Daniels v. Mahone et al

Filing 6

Memorandum of Opinion and Order: Plaintiff's claims against Gary Mohr and Kimberly Clippers are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decisi on could not be taken in good faith. This action shall proceed solely on Plaintiff's claim for use of excessive force against James Mahone. The Clerk's Office is directed to forward the appropriate documents to the U.S. Marshal for service of process and shall include a copy of this order in the documents to be served upon Mahone. Judge Patricia A. Gaughan on 6/8/15. (LC,S)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

Gary Edward Daniels,
Plaintiff,
v.
James C. Mahone, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 1:14 CV 2753
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

Memorandum of Opinion and Order

INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Gary Edward Daniels filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Lorain Correctional Institution Corrections Officer James C. Mahone, Lorain Correctional
Institution Warden Kimberly Clippers, and Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction
(“ODRC”) Director Gary C. Mohr. In the Complaint, Plaintiff claims he was physically
assaulted by Officer Mahone. He seeks monetary relief.

BACKGROUND
On the morning of October 16, 2014, Plaintiff was directed to go to pod 3A to escort
new reception inmates to pill call. This was his prison job, and when he was performing these
duties, he was permitted to move about the prison, even when movement was restricted. He

wore an orange safety vest to designate to prison staff that he was escorting other inmates. On
the morning of the incident, he lined up eight new inmates outside of their pod, and was
preparing to escort them when Officer Mahone rode up on his bicycle and told them to “hold up
a second.” (ECF No. 1 at 3). Plaintiff saw a construction crew preparing to enter a locked gate
adjacent from the group. When the construction crew had entered the gate, Plaintiff assumed it
was okay for his group to proceed to pill call and began to escort them. Officer Mahone saw the
movement and terminated Plaintiff’s employment on the spot. He demanded that Plaintiff hand
in his vest. Plaintiff states he first threw the vest to the ground, then feeling guilty about his
action, retrieved it and tossed it at Officer Mahone.
Plaintiff contends he then started to walk back to his cell. He first tried to walk in front
of Mahone to enter through the front entrance but Mahone stopped him and told him to enter
through the back entrance. Plaintiff contends he turned to do as he was directed. He claims
Mahone ran up behind him and attempted to grab his arm. Plaintiff alleges Mahone failed to
make contact with Plaintiff, lost his footing and fell backward three to five feet. He claims he
continued on toward the entrance. He indicates Mahone again ran after him, and this time
picked him up and forcefully slammed him to the ground on his back. Plaintiff alleges Mahone
used excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is
required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.

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Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v.
City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or
fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual
contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A pleading must contain a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right
to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint
are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. The Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual
allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In
reviewing a Complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the
Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.1998).
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not allege any facts to suggest how ODRC Director
Gary Mohr or Warden Kimberly Clippers were involved in the incident described in the
Complaint, nor does he assert any claims against them. To meet the basic pleading
requirements of Federal Civil Procedure Rule 8, the Complaint must give the Defendants fair
notice of what the Plaintiff’s claims against them are, and the grounds upon which they rest.
Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008). There is

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nothing in the Complaint to suggest why Mohr or Clippers is a party to this case.
It is possible Plaintiff named them as Defendants because they have supervisory
authority over Officer Mahone. Respondeat superior, however, is not a proper basis for liability
under § 1983. Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 903 (6th Cir.2003); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729
F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.1984). A supervisor cannot be held liable based solely on his or her right
to control employees, nor on the supervisor’s simple awareness of employee’s misconduct.
Leary, 349 F.3d at 903; Bellamy, 729 F.2d at 421. Instead, Plaintiff must establish that the
Defendants were personally involved in the activities which form the basis of the alleged
unconstitutional behavior. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); Mullins v. Hainesworth,
No. 95-3186, 1995 WL 559381 (6th Cir. Sept. 20, 1995). The Complaint simply contains no
facts which reasonably associate Mohr or Clippers to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. Mohr
and Clippers are dismissed from this action.
The only claim identified in the Complaint is asserted against Officer Mahone for use of
excessive force under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional
limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not
be “barbarous” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). The Eighth Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by
prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson,
832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346).
The Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), set forth a framework
for courts to use when deciding whether certain conditions of confinement constitute cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. A plaintiff must first plead facts

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which, if true, establish that a sufficiently serious deprivation has occurred. Id. Seriousness is
measured in response to “contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.
1,8 (1992). Routine discomforts of prison life do not suffice. Id. Only deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs or extreme deprivations regarding the conditions of confinement will
implicate the protections of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 9. A plaintiff must also establish a
subjective element showing the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.
Id. Deliberate indifference is characterized by obduracy or wantonness, not inadvertence or
good faith error. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Liability cannot be predicated
solely on negligence. Id. A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when both the
objective and subjective requirements are met. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)
Plaintiff first must satisfy the objective component by alleging sufficient facts to show
that a serious deprivation of a basic human need has occurred. Because routine discomfort is
“part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society,” Rhodes, 452
U.S. at 347, “only those deprivations denying ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.’” Wilson,
501 U.S. at 298. In the context of excessive force, society’s expectations are different. When
prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of
decency always are violated. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327. This is true whether or not
significant injury is evident. Id.
That is not to say that every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal
cause of action. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d, at 1033 (“Not every push or shove, even if it
may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s

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constitutional rights”). The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual”
punishments necessarily excludes de minimis uses of physical force as constitutional violations,
provided that the use of force is not of a sort “‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’”
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). The standard to
apply when prison officials are accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the
Eighth Amendment is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10-11.
In this case, Plaintiff alleges an altercation took place between him and Mahone. He
contends Mahone fired him from his prison job in front of the new inmates. He tossed his vest
on the ground and then picked it up and tossed it at Mahone. Plaintiff claims he attempted to
leave the way Mahone instructed. Mahone went after him, attempted to grab his arm, and fell.
Plaintiff did not stop. Mahone got up and ran after him. Plaintiff alleges that when Mahone
caught up to him, Mahone picked him up and slammed him to the ground. At the pleading
stage, Plaintiff need only allege sufficient facts to suggest he has a plausible claim against
Mahone for use of excessive force. Whether Mahone acted to restore discipline or whether he
acted maliciously to cause harm to Plaintiff is a question of fact. Plaintiff, however, has alleged
sufficient facts to state a claim for use of excessive force that is plausible on its face. This
action shall proceed solely against Mahone on Plaintiff’s use of excessive force claim.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Gary Mohr and Kimberly Clippers are dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an
appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. This action shall proceed solely on

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Plaintiff’s claim for use of excessive force against James Mahone. The Clerk’s Office is
directed to forward the appropriate documents to the U.S. Marshal for service of process and
shall include a copy of this order in the documents to be served upon Mahone.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge
Dated: 6/8/15

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