work, she is able to
perform other work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy (Tr. 8-70). The Court
finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision for the following reasons:

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, Bronetta S. Beasley, filed her application for DIB on January 5, 2012, alleging she

became disabled on January 4, 2012 (Tr. 184-191). Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and
on reconsideration (Tr. 85-127, 134-140). Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ, and on
February 6, 2013, a hearing was held where Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified before an
ALJ, and Dr. James Soldner, a vocational expert, also testified (Tr. 27-70).
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On May 22, 2013, the ALJ issued her decision, finding Plaintiff not to be disabled (Tr. 8-22).
Plaintiff requested a review before the Appeals Council, and the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review (Tr. 1-6). Therefore, Plaintiff has requested judicial review of the Commissioner’s
final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g).

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff was born on December 5, 1965, which made her forty-nine years old when the ALJ

denied her request for DIB (Tr. 8-22). Plaintiff has a high school education and past work experience
as a machine operator and cashier (Tr. 27-70).

III.

SUMMARY OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE
Plaintiff received care at the Free Clinic of Lorain County. On April 5, 2010, she complained

of pain and cramping in her feet and shoulders (Tr. 659). Her A1C was elevated at 11.6, and she was
diagnosed with poor diabetes control (Tr. 681). Subsequent tests documented continuing elevated
A1C, at 7.4 on April 1, 2011 and 9.7 on July 26, 2011 (Tr. 674, 677). On April 19, 2011, they found
paresthesia in her bilateral lower extremities consistent with diabetic neuropathy (Tr. 652). On
December 8, 2011, they found multiple trigger points in her upper arms, upper back, upper thighs and
knees, in addition to pelvic pain. The generalized pain had been present for eight months (Tr. 649).
On February 20, 2012, they noted continued complaints of multiple joint pain worse in the past year,
with x-rays revealing only mild osteoarthritis. A diagnosis of fibromyalgia was made (Tr. 647).
On April 14, 2011, she was seen by Dr. Serna for complaints of pain and limitation of motion
in her left shoulder. An MRI showed mild to moderate rotator cuff tendinopathy and AC joint arthritis.

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She was given an injection (Tr. 432-436).
On November 28, 2011, Plaintiff was seen in the emergency room at Mercy Regional Medical
Center, complaining of pain in her legs, back, arm, hands, and neck. She was diagnosed with
hyperglycemia and myalgia and told to follow up with her primary care physician (Tr. 463-464). She
was recorded to be a non-smoker (Tr. 460).
Dr. Mendoza is Plaintiff’s primary care physician. On February 7, 2012, he completed a
questionnaire, and reported that Plaintiff suffers from herniated disc, fibromyalgia and diabetes with
pain in her legs, arms, back, feet and hands that had become increasingly worse in the last two years
(Tr. 631). He reported that she had a poor response to pain medications, such as Vicodin and Ultram,
and that Neurontin provided little relief for her neuropathy. He stated that she could not do sustained
lifting, bending or repetitive activity, although she could care for her personal needs (Tr. 632). He
attached the MRI results (Tr. 636-639) and an endocrinologist’s notes in support of his opinion (Tr.
641-643). His office notes of that date record limitation of motion and tenderness in both shoulders,
tenderness in left elbow, hip and ankle, right ankle, lumbar spine and thoracic spine. He diagnosed
diabetes and fibromyalgia and prescribed Vicodin for both the diabetic pain and fibromyalgia (Tr.
719-720). On September 20, 2012, Dr. Mendoza noted that Plaintiff had constant moderate back pain
that was increased by twisting, sitting, lying down and bending. She also experienced moderate neck
pain aggravated by twisting and bending. On examination, she was found to have limitation of motion
and muscle spasm in both the neck and back. He referred her for a neurosurgical consult (Tr. 723724). He noted that she had quit smoking on August 3, 2011 (Tr. 726).
On May 7, 2010, Plaintiff came under the care of Dr. Jeet, an endocrinologist, for treatment
of her uncontrolled diabetes (Tr. 608-609). He found that she also suffered from diabetic neuropathy
and radiculopathy at the level of the neck and lower extremities based upon the result of abnormal
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microfilament (Tr. 607). He ordered an MRI of her spine, which showed multiple level disc bulges,
and he referred her to neurosurgeon Dr. Sertich (Tr. 624-628). Her blood glucose was measured at
301 on September 13, 2011 (Tr. 622). On October 3, 2011, Dr. Jeet noted that control of Plaintiff’s
diabetes was worsening, she was now describing episodes of blurred vision. He diagnosed pancreatic
disease associated with her uncontrolled diabetes (Tr. 604-605). On November 28, 2011, her glucose
was measured at 274 (Tr. 616). On December 12, 2011, he noted that her symptoms included fatigue,
blurred vision, and edema, and that she had diabetic neuropathy pain, numbness in lower legs, worse
in the evening (Tr. 600-601). Subsequent records document persistent elevation in her A1C (Tr. 791,
794, 797).
On January 21, 2011, Plaintiff was seen at Neurospine Center by Dr. Gonzalez for evaluation
of the increasing pain in her neck. On examination, he found tenderness and limitation of motion in
the neck and thoracic and lumbar spines. Straight leg raising was positive for back pain. Deep tendon
reflexes were depressed at 1+ and he could not elicit either ankle jerk. He reviewed the MRI findings
from January 8, 2011, and concluded that her pain was related to mechanical back pain secondary to
degenerative changes throughout the spine, obesity, and possible diabetic neuropathy.

