Lane v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 19

Memorandum Opinion and Order affirming Commissioner's decision denying benefits. Magistrate Judge James R. Knepp, II on 2/3/16. (A,P)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

MARIA LANE,
ON BEHALF OF D.C.,

Case No. 1:14 CV 2803

Plaintiff,

Magistrate Judge James R. Knepp, II

v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Maria Lane (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of her minor child D.C., appeals the
administrative denial of child supplemental security income (“SSI”). The district court has
jurisdiction over this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). The parties have consented to the
exercise of jurisdiction by the undersigned in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Civil Rule
73. (Doc. 14). For the reasons given below, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision
denying benefits.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed D.C.’s application for SSI on December 16, 2011, alleging a disability
onset date of November 1, 2011. (Tr. 122). Her application was denied initially (Tr. 55-63) and
on reconsideration (Tr. 65-73). Plaintiff, represented by counsel, requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 93). Plaintiff testified at the hearing on April 29, 2013,
after which the ALJ found D.C. not disabled. (See Tr. 10-24, 28-53). The Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the hearing decision the final decision of the

Commissioner. (Tr. 1); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1455, 416.1481. On December 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed
the instant case. (Doc. 1).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Hearing Testimony
D.C. was in the fifth grade at the time of the hearing and lived with his mother and
siblings. (Tr. 32, 34). She testified D.C. was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (“ADHD”) and oppositional defiant disorder (“ODD”). (Tr. 33). She reported D.C. did
not get along well with his siblings, constantly hit them, called them names, and used
inappropriate language. (Tr. 34). She also reported he needed multiple promptings before he
would perform chores, do school work, or complete his personal hygiene. (Tr. 34, 37-38).
D.C. was taking Intuniv and Adderall; the medications created “a big difference” in his
behavior, although he still had outbursts and needed promptings. (Tr. 35-36). D.C. was in regular
classes at school but he also had a 504 education plan. (Tr. 36). Plaintiff stated D.C.’s grades
were “exceptional” and he was only struggling in math. (Tr. 38). She also stated that she got a
daily report regarding D.C.’s behavior at school, which often included outbursts and being
argumentative, but she admitted he was doing “a lot better”. (Tr. 39). Plaintiff testified D.C. had
a couple of friends that he socialized with at school and sometimes on the weekends but he could
not get along with them for extended periods. (Tr. 40, 42, 46). She reported D.C. liked to play Xbox, football, and basketball. (Tr. 41, 43).
Plaintiff stated D.C. had been in four schools between August 2011 and August 2012
because of his behavioral issues. (Tr. 43-44). D.C. had been suspended for three days in May
2012, but he had not had any suspensions since then; however, when behavioral incidents
occurred he was removed from class. (Tr. 44).

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Plaintiff testified she was in the process of finding a new doctor for D.C. and that was
why the medical record was so scarce in the months leading up to the hearing. (Tr. 46). She also
testified D.C. ceased counseling in 2011 because it was not successful. (Tr. 48-49).
Function Reports
On December 16, 2011, Plaintiff completed a function report regarding D.C. where she
stated he was capable of making new friends, getting along with her and other adults, and
playing team sports; but she noted his difficulty getting along with teachers. (Tr. 147). She
reported D.C. could dress and feed himself, and perform personal hygiene requirements; but did
not do as he was told or accept criticism. (Tr. 148). Plaintiff also reported an inability to finish
tasks, including homework and chores; however, she stated “when [D.C.] is on his meds he is
fine.” (Tr. 149).
A month later, Plaintiff completed a second report where she reported hyperactivity,
difficulty getting along with siblings, and the need for constant redirection. (Tr. 162-63). Yet, she
also stated D.C. completed his chores, needed minimum supervision, and could be left at home
alone. (Tr. 162). Socially, she stated he had a couple of friends and was courteous, helpful, and
well-mannered with family members and neighbors. (Tr. 162). She also reported D.C. could
maintain attention on his favorite TV shows or books, and could remember the major plot points.
(Tr. 163-64). Plaintiff stated D.C. had behavioral problems at school, mainly with fighting,
disrespectful comments, and an inability to follow directions. (Tr. 163). Again, she noted
improvement with medication. (Tr. 163).
In July 2012, Plaintiff indicated an increase in severity of D.C.’s symptoms, particularly
an increase in his frustration levels, ease of distractibility, ease of irritation, and almost daily
fighting, cursing, or throwing of objects. (Tr. 205-06).

