Standen v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 23

Opinion & Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 3/7/16. For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and affirms the denial of benefits by the Administrative Law Judge except as to the effect of failing to analyze plaintiff's case under Listing 14.09. On this issue, the Court remands the case for further consideration. (Related Docs. 1 and 20 ) (D,MA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
------------------------------------------------------:
JESSICA STANDEN,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
:
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
:
SOCIAL SECURITY,
:
:
Defendant.
:
:
-------------------------------------------------------

Case. No. 1:15-CV-482

OPINION & ORDER
[Resolving Doc. 1]

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
In this social-security disability benefits case, Plaintiff Jessica Standen objects to the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (R&R), which recommends affirming the
Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of benefits. 1 The ALJ has substantial evidence to
support his decision.
However, as the R&R acknowledges, the ALJ failed to properly analyze Standen’s claims
under Listing 14.09. While the Magistrate Judge found this to be harmless error, this Court
concludes it was not.
The Court ADOPTS the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and AFFIRMS the
denial of benefits by the ALJ, except as to the effect of failing to analyze Plaintiff’s case under
Listing 14.09. On this issue, the Court REMANDS the case for further consideration by the
ALJ.

1

Doc. 20 (Report and Recommendation); Doc. 21 (Objection).

Case No. 1:15-CV-482
Gwin, J.
I.

Background

On September 1, 2011, Plaintiff Standen filed applications for Supplemental Security
Income benefits and Disability Insurance benefits. 2 The application was based on arthritis,
anxiety, insomnia, depression, and fibromyalgia. She alleged a June 1, 2009 disability onset
date. 3 After her applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration, Plaintiff requested a
hearing before an ALJ. 4
Standen appeared with counsel at a hearing before ALJ Thomas M. Randazzo on October
2, 2013. 5
On October 31, 2013, the ALJ determined that Standen was not entitled to Supplemental
Security Income or Disability Insurance. 6 The ALJ’s findings can be summarized as follows:
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
through December 31, 2013.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 1,
2009, the alleged onset date.
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: rheumatoid arthritis,
fibromyalgia, depression, and anxiety.
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a reduced range of
light work with the following nonexertional limitations. She can lift up to
twenty pounds occasionally and up to ten pounds frequently. She can stand
and walk for six hours and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday, with
normal breaks. She can frequently climb ramps and stairs but she can never
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can frequently balance, stoop, kneel,
2

Doc. 20 at 1.
Id.
4
Id. at 1-2.
5
Id. at 2.
6
Id.
3

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Case No. 1:15-CV-482
Gwin, J.
crouch, and occasionally crawl. She must avoid all exposure to hazardous
machinery and unprotected heights. She is limited to frequent handling,
fingering and feeling with bilateral hands. She is limited to superficial
interaction with co-workers and the public, such as interaction that is of a brief
duration and for a specific purpose. The claimant requires a sit/stand option
for 1-2 minutes duration every half hour without being off task. In addition,
the claimant will be off task 5% of the time.
6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work.
7. The claimant was born on August 18, 1982 and was 26 years old, which is
defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date.
The claimant subsequently changed age category to closely approaching
advanced age.
8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate
in English.
9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability
because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a
finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has
transferable job skills.
10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that the claimant can perform.
11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, from June 1, 2009, through the date of this decision. 7
Standen filed this complaint. 8 She argues that: (1) the ALJ erred in analyzing Plaintiff’s
severe impairments under Listing 1.02 and Listing 1.04 instead of Listing 14.09 for rheumatoid
arthritis; (2) the ALJ erred when the ALJ did not give controlling weight to the opinions of
treating rheumatologist Dr. Kuchynski; (3) the ALJ’s credibility determination is unsupported by
substantial evidence; (4) the ALJ erred in relying upon the vocational expert’s testimony in
response to an incomplete hypothetical question. 9

7

Id. at 12-13.
Doc. 1.
9
Doc. 14.
8

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Gwin, J.
The Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Kenneth McHargh. Magistrate Judge
McHargh issued a Report and Recommendation, finding that the ALJ’s determination was
supported by substantial evidence and recommending that the Court deny Standen’s appeal. 10
Specifically, the R&R concluded that (1) the ALJ should have additionally (or alternatively)
analyzed Plaintiff under Listing 14.09, but Judge McHargh found this was harmless error that
does not require remand; (2) the ALJ properly considered the opinion evidence under the treating
source rule; (3) the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff’s credibility; and (4) the hypothetical
presented to the vocational expert at the hearing adequately reflected Plaintiff’s RFC
limitations.11
Standen now objects to the R&R. 12 This Court reviews the objections de novo. 13

II.

Legal Standard

In reviewing an ALJ’s disability determination under the Social Security Act, a district
court is limited to reviewing whether the ALJ’s decision is “supported by substantial evidence
and is made pursuant to proper legal standards.” 14

Substantial evidence is “such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 15 A district
court should not try to resolve “conflicts in evidence or decide questions of credibility,” 16 and
may not reverse an ALJ’s decision when substantial evidence supports it, even if the court would
have made a different decision. 17
10

Doc. 20 at 1.
Doc. 20
12
Doc. 17.
13
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (requiring de novo review of the claimant’s objections to a report and
recommendation).
11

14

Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quotation omitted).
16
Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007).
17
Siterlet v. Sec. of Health and Human Servs., 823 F.2d 918, 920 (6th Cir. 1987).
15

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Gwin, J.
To establish disability under the Social Security Act, Plaintiff must show that she cannot
engage in any substantial gainful activity because of a “medically determinable physical or
mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 18 Plaintiff’s impairment must
prevent her from doing her previous work or any other work existing in significant numbers in
the national economy. 19
III.

Discussion

A. Listing 14.09
At Step Three of the disability evaluation process, the ALJ must evaluate whether the
claimant’s impairments satisfy the requirements of any of the medical conditions enumerated in
the Listings of Impairments, or Listings. If the claimant does not meet a Listing, then the ALJ
continues on to Steps Four and Five of the analysis to determine if the claimant’s impairment
prevents her from doing her past relevant work or other work in the national economy that
accommodates the claimant’s residual functional capacity.
Plaintiff Standen says that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate whether her condition met
or equaled Listing 14.09, Section D. 20

Instead, the ALJ evaluated Standen’s claim under

Listings 1.02 (major dysfunction of the joint(s) (due to any cause)) and 1.04 (disorders of the
spine). 21 Section D of Listing 14.09 requires a claimant to show:
Repeated manifestations of inflammatory arthritis, with at least two of the
constitutional symptoms or signs (severe fatigue, fever, malaise, or involuntary
weight loss) and one of the following at the marked level:
1. Limitations of activities of daily living.

18

See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d).
Id.
20
Doc. 14 at 15-18.
21
Doc. 20 at 22.
19

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Gwin, J.
2. Limitation in maintaining social functioning.
3. Limitation in completing tasks in a timely manner due to deficiencies in
concentration, persistence, or pace. 22
The Listings explain, “Listing-level severity is shown in . . . 14.09D by inflammatory
arthritis that involves various combinations of complications of one or more major
peripheral joints or other joints, such as inflammation or deformity, extra-articular
features, repeated manifestations, and constitutional symptoms or signs.” 23
Magistrate Judge McHargh correctly agreed with Plaintiff that “the ALJ should
have additionally (or alternatively) analyzed Plaintiff’s rheumatoid arthritis and
fibromyalgia under Listing 14.09.” 24
However, Magistrate Judge McHargh then concluded that the failure to analyze
Plaintiff’s application under Listing 14.09 “is harmless error and does not require
remand.” 25 The claimant must show that she was some way prejudiced or deprived of
substantial rights because of this procedural error. Magistrate Judge McHargh concluded
that the Plaintiff did not meet her burden, saying that, “[i]n her brief, Plaintiff does not
point to any evidence that was not considered by the ALJ in his decision, much of which
was appropriately discredited as discussed.” 26
The Court disagrees with the conclusion that the ALJ’s error was harmless. The
Sixth Circuit has found that completely failing to review a disability application under the
requisite Listing is harmful error: “[T]he regulations indicate that if a person is found to
meet a Listed Impairment, they are disabled within the meaning of the regulations”;
22

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P., Appx. 1, Listing 14.09D.
Id. at § 14.00(D)(6)(e)(ii).
24
Doc. 20 at 24-25 (collecting citations that rheumatoid arthritis and fibromyalgia need to be evaluated
under Listing 14.09, notwithstanding analysis under 1.02 and 1.03).
25
Id. at 25.
26
Id.
23