He

recommended conservative therapy, as her problems could not be corrected with surgery (Tr. 811812). Plaintiff was not seen again until September 7, 2012, when she reported worsening severe back
pain, and he found that she had severe limitation of motion in the lumbar spine. There was sensory
loss in the feet and reflex loss in both the upper and lower extremities. His diagnosis remained the
same, and he again recommended physical therapy (Tr. 809). On November 26, 2012, she was
evaluated by Dr. Choi at the request of Dr. Mendoza. Dr. Choi found deep tendon reflexes of the
knees and ankles were absent. Her gait was antalgic. Sitting and standing were uncomfortable.
Straight leg raising was limited on the left. Motion of the spine was limited. He concluded that she
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suffered from mechanical back pain, spondylosis, left L5 radicular pain, and recommended injections
(Tr. 804-805).
On February 21, 2012, Plaintiff was seen by psychologist Thomas Zeck, at the request of the
state agency charged with the medical evaluation for the disability claim. She reported to him that
she did not have any health insurance and the family income consisted of her husband’s disability
benefits (Tr. 703). She had a past history of drug abuse, but had been clean for two years. She was
taking her insulin and Neurontin. She attended AA meetings. She had a difficult time recalling dates
(Tr. 704). She reported difficulty with sleep and chronic pain. Her mood and affect were consistent
with depression. He diagnosed Major Depressive Disorder and Cocaine Dependence, in remission.
He assigned a GAF score of 50, indicating severe impairment. He opined that she would have a very
difficult time relating appropriately to co-workers and supervisors (Tr. 707-708).
On April 12, 2012, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Darr, at the request of the state agency. He found
mild limitation of motion in her back and knees. He concluded that she suffers from low back and
neck pain, probably from degenerative disc disease, which pose mild to moderate limitations on her
ability to lift and carry (Tr. 714). She told him that she did not use tobacco (Tr. 712).
On April 19,2012, Dr. Das reviewed the records on behalf of the state agency, and concluded
that Plaintiff suffers from severe impairments of osteoarthritis, history of rotator cuff repair, decreased
range of motion in spine and fibromyalgia, but her strength and manipulative abilities were intact.
She concluded that Plaintiff could perform light work with occasional climbing stairs and ramps,
stooping, crouching, crawling. She gave weight to Dr. Darr, but not Dr. Mendoza (Tr. 94-95).
On June 26, 2012, Dr. Green reviewed the records on behalf of the state agency, and she
agreed with the assessment previously made by Dr. Das (Tr. 110-111).

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Plaintiff was seen at The Nord Center for mental health assessment on April 16, 2012, where
she was diagnosed with Major Depression and PTSD, and assigned a GAF score of 51. She was
found to suffer from fatigue, insomnia, difficulty concentrating, repeated episodes of tearfulness (Tr.
755-756). She was noted to be withdrawn and guarded and avoiding eye contact (Tr. 757). She
reported difficulties interacting with people (Tr. 764).
On December 12, 2012, Plaintiff was admitted to Mercy Regional Medical Center for
abdominal pain. She was diagnosed with diverticulitis (Tr. 849-851).
On January 17, 2013, Dr. Mendoza completed a Physical Residual Functional Capacity
Questionnaire. He reported that Plaintiff suffers from low back pain with radiculopathy down her left
leg and diabetic neuropathy in her legs and hands. Sitting, twisting and bending increased the pain.
She was in constant pain and experienced moodiness and agitation every day. She could not tolerate
even low stress. She was unable to sit or stand for more than ten minutes at a time in a work setting,
and could perform no more than two hours in an eight-hour day. She could not lift ten pounds
occasionally. She would likely miss work more than four days in a month. She cannot tolerate stress,
cold or humidity (Tr. 832-836).

IV.

SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
At the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that the date listed on her application for

benefits of January 4, 2012 was not when her disability began, but it was the date that she realized she
would not be able to sustain work activity. The date of January 4, 2012 was the day she was laid off
from her job (Tr. 49). However, she stated that she applied for disability benefits at that time because
she finally accepted that she was not going to feel better and be able to sustain work activity (Tr. 32).
She thought that was the day she felt pain all over and she went to the emergency room at Mercy
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Hospital, where tests were done and she was told she had degenerative discs in her back and given
a shot (Tr. 33, 49). She has not had health insurance for most of the relevant period of time, although
she was approved for Medicaid for several months at the end of 2012 (Tr. 33). In reviewing her work
history, she admitted to working a variety of jobs, many of which were part-time or for temporary
agencies, and she was not certain of the dates for all of them (Tr. 34-47). She described discomfort
sitting in the chair during the hearing, due to increased back pain (Tr. 48). She had experienced
significant increase in her pain when she worked her last job at the end of 2011 and would come home
every night stiff and swollen and in pain (Tr. 49). She had run out of her medication about two weeks
before the hearing, and had gone eight months without it in the year before the hearing (Tr. 50). She
experienced increased pain and stiffness when she was without medication. She had been prescribed
insulin and Neurontin, but she was without them for most of the relevant period. When she was able
to take the insulin regularly, her blood sugar readings improved, but she never achieved good control
(Tr. 52). She had completed a substance abuse program in 2010, and she attended meetings to
maintain her sobriety whenever her heath permitted (Tr. 53-54). She has good days when she can do
some cleaning and cooking, but mostly bad days when she is in too much pain to do anything (Tr. 5657). She was being treated for depression at The Nord Center, but she could not afford the medication
they prescribed. She has a poor memory for dates and has trouble concentrating (Tr. 58).
Thereafter, Vocational Expert Soldner testified at the request of the ALJ. He testified that
Plaintiff’s past relevant work consists of machine operator and cashier (Tr. 59). In response to a
hypothetical question for an individual who can engage in light work, with occasional push and pull
with the upper or lower extremities, and occasional climbing ramps and stairs, occasional crouching,
crawling, or stooping, with unskilled work but no machine driven pace, and only occasional
interaction with the public, co-workers and supervisors, including speaking, signaling, taking
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instructions and helping, he testified that such a person cannot perform her past relevant work (Tr.
59-60). In addition, other jobs that such a hypothetical person could perform are marker II, fruit
distributor, and plastic hospital products assembler (Tr. 60). In response to questions from Plaintiff’s
counsel, the vocational expert testified that missing four days of work per month would not be
tolerated by employers in the competitive job market, nor would an employee being off task more
than 10-15 percent of the workday (Tr. 68-69).

V.

STEPS TO EVALUATE ENTITLEMENT TO SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
An ALJ must proceed through the required sequential steps for evaluating entitlement to

disability insurance benefits. These steps are:
1.

An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful
activity will not be found to be “disabled” regardless of medical
findings (Sections 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(b) and 416.920(b) (1992);

2.

An individual who does not have a “severe impairment” will not be
found to be “disabled” (Sections 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c)and
416.920(c)(1992);

3.

If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe
impairment which meets the duration requirement, see Sections 20
C.F.R. 404.1509 and 416.909 (1992), and which meets or is equivalent
to a listed impairment in Sections20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1,
a finding of disabled will be made without consideration of vocational
factors (Sections 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d) and 416.920(d) (1992);

4.

If an individual is capable of performing the kind of work he or she has
done in the past, a finding of “not disabled” must be made (Sections 20
C.F.R. 404.1520(e) and 416.920(e) (1992);

5.

If an individual’s impairment is so severe as to preclude the
performance of the kind of work he or she has done in the past, other
factors including age, education, past work experience and residual
functional capacity must be considered to determine if other work can
be performed (Sections 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f) (1992).

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Hogg v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 1992). The claimant has the burden of going forward
with the evidence at the first four steps and the Commissioner has the burden at Step Five to show that
alternate jobs in the economy are available to the claimant, considering her age, education, past work
experience and residual functional capacity. See, Moon v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1181 (6th Cir.
1990).

VI.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Social Security Act, the ALJ weighs the evidence, resolves any conflicts, and makes

a determination of disability. This Court’s review of such a determination is limited in scope by
Section 205 of the Act, which states that the “findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to
any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g).
Therefore, this Court is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s findings and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. See,
Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 1990). The Court cannot reverse the ALJ’s decision,
even if substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion, so
long as substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion. See, Walters v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 127 F.3d 525., 528 (6th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence,
but less than a preponderance. See, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). It is evidence
that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the challenged conclusion. See, id.,
Walters, 127 F.3d 525, 532 (6th Cir. 1997). Substantiality is based upon the record taken as a whole.
See, Houston v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 736 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1984).

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VII.

ANALYSIS
Plaintiff raises four legal issues:
A.

Whether the finding that Plaintiff can perform substantial gainful
activity is supported by substantial evidence? 42 U.S.C. Section
405(g).

B.

Whether the Commissioner accorded appropriate weight to the report
of the treating physician? Shelman v. Heckler, 821 F.2d 316, 320-1 (6th
Cir. 1987); 20 C.F.R. 404.1527.

C.

Whether the Commissioner accorded appropriate weight to the report
of the consultative examiner? 20 C.F.R. Sections 404.1502 and
404.1527(c)(2).

D.

Whether the Commissioner’s determination as to the claimant’s
credibility and residual functional capacity are supported by substantial
evidence? Rogers v. Commissioner, 486 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2007).