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Education Records
On February 6, 2011, Danielle Opalich, D.C.’s teacher who saw him every day for
approximately three hours, completed a teacher questionnaire. (Tr. 131-38). She reported D.C.
was functioning at the fourth grade level in reading, math, and written language. (Tr. 131). She
noted no problems in acquiring and using information but reported slight problems in attending
and completing tasks, interacting and relating with others, and caring for yourself. (Tr. 132-37).
She commented that D.C. was social and talkative, which can be disruptive, had difficulty
switching tasks prior to completion, did not like to be corrected for misbehavior, and had trouble
handling frustration. (Tr. 133, 136). Ms. Opalich reported D.C.’s behavior was significantly
improved with medication and his hyperactivity had decreased. (Tr. 134, 137). His report card
indicated D.C. was capable of above-average grades, but his failure to complete assignments or
comply with instructions resulted in sub-standard grades; although his performance was helped
by medication. (Tr. 183-84, 246).
From August to November 2011, the record includes multiple disciplinary referrals,
suspension notices, and reports of inappropriate behavior. (See Tr. 167-69, 170-73, 179, 185,
186, 193). Yet, D.C. was not suspended again until May 2012. (Tr. 213-14).
D.C. had a 504 education plan which allowed D.C. to move around during the day,
utilized token reinforcement strategies to improve behavior, and attempted to break his
behavioral patterns. (Tr. 256-60). In conjunction with the 504, D.C. underwent a battery of
academic testing which revealed he had average verbal comprehension, perceptual reasoning,
and memory; simply put, D.C. had an average IQ. (Tr. 262-64). He also fell in the average range
on the behavioral test administered. (Tr. 265).

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Further in November 2012, Regina White, D.C.’s teacher, observed D.C.’s academic
performance to be at grade level except in the areas of writing paragraphs and essays, and
applying math to real life. (Tr. 267-68). She also noted D.C.’s social and adaptive behavior was
in average range. (Tr. 269-70). Ms. White stressed the importance of D.C.’s medication and the
significant effect it had on his ability to learn. (Tr. 270).
In an undated report, Ms. White reported D.C. had a tendency to speak out of turn and
engage in verbal altercations, did not respond to change well, and did not accept criticism well.
(Tr. 249-50). However, she also reported that when on his medication and able to focus, D.C.
could follow instructions, work independently, and understand and complete assignments. (Tr.
249).
Relevant Medical Evidence
D.C. began treating at the Center for Families and Children in June 2010 and was seen
approximately once a week by Stefanie Stedmire-Walls, LISW. (Tr. 282). On initial evaluation,
it was noted D.C. was hyper, oppositional, and had moderate to severe conflicts with family
members. (Tr. 295-96). It was also reported D.C. had mild/moderate problems with
concentration, impulsivity, and anger management; and further, moderate problems with
aggressive and disruptive behaviors. (Tr. 299). On November 1, 2011, child psychiatrist
Solomon Zaraa, D.O., diagnosed D.C. with ADHD-Combined Type. (Tr. 209). At further
appointments at the Center for Families and Children, significant progress with medication was
noted. (Tr. 302, 304).
On February 1, 2012, Ms. Stedmire-Walls opined D.C. easily took on the negative
behaviors of others, this combined with his impulsivity, caused him to make poor decisions. (Tr.
282). She noted his short attention span, poor disciplinary record at school, inability to take

