Elbana v. U.S. Bank Home Mortgage et al

Filing 9

Memorandum Opinion and Order granting 3 Motion to dismiss case as frivolous and denying as moot 8 Motion for judgment on the pleadings, and this case is dismissed in its entirety as to all defendants. Judge Dan A. Polster (C,KA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EMAD M. ELBANA,
Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. BANK HOME MORTGAGE, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 1:15 CV 714
JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION
On April 13, 2015, pro se Plaintiff Emad M. Elbana Jr. filed this action against
Defendants U.S. Bank Home Mortgage, Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Department, Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas