Layton v. US Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons

Filing 3

Memorandum Opinion and Order. This Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's action, and the complaint is dismissed pursuant to the Court's authority established in Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477.Judge Dan A. Polster(C,KA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

DANIEL LAYTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 1:15 CV 113
JUDGE

DAN

AARON

POLSTER

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Daniel Layton has filed this civil rights action against the United States
Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, alleging he was refused a private personal
confidential phone call to his attorney while he was incarcerated at FCI Elkton. He seeks $400,000
in damages.
A district court may sua sponte dismiss a fee-paid complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction without affording the plaintiff the opportunity to amend where the complaint is “totally
implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.”
See Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff’s complaint must be sua sponte
dismissed pursuant to Apple v. Glenn.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(1971) provides a cause of action against individual federal agents who allegedly violate the

Constitution. However, the plaintiff has sued federal agencies in this case, the United States
Department of Justice and the Bureau of Prisons. A suit against a federal agency or federal officer
in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a claim against the United States, see Will v. Dept. of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), and “[i]t is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued
without consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite to jurisdiction.” United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). The United States has not waived its immunity to suits
asserting Bivens claims. Fagan v. Luttrell, No. 97–6333, 2000 WL 876775, at *3 (6th Cir. June 22,
2000) (“Bivens claims against the United States are barred by sovereign immunity. The United
States has not waived its immunity to suit in a Bivens action.”) (citation omitted); Miller v. Fed.
Bureau of Investigation, No. 96–6580, 1998 WL 385895, at *1 (6th Cir. July 1, 1998) (“the doctrine
of sovereign immunity precludes a Bivens action against a federal agency for damages”);
Lundstrum v. Lyng, 954 F.2d 1142, 1146 (6th Cir.1991) (“A Bivens action may not be maintained
against the United States.”).
Conclusion
Accordingly, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s action, and the
complaint is dismissed pursuant to the Court’s authority established in Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d
477.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/Dan Aaron Polster 2/11/15
DAN AARON POLSTER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-2-