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responsibility, poor organizational skills, and his frequently disruptive and aggressive behaviors.
(Tr. 282). However, she stated there was “marked improvement” in D.C. since he had been
medicated. (Tr. 284).
On October 23, 2012, child psychiatrist Solomon Zaraa, D.O., opined D.C. had a
moderate limitation in caring for himself; a marked limitation in acquiring and using information
and in attending and completing tasks; and an extreme limitation in interacting and relating with
others. (Tr. 291-92). Dr. Zaraa noted medication side effects of loss of appetite and headaches.
(Tr. 292). He also commented that D.C. continued to have difficulties at home and in some
school subjects due to his diagnoses of ADHD and ODD. (Tr. 293).
State Agency Reviewers
On initial evaluation in February 2012, Kristen Haskins, Psy.D., opined D.C. had less
than marked limitations in acquiring and using information, attending and completing tasks,
interacting and relating with others, and caring for yourself. (Tr. 59-60). She noted D.C.’s
average language skills, attention issues, improvement with medication, and ease of frustration
as the basis for her opinion. (Tr. 59-60). On reconsideration in August 2012, Aracelis Rivera,
Psy.D., opined D.C. had no limitation in acquiring and using information or interacting and
relating with others; but concurred with Dr. Haskins that he had less than marked limitations in
attending and completing tasks, and caring for yourself. (Tr. 69-70).
ALJ Decision
After the hearing, the ALJ rendered a decision and found D.C. was not disabled. (Tr. 1624). She found D.C. had the severe impairments of ADHD and ODD, but they did not meet or
medically equal a listed impairment. (Tr. 16). The ALJ further found D.C. had less than marked

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limitations in attending and completing tasks, and caring for himself; and no limitation in any
other functional domains. (Tr. 18-24).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the denial of Social Security benefits, the Court “must affirm the
Commissioner’s conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply
the correct legal standards or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in
the record.” Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). “Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance and is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Besaw v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 966 F.2d 1028, 1030 (6th Cir. 1992). The Commissioner’s findings
“as to any fact if supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive.” McClanahan v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Even if substantial
evidence or indeed a preponderance of the evidence supports a claimant’s position, the court
cannot overturn “so long as substantial evidence also supports the conclusion reached by the
ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003).
STANDARD FOR DISABILITY
Eligibility for SSI is predicated on the existence of a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a).
“Disability” is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). In the case of a claimant
under the age of 18, the Commissioner follows a three-step evaluation process – found at 20
C.F.R. § 416.924(a) – to determine if a claimant is disabled:

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1.

Is claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is
not disabled regardless of their medical condition. If not, the analysis
proceeds.

2.

Does claimant have a medically determinable, severe impairment, or a
combination of impairments that is severe? For an individual under the
age of 18, an impairment is not severe if it is a slight abnormality or a
combination of slight abnormalities which causes no more than minimal
functional limitations. If there is no such impairment, the claimant is not
disabled. If there is, the analysis proceeds.

3.

Does the severe impairment meet, medically equal, or functionally equal
the criteria of one of the listed impairments? If so, the claimant is disabled.
If not, the claimant is not disabled.

To determine, under step three of the analysis, whether an impairment or combination of
impairments functionally equals a listed impairment, the minor claimant’s functioning is
assessed in six different functional domains. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1). This approach, called
the “whole child” approach, accounts for all the effects of a child’s impairments singly and in
combination. SSR 09-1P, 2009 WL 396031, at *2. If the impairment results in “marked”
limitations in two domains of functioning, or an “extreme” limitation in one domain of
functioning, then the impairment is of listing-level severity and therefore functionally equal to
the listings. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a).
A “marked” limitation is one that is more than moderate but less than extreme, and
interferes “seriously” with the ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. 20
C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). An “extreme” limitation is one that interferes “very seriously” with
the ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i).
The six functionality domains are: (i) acquiring and using information, (ii) attending and
completing tasks, (iii) interacting and relating with others, (iv) moving about and manipulating
objects, (v) caring for yourself, and (vi) health and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. §
416.926a(b)(1).

