Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 21

Memorandum Opinion and Order that the decision of the Commissioner denying Brown's applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income be reversed and the matter remanded for further administrative proceedings. (Related docs. # 1 , # 18 ). Signed by Magistrate Judge William H. Baughman, Jr on 3/4/2016. (S,MD)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

RICHARD T. BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

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CASE NO. 1:14 CV 2479

MAGISTRATE JUDGE
WILLIAM H. BAUGHMAN, JR.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER

Introduction
A.

Nature of the case and proceedings
Before me1 is an action by Richard T. Brown under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial

review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his applications
for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income.2 The Commissioner has
answered3 and filed the transcript of the administrative record.4 Under my initial5 and

1

ECF # 18. The parties have consented to my exercise of jurisdiction.

2

ECF # 1.

3

ECF # 12.

4

ECF # 13.

5

ECF # 7.

procedural6 orders, the parties have briefed their positions7 and filed supplemental charts8 and
the fact sheet.9 After review of the briefs, the issues presented, and the record, it was
determined that this case can be decided without oral argument.
B.

Background facts and decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
Brown, who was 26 years old at the time of the administrative hearing,10 graduated

high school and completed some course work in special education.11 He was last employed
as an industrial cleaner in 2011.12
The ALJ, whose decision became the final decision of the Commissioner, found that
Brown had the following severe impairments: bipolar disorder, borderline intellectual
functioning, anxiety disorder, and history of polysubstance abuse.13
After concluding that the relevant impairments did not meet or equal a listing, the ALJ
made the following finding regarding Brown’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”):

6

ECF # 14.

7

ECF # 16 (Brown’s brief); ECF # 19 (Commissioner’s brief); ECF # 20 (Brown’s
reply brief).
8

ECF # 16-1 (Brown’s charts); ECF # 19-1 (Commissioner’s charts).

9

ECF # 15 (Brown’s fact sheet).

10

Id. at 1.

11

Id.

12

ECF # 13, Transcript (“Tr.”) at 212.

13

Id. at 22.
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After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1545 and 416.945)
to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following
nonexertional limitations: he can perform simple, routine tasks in a low stress
environment (no fast pace, strict quotas, frequent duty changes, or jobs that
require reading writing, or arithmetic), in a non-public setting involving
superficial interpersonal interactions with co-workers and supervisors (20 CFR
404.1569a and 416.969a).14
Given that residual functional capacity, the ALJ found Brown capable of his past relevant
work as an industrial cleaner.15
Based on an answer to a hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert at the
hearing setting forth the residual functional capacity finding quoted above, the ALJ
determined alternatively that a significant number of jobs existed locally and nationally that
Brown could perform.16 The ALJ, therefore, found Brown not under a disability.17
C.

Issue on judicial review and decision
Brown asks for reversal of the Commissioner’s decision on the ground that it does not

have the support of substantial evidence in the administrative record. Specifically, Brown
presents the following issue for judicial review:
Whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s residual functional capacity
finding where the ALJ did not explain the omission of restrictions opined by
the State agency physicians that formed the basis of the residual functional
capacity.

14

Id. at 24.

15

Id. at 27.

16

Id. at 29.

17

Id.
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For the reasons that follow, I will conclude that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity
finding is not supported by substantial evidence, and therefore must be remanded.
Analysis
A.

Standards of review

1.

Substantial evidence
The Sixth Circuit in Buxton v. Halter reemphasized the standard of review applicable

to decisions of the ALJs in disability cases:
Congress has provided for federal court review of Social Security
administrative decisions. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). However, the scope of review is
limited under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g): “The findings of the Secretary as to any fact,
if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive....” In other words, on
review of the Commissioner’s decision that claimant is not totally disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the only issue reviewable by
this court is whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence is “ ‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’ ”
The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal merely
because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different
conclusion. This is so because there is a “zone of choice” within which the
Commissioner can act, without the fear of court interference.18

Viewed in the context of a jury trial, all that is necessary to affirm is that reasonable
minds could reach different conclusions on the evidence. If such is the case, the

18

Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
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Commissioner survives “a directed verdict” and wins.19 The court may not disturb the
Commissioner’s findings, even if the preponderance of the evidence favors the claimant.20
I will review the findings of the ALJ at issue here consistent with that deferential
standard.
B.

