Hill v. Mohr
Filing
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Memorandum of Opinion and Order: The plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) against Director Mohr; Warden Lazaroff; Dr. Airaldi; Deputy Warden of Administration Hunsinger; Aramark Food Service Direc tor Guiler; Healthcare Administrator Hensley; John Babjide; and Unit Manager Chief Azmoun. Additionally, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. This action sh all proceed only as against Dr. Olynyk and only with respect to a claim by the plaintiff that Dr. Olynyk was deliberately indifferent to his needs for adequate food and/or medical care in taking crutches away from him. Accordingly, the Clerk's Office is directed to forward the appropriate documents to the U.S. Marshal for service of process on Dr. Olynyk, and a copy of this order shall be included with the documents to be served. The plaintiff's pending motions for copies, appointment of counsel, and to consolidate (Doc. Nos. 21 ,[ 22]) and to renew proceedings (Doc. No. 23 ) are denied. Judge Patricia A. Gaughan on 5/10/16. (LC,S)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
David Tyrone Hill,
Plaintiff,
v.
Gary C. Mohr, et al.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 1:14 CV 2147
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
Memorandum of Opinion and Order
Pro se plaintiff David Tyrone Hill, a prisoner incarcerated in the Mansfield Correctional
Institution (“ManCI”), has filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, indicating
he seeks to sue the Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC)
Gary C. Mohr; ManCI Warden Alan Lazaroff; prison Doctors Airaldi and Olynyk; Deputy
Warden of Administration Angie Hunsinger; Aramark Food Service Director M. Guiler;
Healthcare Administrator J. Hensley; John Babjide; and Unit Manager Chief R. Azmoun. He
has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Allegations
The only factual basis for the plaintiff’s action that is reasonably discernible from his
complaint1 is a September 22, 2014 decision of Dr. Olynyk to take crutches away from him. He
alleges that after he was transferred to ManCI in April 2014, he was issued crutches by Chief
1
The plaintiff has previously filed at least three other civil rights lawsuits against Ohio prison
officials and employees under §1983 alleging constitutional violations in connection with his
confinement in other prisons. See Hill v. Cuyahoga County, Case No. 1: 11 CV 874 (N.D. Ohio);
Hill v. CRUMP Healthcare Administration, Case No. 3: 09 CV 889 (N.D. Ohio);; Hill v. Mason,
No. 1: 06 CV 379 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
Medical Officer Dr. Airaldi “until October 16, 2014.” However, Dr. Olynyk took the crutches
away from him on September 22, 2014, because Olynyk believed the plaintiff was refusing to
properly address his medical treatment. The plaintiff disagrees with Dr. Olynyk’s assessment
that he does not need the crutches and alleges his ambulation without crutches is limited and
painful, and that he is suffering from “starvation” because he is unable to walk to the chow hall.
Other than Drs. Airaldi and Olynyk, the only other defendant he specifically mentions in the
body of his complaint is Warden Lazaroff, who he alleges was “present” but stated he was not a
doctor.
The only reasonably discernible claim the plaintiff alleges is deliberate indifference to
his needs for adequate food and medical care. He seeks injunctive relief of having the crutches
returned to him and $200,000 in monetary damages “for painful and limited ambulation that[’]s
denying food and services.”
Standard of Review
Because the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review his
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608
(6th Cir.1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). That statute
requires the Court to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion of it, that the Court
determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Hill v. Lappin, 630
F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Although pro se complaints are construed liberally, see Boag
v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), in order
to survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must still contain
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“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Hill, 630 F.3d at 471 (holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) governs dismissals
under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)). The allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to raise a
right to relief above a speculative level assuming the allegations are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555.
Upon review, the Court finds the action may proceed only as against Dr. Olynyk;
however, the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted and must be
dismissed against all of the remaining defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B).2
Analysis
A prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for acting with
“deliberate indifference” toward conditions at the prison that created a substantial risk of serious
harm to an inmate. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000), citing Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To make out such a claim, an inmate must demonstrate
both objective and subjective components. He must show that he is incarcerated under
conditions posing a “substantial risk of serious harm” to his health or safety, and that the prison
official in question had “a sufficiently culpable” subjective state of mind. See id.