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DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by (1) finding D.C. did not have marked impairments in
two functional domains such that his impairments functionally met the listing; and (2)
inappropriately weighing the opinion of Dr. Zaraa. (Doc. 16). The Court will begin by addressing
the weight of the medical opinion and proceed into an analysis of the evidence supporting the
functional domain determinations.
Treating Physician
Plaintiff argues by failing to give good reasons for the diminished weight accorded to the
opinion of Dr. Zaraa, the ALJ created reversible error. (Doc. 16, at 11). Generally, the medical
opinions of treating physicians are afforded greater deference than those of non-treating
physicians. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 242 (6th Cir. 2007); see also SSR 962p, 1996 WL 374188. But treating physician status is only established when a plaintiff can
demonstrate an ongoing treatment relationship with the doctor. An ongoing treatment
relationship exists when “medical evidence establishes that [D.C.] see[s], or ha[s] seen, the
source with a frequency consistent with accepted medical practice”. § 404.1502.
Plaintiff would have this Court treat Dr. Zaraa’s opinion as that of treating physician
simply because he possesses a medical degree; but, that is an incorrect analysis. The record
provided reveals that D.C. only saw Dr. Zaraa two times in the course of a year. (Tr. 209, 291).
This brief and intermittent relationship is not sufficient to create a “longitudinal picture of
[D.C.’s] medical impairments” which would warrant deference. Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242; see
e.g., Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 832 (2003) (“[T]he assumption that
the opinion of a treating physician warrant greater credit than the opinions of [others] may make
scant sense when, for example, the relationship between the claimant and the treating physician

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has been of short duration.”); Helm v Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 405 F. App’x 997, 1000 n.3 (6th Cir.
2011) (stating that “it is questionable whether a physician who examines a patient only three
times over a four-month period is a treating source . . .”); Yamin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 67 F.
App’x 883, 885 (6th Cir. 2003). The treating physician rule is intended to grant deference to
those medical sources that have a detailed and complete picture of the plaintiff’s medical history;
that rationale does not apply to Dr. Zaraa.
Although Dr. Zaraa is not a treating physician, the ALJ is still required to determine the
weight afforded to his opinion. §§ 416.902, 416.927. The factors for determining the weight of a
non-treating source opinion are the length of treatment relationship, the frequency of
examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, the supportability of the opinion,
the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and the specialization of the source.
Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 660 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2)). The ALJ also considers any fact “which tend[s] to support or contradict the
opinion.” § 404.1527(c).
The ALJ accorded some weight to the opinion of Dr. Zaraa but discounted his more
extreme limitations because they were “not supported by the objective evidence in the record”
and medication improved D.C.’s behavior. (Tr. 24). The basis of Plaintiff’s argument is that the
ALJ’s conclusory statement regarding objective evidence is inadequate to discount Dr. Zaraa’s
opinion without citation to specific evidence. See e.g., Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375
F.App’x 543, 551-52 (6th Cir. 2010); Patterson v. Astrue, 2010 WL 2232309 (N.D. Ohio).
Putting aside that these citations apply to a treating physician and the heightened articulation
requirement attendant with that; the ALJ’s explanation, though brief, is sufficient to explain why
he did not afford greater weight to Dr. Zaraa.