In her decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is not disabled. She found that Plaintiff is able
to perform a reduced range of light work and is unable to perform her past relevant work. However,
she can perform other substantial gainful activity, such as the jobs of marker, fruit distributor, and
plastic hospital products assembler (Tr. 21). She gave great weight to the report of Dr. Darr and little
weight to the report of Dr. Mendoza (Tr. 18).
Based upon substantial evidence, the ALJ correctly found that Plaintiff’s allegations were not
fully credible. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s physical impairments significantly reduced her capacity
to work, but correctly concluded that the record did not fully support Plaintiff’s allegations of
disabling limitations (Tr. 17). An ALJ’s finding concerning the credibility of an applicant is entitled
to great weight and deference. Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). The
Sixth Circuit has stated that courts are “limited to evaluating whether or not the ALJ’s explanations
for partially discrediting [claimant] are reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the
record.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F3d 469, 476 (6th Cir. 2003). In reviewing a claimant’s
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credibility as to subjective allegations, an ALJ must review whether a claimant’s symptoms and
limitations are supported by the medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. Section 404.1529(a). In
making this determination, the ALJ thoroughly reviewed the factors for evaluating Plaintiff’s
credibility, and noted that the record did not fully support Plaintiff’s allegations (Tr. 16-20).
In determining Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ also found inconsistencies between her
complaints and the record. She noted that the objective medical evidence did not support Plaintiff’s
complaints (Tr. 17). This undermined her credibility. 20 C.F.R. Section 404.1529(c)(4) (stating an
ALJ must consider whether there are conflicts between a claimant’s statements and the signs and
laboratory findings).
In this case, the ALJ noted that imaging showed only mild-to-moderate degenerative disc
disease (Tr. 17; Tr. 639). In addition, the consultative examination was normal, except for some
decreased range of motion in the spine (Tr. 711-718). Furthermore, while Plaintiff complained of
upper extremity pain and weakness, she did not complain of those symptoms at the consultative
examination, and the physical examination showed good strength and range of motion in the upper
extremities (Tr. 18; 713-715). While Plaintiff claimed she had severe mental limitations, examinations
were essentially normal, and her treatment providers opined that she had no more than moderate
symptoms and functional limitations (Tr. 776). Hence, the undersigned finds that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s finding that the objective evidence did not support Plaintiff’s complaints.
The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff received conservative treatment and only took over-thecounter medication to relieve her pain (Tr. 17). These facts also undermined Plaintiff’s credibility.
20 C.F.R. Section 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v) (stating an ALJ must consider the type of treatment). In
regard to Plaintiff’s claims of mental impairments, the ALJ noted that she had not sought consistent
mental health treatment (Tr. 18). 20 C.F.R. Sections 404.1529(c)(4) (stating an ALJ must consider
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inconsistencies in the evidence).
The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s reports of the reasons she stopped working were
inconsistent (Tr. 19). At one point, she stated that she became unable to work and filed for disability
benefits in January 2012, after an emergency room visit, but there were no records of treatment on that
date (Tr. 32). She also claimed that her last day of work was in December 2011 (Tr. 49). The ALJ
correctly found these inconsistencies undermined Plaintiff’s credibility.

20 C.F.R. Section

404.1529(c)(4). Furthermore, the ALJ also noted that Plaintiff testified that she stopped working
because she was laid off, not due to her impairments (Tr. 17; 49).
Furthermore, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s activities were not consistent with her complaints.
She indicated that she was able to care for her personal needs, occasionally take care of her
grandchildren, attend church and peer support meetings, shop, and go to medical appointments (Tr.
53, 55, 253-256). In addition, she indicated she was able to perform some light housework (Tr. 254),
which the ALJ noted was inconsistent with what she told Dr. Zeck, i.e., that her husband took care of
all of the household chores (Tr. 19, 707). These activities do not support Plaintiff’s claims. 20 C.F.R.
Section 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (stating an ALJ must consider a claimant’s activities).
Thus, the ALJ gave a number of valid reasons, supported by the record, for finding Plaintiff
was not entirely credible.
Plaintiff does not dispute the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Darr’s examination was inconsistent with
Plaintiff’s complaints (Tr. 18). However, she notes that other physicians recorded positive findings
on examination (Pl. Br. at 12). She also suggests that her impairments could have caused her upper
extremity problems (Pl. Br. at 13). Hence, she is arguing that the evidence supports her testimony.
Plaintiff also suggests that Dr. Darr’s examination was unreliable because he did not examine
her for fibromyalgia (Pl. Br. at 12). The Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ should examine all of
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the evidence, including Dr. Darr’s report, to determine Plaintiff’s actual limitations. See Social
Security Ruling 12-2p, 2012 WL 3104869, at *5 (explaining that the evaluation for symptoms caused
by fibromyalgia is the same as any impairment).
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ concluded that her work record from October 2011 to January
2012 was evidence that she was not disabled (Pl. Br. at 12). However, the Defendant could not find
any place in the decision where the ALJ found her working in that period of time showed she was not
disabled. Actually, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff was able to work while receiving treatment, which
suggested that the treatment was effective (Tr. 17). She observed that Plaintiff’s alleged mental
impairments had not precluded her from working, which showed that her limitations were not as
severe as alleged (Tr. 19). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff gave different accounts of why she
stopped working (Tr. 19). And the ALJ noted that Plaintiff testified that she was laid off from work
(Tr. 19). Hence, the record does not support Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ concluded that the
fact that she worked in late 2011 and early 2012 meant that she was not disabled.
Plaintiff admits that she “had difficulties recalling the dates of her past employment” (Pl. Br.
at 13). This, in essence, undermines her testimony as to being credible, as concluded by the ALJ.
Since Plaintiff admits she had trouble remembering things, she is admitting that her testimony does
not entirely support her credibility. The ALJ did not err in the weight given to conflicting statements.
Plaintiff also alleges errors by the ALJ in considering her tobacco abuse. She claims that the
ALJ erred in finding that she was not credible because her non-compliance with treatment was not
excusable because her reason, i.e., not having enough money, was belied by her smoking cigarettes
(Pl. Br. at 12). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was non-compliant, and that her reason for noncompliance was not credible (Tr. 17-18). Nevertheless, she found the issue of non-compliance was
irrelevant, because even when non-compliant with treatment recommendations, Plaintiff was still able
to perform work at the residual functional capacity found by the ALJ.