Application of standards
This case presents a single question concerning the RFC. As formulated, Brown

argues that the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence because it does not include two
mental restrictions that were mentioned by State agency reviewing physicians, despite the
fact that the opinions of these sources were given “some weight” by the ALJ and otherwise
were largely relied upon in determining the RFC.21
As noted above, the ALJ found that Brown had the residual functional capacity to
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, but with non-exertional limitations in
the following areas: he can perform simple, routine tasks in a low stress environment (no fast
pace, strict quotas, frequent duty changes or jobs that require reading, writing and
arithmetic), in a non-public setting involving superficial interpersonal interactions with coworkers and supervisors.22 Brown maintains that the additional non-exertional limitations

19

LeMaster v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 802 F.2d 839, 840 (6th Cir. 1986);
Tucker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:06CV403, 2008 WL 399573, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 12,
2008).
20

Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007).

21

ECF # 16 at 5-6.

22

Tr. at 24.
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should have included a need for occasional redirection at work, and a need to have tasks
occasionally explained.23
In that regard, Brown notes that these additional restrictions were included in the
opinions of Aracelis Rivera, Psy. D.,24 and Vicki Warren, Ph.D.,25 two state agency reviewing
sources, whose opinions were given “some weight” by the ALJ “to the extent they are
consistent with the evidence of record.”26 Significantly, the ALJ went on to observe that the
opinions of these sources that Brown has “moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence
and pace is supported by the objective evidence.”27
The importance here of the omitted restriction as to redirection is highlighted by an
exchange with the VE, where the VE testified that no work would exist for an individual with
that restriction incorporated into the RFC.28 Moreover, this case arises in the context of case
authority construing Ealy v. Commissioner of Social Security,29which notes that a general
limitation to simple, repetitive, non-skilled work may not be sufficient if the medical source

23

ECF # 16 at 5-6.

24

Tr. at 98-101.

25

Id. at 118-121.

26

Id. at 27.

27

Id. (citing record).

28

Id. at 54-55.

29

Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2010).
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opinions relied on by the ALJ incorporate additional limitation as to duration and pace that
are not specifically dealt with in the RFC.30
But, as I further noted in the later decided case of Pierce v. Commissioner of Social
Security,31 the case law applying Ealy remains somewhat “fluid,” and courts have been
reluctant to adopt a “bright line rule” that a restriction to “simple repetitive tasks”in a matter
involving moderate impairment in the area of concentration, persistence and pace must
necessarily be inadequate where the claimant is experiencing “difficulty responding
appropriately to stress or pressure in the workplace or adapting to changes in the work
environment.”32
Rather, I suggested in Pierce, the analysis as to whether more specific limitations need
to be included in the RFC must “address the underlying source of the claimant’s
impairment,” because, for example, a restriction to a low stress work environment would not
be a sufficient RFC limitation “where stress did not cause the claimant’s difficulties with
concentration, persistence or pace.”33
In the present case, it is by no means clear that the RFC restricting Brown to simple,
routine tasks in a low-stress, non-public environment addresses the limitations found by the

30

See, Salem v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 1304933, at * 3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 27,

2014).
31

Pierce v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 3787187 (N.D. Ohio July 31, 2014)(Report
and Recommendation adopted by the district court).
32

Id. at * 6 (citations omitted),

33

Id. (citation omitted).
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reviewing sources that point to the need for occasionally redirecting Brown at work, or for
someone to be available to occasionally explain the tasks. While, arguably, the concern about
explaining the work might be somewhat addressed by the limitation to routine work that does
not vary or require additional explanations, the problem expressed by the reviewing sources
as a need to occasionally redirect Brown’s focus at work is not obviously addressed by the
present RFC. Indeed, by currently limiting Brown to only “superficial” interactions with coworkers and supervisors, the present RFC seems to preclude the very vocational assistance
the reviewing sources thought to be required.
In sum, there is not sufficient articulation in the ALJ’s opinion to support the RFC as
written. In particular, the RFC’s restrictions to simple, low stress and routine work with
limited interaction with others do not specifically address the exact limitation of a periodic
loss of focus and the need for redirection, which limitations were found by medical opinions
that, in this area, the ALJ concluded were “supported by objective evidence.”34
Conclusion
Therefore, the decision of the Commissioner is reversed and the matter remanded, as
detailed above, for reconsideration of and further articulation with respect to the RFC
finding.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 4, 2016

34

s/ William H. Baughman, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge

Tr. at 27.
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