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In this case, it would be hard to ask the ALJ to perform an in-depth analysis of the basis
of Dr. Zaraa’s opinion, the reason being that there is hardly any record of Dr. Zaraa’s treating
D.C. Dr. Zaraa’s name appears on only two documents within the entire record, neither of which
are medical records. (Tr. 209, 291). More importantly, these records do not contain any details
regarding Dr. Zaraa’s treatment course or any mental status observations of D.C. (Tr. 209, 291).
At most, medication management notes reveal D.C. was responding well to medication, which
supports the ALJ’s conclusion. (Tr. 24, 302, 304). Furthermore, objective evidence in the record
does not support Dr. Zaraa’s marked limitation in acquiring and using information. For example,
D.C.’s grades, intelligence tests, reports of his teachers, and Plaintiff’s testimony, all indicate
D.C. is of average intelligence and capable of adequate performance in academics. (See Tr. 38,
163-64, 183-84, 246, 262-64, 267-68). Even more evidence supports the benefits of medication
on D.C.’s behavioral and social problems. (See Tr. 35-36, 39, 40, 42, 46, 147, 149, 162-63, 249,
270, 284, 302, 304). In reviewing the opinion submitted by Dr. Zaraa, it provides no explanation
for the restrictions opined nor does he reference any medical records to support his limitations.
(Tr. 290-93).
Where, as here, the physician did not provide explanations for the restrictions, the
regulations instruct a reduction in weight may be appropriate. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3)
(“The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly
medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that opinion. The better an
explanation a source provides for an opinion, the more weight we will give that opinion.”); see
also White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 286 (6th Cir. 2009) (conclusory statements
from physicians, without support from specific documents, are a valid reason for discounting an
opinion). Dr. Zaraa’s checkbox opinion, submitted without explanation or reference to the

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record, signals unreliability; therefore, the ALJ properly diminished the opinion’s weight.
Functional Domains
Plaintiff’s remaining argument focuses on the ALJ’s determination that D.C. had less
than marked limitations in the area of attending and completing tasks and no limitation in
interacting and relating with others. (Doc. 16, at 6-10). At step three, an ALJ must provide
“sufficient analysis to allow for meaningful judicial review of the listing impairment decision.”
Snoke v. Astrue, 2012 WL 568986, at *6 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (quoting Bledsoe v. Barnhart, 165
Fed. App’x 408, 411 (6th Cir. 2006)). But, the court may look to the ALJ’s decision in its
entirety to justify the ALJ’s step three analysis. Snoke, 2012 WL 568986, at *6 (citing Bledsoe,
165 Fed. App’x at 411). When assessing functional limitations at step three, the ALJ considers
myriad relevant factors, including the effects of medication and treatment. 20 C.F.R. §
416.924a(b)(9); see also §§ 416.924a, 416.924b, 416.929. The regulations direct the ALJ to
examine the information in the child's record about how his functioning is affected during
performance of all activities when deciding whether the impairment or combination of
impairments functionally equals the listings. § 416.926a(b).
Plaintiff argues in support of marked limitations in both domains that the ALJ failed to
take into account the relevant opinions of Ms. Stedmire-Walls, Dr. Zaraa, Ms. White, and D.C.’s
disciplinary and academic record; and instead, improperly relied on the opinion of Ms. Opalich
which was rendered before the disability onset date. (Doc. 16, at 7-9). Preliminarily, it bears
repeating that the applicable standard of review holds that even if substantial evidence supports a
finding contrary to the ALJ’s, this Court still cannot reverse so long as substantial evidence also
supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ. See Jones, 336 F.3d at 477. Thus, the Court will