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The ALJ did not totally reject Plaintiff’s allegations. The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s
impairments, and found that she could perform a highly restricted range of light work (Tr. 16). The
ALJ correctly evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility, and provided specific reasons for her finding that
Plaintiff was not fully credible. The undersigned finds that the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported
by substantial evidence.
In determining Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ also considered the medical
opinion evidence of record (Tr. 18). The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Mendoza’s opinion (Tr. 18;
Tr. 631-632, 832-836). She noted that the first opinion was inconsistent, in that Dr. Mendoza opined
that Plaintiff was able to care for herself, which included lifting some small objects, but that she could
not do bending, repetitive movement, or lifting (Tr. 18; 631-632). Hence, she gave less weight to that
opinion. 20 C.F.R. Section 404.1527(c); Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 652 (6th Cir.
2006).

In addition, the ALJ observed that both opinions were inconsistent with Dr. Darr’s

examination findings, which indicated only some decreased lumbar range of motion, and showed
normal gait and strength in the extremities (Tr. 18). The ALJ was correct in according less weight to
opinions that are inconsistent with substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. Section
404.1527(c)(4) (stating an ALJ must consider whether an opinion is consistent with the record as a
whole).
Next, Plaintiff argues that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s reasoning, in finding
Dr. Mendoza’s first opinion internally inconsistent. She interprets Dr. Mendoza’s opinion to mean
that she cannot bend, move repetitively, or lift on a sustained basis, and that the ability to care for
herself was meant to apply to her mental functioning, not her physical abilities (Pl. Br. at 10).
However, the ALJ’s conclusion is supported by the record, that the prohibitions applied to physical
abilities as well as mental functioning, and, therefore, the Court accepts the ALJ’s interpretation of
the evidence.

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Finally, Plaintiff does not dispute that Dr. Mendoza’s opinions were inconsistent with Dr.
Darr’s examination. However, she alleges that other examinations showed she had impairments which
could have caused the limitations she claimed (Pl. Br. at 11). The ALJ agreed with her in finding that
Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged
symptoms” (Tr. 17). Plaintiff also contends that Dr. Darr’s examination results should be given less
weight than other examinations because the results were different (Pl. Br. at 11-12). Plaintiff is
arguing that there was inconsistent medical evidence in the record. However, the ALJ is required to
weigh the evidence and give proper weight based upon substantial evidence contained in the entire
record.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Based upon a review of the record and law, the undersigned affirms the ALJ’s decision.
Substantial evidence supports the finding of the ALJ that Plaintiff cannot perform past relevant work.
However, she is still able to perform other work that exists in substantial numbers in the economy,
and, therefore, was not disabled. Hence, she is not entitled to DIB.

Dated: May 15, 2015

/s/George J. Limbert
GEORGE J. LIMBERT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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