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therefore, failure to address a relevant listing impairs substantive rights, “regardless of
what the ALJ’s conclusions would have been at Steps Four and Five.” 27
The Sixth Circuit has found that correcting the failure to evaluate a requisite
listing is not “merely a formalistic matter of procedure.” 28 Remand is required. This
conclusion is still persuasive even in a case such as this, where it is not immediately
apparent that the Plaintiff would meet the Listing. Nevertheless, “the ALJ needed to
actually evaluate the evidence, compare it to . . . the Listing, and give an explaining
conclusion in order to facilitate meaningful judicial review.” 29 District Courts in this
Circuit have remanded on this ground when faced with the specific failure at issue in this
case: failure to review rheumatoid arthritis under Listing 14.09. 30
It is not sufficient for this Court to conclude after the fact that Plaintiff did not
meet Listing 14.09, Section D. Analysis in the first instance by the ALJ is required.

B. Treating Source Rule
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in failing to assign controlling weight to Plaintiff’s
treating rheumatologist, Dr. Kuchynski. 31 In his analysis of the opinion evidence of
record, the ALJ assigned “less weight” to Dr. Kuchynski’s statement of Plaintiff’s

27

Reynolds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 424 F. App’x 411, 416 (6th Cir. 2011).
Id.
29
Id.
30
See Hakkarainen ex rel. Blanton v. Astrue, No. 1:10-cv-2463, 2012 WL 398595 at *13 (N.D. Ohio Jan.
19, 2012) (Report and Recommendation) (“To the extent that the Commissioner argues that evidence
otherwise supports the conclusion that the claimant’s rheumatoid arthritis did not meet or medically equal
Listing 14.09, such post hoc rationale is not persuasive, as the ALJ’s rationale is under consideration, not
defense counsel’s”); see also Christephore v. Comm’r Soc.Sec., No. 11-13547, 2012 WL 2274328 at *10
(E.D. Mich. June 18, 2012) (“The Court will not follow the Commissioner’s suggestion that it divine
what the ALJ might have been thinking at Step Three.”).
31
Doc. 14 at 18-22.
28

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Case No. 1:15-CV-482
Gwin, J.
residual functional capacity (RFC). 32 The ALJ still recognized Dr. Kuchynski as a
treating source. 33 Further, the ALJ assigned “significant weight” to the opinions of the
State Agency medical consultants. 34
Magistrate Judge McHargh concluded that the ALJ properly considered the
opinion evidence under the treating source rule. 35 The Court agrees with Magistrate
Judge McHargh’s conclusion.
Under the treating physician rule, “treating source opinions must be given
‘controlling weight’ if two conditions are met: (1) the opinion ‘is well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques’; and (2) the opinion
‘is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 36
However, an ALJ is allowed to give a treating source’s opinion less controlling
weight so long as he gives “good reasons” for doing so. “Good reasons” are reasons that
are sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight given to the
treating physician’s opinion and the reasons for that weight. 37
In deciding the weight to be given to the treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ
must consider factors such as (1) the length of the treatment relationship and the
frequency of the examination, (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (3)
the supportability of the opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record as a
whole, (5) the specialization of the source, and (6) any other factors that tend to support

32

Id.
Id.
34
Id.
35
Doc. 20 at 14-18.
36
Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c
)(2)).
37
Id.
33

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or contradict the opinion. 38 The ALJ is not required to provide “an exhaustive factor-byfactor analysis.” 39 However, “the reasons must be supported by the evidence in the record
and sufficiently specific to make clear the weight given to the opinion and the reasons for
that weight.” 40
Here, the ALJ wrote the following about Dr. Kuchynski’s opinion:
The undersigned gives less weight to Dr. Kuchynski’s treating source
statements of the claimant’s residual functional capacity for the following
reasons. First, the undersigned finds that the extreme limitations to which
she opined are not consistent with her own longitudinal history of physical
examination findings in her treatment notes. Second, although Dr.
Kuchynski’s treatment notes indicate that she has adjusted or added
medications to the claimant’s daily regimen to accommodate flare-ups of
her symptoms, these treatments have all been conservative and/or shortterm, such as Prednisone bursts. Third, Dr. Kuchynski’s assessment is not
consistent with the claimant’s actual performance of activities of daily
living to which she testified on a general basis, despite exacerbations of
her pain symptoms. Fourth, the undersigned finds that the State Agency
medical consultant’s physical and mental assessments are more consistent
with the medical record as a whole than Dr. Kuchynski opined. 41
This Court agrees with Magistrate Judge McHargh that the ALJ’s analysis
sufficiently explained the “good reasons” for giving less weight to Dr. Kuchynski’s
opinion.
Plaintiff relies heavily on Rogers v. Commissioner of Social Security to argue that
the ALJ’s conclusion was improper. 42 Rogers is inapposite. Rogers concerns an ALJ’s
failure to find that fibromyalgia and rheumatoid arthritis were severe impairments, in