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undertake an analysis of whether the ALJ had substantial evidence to support his conclusions on
D.C.’s functional limitations.
In support of her conclusion that D.C. had less than marked limitation in attending and
completing tasks, the ALJ relied heavily on the February 2011 opinion of D.C.’s teacher, Ms.
Opalich. (Tr. 19). Ms. Opalich opined D.C. only had slight problems in some areas of attending
and completing tasks; such as, carrying out multi-step instructions, refocusing to a task, and
changing from one activity to another without being disruptive. (Tr. 19, 131-38). Ms. Opalich’s
opinion addresses the relevant functional domains and specifically states the daily activities
where D.C. is limited; thus, the ALJ’s reliance on a well-explained opinion from a source with
regular contact with D.C. is not improper. Plaintiff believes the ALJ’s reliance on this opinion
was misplaced because it was given before the disability onset date. However, an ALJ is free to
consider all the evidence in the record as long as she considers both pre and post-onset date
evidence in her determination. See Puterbaugh v. Colvin, 2013 WL 3989581, at *15 (S.D. Ohio)
(“The Court is unaware of, and Plaintiff has not cited to, any rule, regulation, or case prohibiting
an ALJ from considering evidence in the record simply because it is from prior to an alleged
disability onset date.”); see also Sparks v. Comm. of Soc. Sec., 2015 WL 5210463, at *12 (E.D.
Mich.).
In reviewing the entire opinion, it is clear the ALJ reviewed evidence from both before
and after the alleged onset date. (Tr. 18-24). First, in the same section where the ALJ cited to Ms.
Opalich’s opinion she also referred to the opinion of Ms. Stedmire-Walls; a clear indication that
she reviewed and considered post-onset date evidence. Simply because the ALJ did not accord
more weight to Ms. Stedmire-Walls’ opinion, as Plaintiff would like, is not sufficient to overturn
her determination. Second, the remainder of the decision includes citation to D.C.’s education

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records, which prove he is capable of attaining average grades, and his significant improvement
with medication; a combination of pre and post-onset evidence. (See Tr. 18-24, 35-36, 39, 40, 42,
46, 147, 149, 162-63, 246, 249, 270, 284, 302, 304). Third, Ms. Opalich’s opinion is consistent
with other reports in the record from after the onset date that finds D.C.’s behavioral issues are
not overly limiting, especially with medication. (See Tr. 265, 269-70). Considering the evidence
of record, the ALJ had substantial evidence to support her determination that D.C. had less than a
marked limitation in attending and completing tasks.
As to interacting and relating with others, the ALJ found D.C. had no limitation because
his behavioral issues were significantly improved by medication. (Tr. 20). Again, Plaintiff
posited that the opinions of Ms. White, Ms. Stedmire-Walls, and Dr. Zaraa should have
controlled any determination in this domain. However, the central factor in determining that D.C.
was not limited in this area, i.e. his improvement with medication, was reflected by each of these
individuals in their opinions. (See Tr. 249, 270, 284). Considering the ALJ had discounted Dr.
Zaraa’s and Ms. Stedmire-Walls’ opinions, as unsupported and overly restrictive, it is reasonable
for her not to rely on their determinations in making her findings. While it is certainly true that
D.C. still suffered from behavioral problems, (Tr. 249, 282); none of the evidence cited by
Plaintiff supports a finding that he was so limited as to render him disabled.
Despite the admitted paucity of the ALJ’s explanations, sufficient evidence exists in the
record to find D.C. does not have a marked limitation in these domains; such that, even if the
ALJ had erred, it would be harmless. See McIntosh ex rel. TLA v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2012 WL
6966654, at *11 (E.D. Mich). Outside of the evidence discussed above and included in the ALJ’s
opinion, the record demonstrates that D.C. is capable of recalling information, maintaining
friendships, acting appropriately with adults, and has not been suspended since May 2012. (See

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Tr. 40, 46, 147, 162-64, 213-14). Undoubtedly, evidence remains that D.C. still has behavioral
problems; however, his limitations are not disabling and appear to be improving. In this case
there is no reason to believe that on remand the ALJ’s decision would be any different; and thus,
“remand would be an idle and useless formality.” NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759,
766 n.6 (1969).
The ALJ reasonably articulated the reasoning and evidence that supported her
determinations in both functional domains at issue; therefore, she did not err.
CONCLUSION
Following review of the arguments presented, the record, and applicable law, the Court
finds the ALJ’s decision supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the Commissioner’s
decision denying benefits is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/James R. Knepp, II
United States Magistrate

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