To prove the subjective component, an inmate must show that the prison official had a
2
It is well-established that “differences in judgment between an inmate and prison medical
personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnosis or treatment [for an inmate] are not enough
to state a deliberate indifference claim,” Dodson v. Wilkinson, 304 F. App’x 434, 440 (6th Cir.
2008), and that allegations of medical malpractice or negligent diagnosis and treatment are also
insufficient to state a claim. Jennings v. Al-Dabagh, 97 F. App’x 548, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2004).
However, the Court will allow the action to proceed against Dr. Olynyk past the screening stage
given the plaintiff’s allegations that he “is not getting food” and is suffering from “starvation” as
a result of Dr. Olynyk’s decision to take away his crutches.
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subjective state of mind more blameworthy than negligence. He must show “the official knows
of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference. Id. at 867, citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 837.
The complaint fails to state a deliberate indifference claim and must be dismissed as
against Angie Hunsinger, M. Guiler, J. Hensley, John Babjide, and R. Azmoun because the
plaintiff does not set forth any specific allegations of alleged wrongful conduct on their part in
the body of his complaint. The Sixth Circuit has made clear that where a person is merely
named as a defendant in an action without any allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is
subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded pro se complaints. See
Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App'x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint
where plaintiff failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his
rights); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App'x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff's claims
where complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants
were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v.
Montgomery, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring
allegations of personal involvement against each defendant); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 90-1010,
1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff's claims against those individuals are
without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would
suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries”).
Likewise, the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim and must be dismissed against
Director Mohr because it does not set forth any specific allegations of misconduct on his part. It
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appears that the plaintiff has sued Mohr solely because he is the Director of the ODRC.
However, it is well-established that liability under §1983 may not be imposed on a supervisory
official solely on the basis of respondeat superior. “[A] §1983 claim must fail against a
supervisory official unless ‘the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in
some other way directly participated in it.’” Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794, 802 (6th Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). The plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of allegations suggesting that
Director Mohr was in any way involved in or encouraged the alleged misconduct of which the
plaintiff complains.
The plaintiff’s allegations are also insufficient to support a plausible claim against
Warden Lazaroff. The plaintiff’s allegations that the Warden was “present” but stated he was
not a doctor suggest, at the most, that the Warden failed to intervene in connection with the
medical decision made by Dr. Olynyk regarding the plaintiff’s need for crutches. There is no
liability under §1983 where a prison official’s only involvement was to deny an administrative
grievance or fail to intervene on an inmate’s behalf as the plaintiff alleges. See Shehee v.
Lutrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999).
Finally, the plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to allege a plausible deliberate
indifference claim against Dr. Airaldi. The plaintiff’s only allegation regarding Dr. Airaldi is
that he gave the plaintiff crutches to use upon his transfer to ManCI. This allegation is
insufficient to support a plausible inference that Dr. Airaldi was “deliberately indifferent” to any
medical or other need the plaintiff had.
Conclusion
For all of the reasons stated above, the plaintiff’s complaint is hereby dismissed pursuant
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to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) against Director Mohr; Warden Lazaroff; Dr. Airaldi; Deputy Warden of
Administration Hunsinger; Aramark Food Service Director Guiler; Healthcare Administrator
Hensley; John Babjide; and Unit Manager Chief Azmoun. Additionally, the Court certifies,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good
faith.
This action shall proceed only as against Dr. Olynyk and only with respect to a claim by
the plaintiff that Dr. Olynyk was deliberately indifferent to his needs for adequate food and/or
medical care in taking crutches away from him. Accordingly, the Clerk’s Office is directed to
forward the appropriate documents to the U.S. Marshal for service of process on Dr. Olynyk,
and a copy of this order shall be included with the documents to be served.
The plaintiff’s pending motions for copies, appointment of counsel, and to consolidate
(Doc. Nos. 21, 22) and to renew proceedings (Doc. No. 23) are denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge
Dated: 5/10/16
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