38

Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 747 (6th Cir. 2007).
Francis v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 414 F. App’x 802, 804 (6th Cir. 2011).
40
Brasseur v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 525 F. App’x 349, 349 (6th Cir. 2013).
41
Doc. 13 at 24.
42
486 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff has added no new arguments in response to Magistrate Judge
McHargh’s Report and Recommendation. Rather, Plaintiff reiterates her initial arguments. Doc. 21 at 12.
39

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Gwin, J.
contradiction to Rogers’ treating physicians opinions. 43

The Sixth Circuit reversed,

pointing out that the ALJ had not provided any explanation of the relevant factors when
the Rogers ALJ discounted the treating physician’s opinion. 44 Moreover, the ALJ’s
decision belied a record replete with evidence from multiple treating doctors about
Rogers’ fibromyalgia and rheumatoid arthritis. 45
In contrast, here the ALJ found that fibromyalgia and rheumatoid arthritis were
severe impairments. The ALJ gave good reasons for his decision to give less weight to
Dr. Kuchynski’s opinion. The ALJ did not discredit the nature of the disease, as the ALJ
appeared to have done in Rogers. Rather, the ALJ properly weighed the evidence and
assigned weights to the various physicians. The ALJ specifically noted good reasons for
discounting Dr. Kuchynski’s opinions: internal inconsistencies, successful treatments and
inconsistencies with Plaintiff’s testimony.

The ALJ’s decision is supported by the

substantial evidence. 46
43

Rogers, 486 F.3d at 244-45.
Id.
45
Id.
46
Plaintiff’s other arguments fail. First, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly discredited Dr.
Kuchynski’s opinion by pointing out that her treatment was “conservative and/or short.” Plaintiff
contends that this characterization is improper because of the “clear litany of medications Plaintiff takes
on a daily basis.” Doc. 14 at 21. However, simply counting the medications Plaintiff takes is not a
proper method of determining Plaintiff’s medical condition.
Second, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly discredited Dr. Kuchynski’s opinion by
pointing out that the doctor’s assessment was inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s daily activities. Plaintiff
contends that “Plaintiff’s mere participation in daily activities does not preclude a finding of disability,
particularly where chronic pain associated with severe impairments of fibromyalgia and rheumatoid
arthritis are concerned.” Id. at 21. However, under the treating source rule, the ALJ is specifically
instructed to consider whether the treating doctor’s opinion is “consistent with the record as a whole.”
Considering daily activities here is proper. See Calvin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 437 F. App’x 370, 371
(6th Cir. 2011). Moreover, there is no indication that the ALJ misconstrued the testimony as to Plaintiff’s
daily activities. Although Plaintiff may require help and takes multiple breaks, this is reconcilable with
the ALJ’s conclusion that, “Dr. Kuchynski’s assessment is not consistent with the claimant’s actual
performance of activities of daily living to which she testified on a general basis, despite exacerbations of
her pain symptoms.” Doc. 13 at 24. See, e.g., Doc. 13 at 45-69, 527-28 (Plaintiff testified that she would
stand and walk to go shopping for at least 20 minute periods; Dr. Kuchynski stated that Plaintiff could
only stand or walk for 10 minutes.). See infra for further discussion of the ALJ’s credibility assessment.
44

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C. Plaintiff’s Credibility
Plaintiff also alleges that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her credibility. 47
The ALJ concluded that “the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms
are not entirely credible.” 48
However, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the ALJ’s credibility assessment is not
supported by substantial evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 describes a two-part process for
assessing the credibility of an individual’s subjective statements about his or her
symptoms.

First, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant has a medically

determinable physical or mental impairment that can reasonably be expected to produce
the symptoms alleged; then the ALJ must evaluate the intensity and persistence
associated with those symptoms to determine how those symptoms limit a claimant’s
ability to work.
When evaluating the intensity and persistence of a claimant’s symptoms,
consideration is given to objective medical evidence and other evidence, including: (1)
daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other
symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness,
Finally, the ALJ properly gave good reasons for assigning significant weight to the state agency
consultants’ opinions. As correctly noted by Magistrate Judge McHaugh, an “ALJ’s decision to accord
greater weight to state agency physicians over [claimant’s] treating sources was not, by itself, reversible
error.” Blakely v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2009). Here, the ALJ clearly explained that
he found the state agency opinions supported by objective evidence on the record, as well as by Plaintiff’s
testimony as to activities of daily living. See infra for further discussion of the ALJ’s credibility
assessment.
47
Doc. 14 at 22-24. Plaintiff has added no new arguments in response to Magistrate Judge McHargh’s
Report and Recommendation. Rather, Plaintiff reiterates her initial arguments. Doc. 21 at 2.
48
Doc. 13 at 21.

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Case No. 1:15-CV-482
Gwin, J.
and side effects of any medication taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; (5)
treatment, other than medication, received for relief of pain or other symptoms; (6) any
measures used to relieve pain or other symptoms; and (7) other factors concerning
functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. 49
“[A]n ALJ's findings based on the credibility of the applicant are to be accorded
great weight and deference, particularly since an ALJ is charged with the duty of
observing a witness’s demeanor and credibility. Nevertheless, an ALJ’s assessment of a
claimant’s credibility must be supported by substantial evidence.” 50
There is substantial record evidence to support the ALJ’s negative credibility
determination.

For example, the ALJ recognized that certain activities exacerbated

Plaintiff’s symptoms and caused acute episodes of pain. Nevertheless, the ALJ properly
considered claimant’s testimony that “she has maintained primary responsibility over her
health and physical wellbeing of herself and her children.” 51 The ALJ went on to explain
that Plaintiff takes care of herself, two cats and a guinea pig, Plaintiff’s mother (who is
disabled secondary to fibromyalgia). 52 The ALJ noted that Plaintiff performs household
duties and cooks full meals. “In addition, she is able to shop for groceries at small
grocery stores and she is physically able to drive.” 53 The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s 10year-old daughter and other members of the family sometimes help with activities. 54 But
nevertheless, the ALJ found that based on the evidence in the record, Plaintiff’s “level of

49

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c).
Calvin, 437 F. App’x at 371 (citing Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir.1997)).
51
Doc. 13 at 45-69.
52
Id. at 23.
53
Id.
54
Id.
50

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Gwin, J.
functioning is not consistent with someone who is allegedly totally disabled.” 55 The ALJ
also pointed to Plaintiff’s continual reporting to her doctor that the medications were
generally working to keep her symptoms under control. 56 Substantial record evidence
supported the ALJ’s credibility conclusion. The ALJ properly considered the steps in the
analysis under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.
Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Plaintiff relies on Hawk v.
Astrue, 57 which states that daily activities of “household chores” and “laundry” are not
comparable to “typical work activities” and thus should not be the basis for a credibility
determination. However, Hawk is distinguishable. Plaintiff’s description of her daily
activities directly related to issues such as standing, walking, lifting, and hand
manipulation, which are relevant to the residual functional capacity analysis. Daily
activities are properly considered, and there is no requirement to exclude them
altogether. 58 In Hawk, the court’s concern was the de minimis nature of the supposedly
telling daily activities. Here, the ALJ’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence
in the record.

D. Vocational Expert
Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in relying upon the vocational
expert’s testimony. Plaintiff says the vocational expert’s hypothetical was incomplete.59
Plaintiff contends the hypothetical was inadequate because of the ALJ’s “errors regarding
the inadequate weight afforded to treating rheumatologist and the determination of
55

Id.
Id. at 22.
57
2012 WL 3044291 (N.D. Ohio July 25, 2012).
58
See Calvin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 437 F. App’x 370, 371 (6th Cir. 2011).
59
Doc. 14 at 24.
56

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Plaintiff’s credibility.” 60 As explained above, the ALJ properly discredited the opinions
of Dr. Kuchynski, and properly assessed Plaintiff’s credibility as to her subjective
complaints. As a result, Plaintiff’s arguments as to the inadequate hypothetical question
fail. 61

IV.

Conclusion

The Court ADOPTS the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and AFFIRMS the
denial of benefits by the ALJ, except as to the effect of failing to analyze Plaintiff’s case under
Listing 14.09. On this issue, the Court REMANDS the case for further consideration by the
ALJ.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/
James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: March 7, 2016

60
61

Id.
The Court agrees with the full analysis provided in the R&R. Doc. 20 at 26-28.

14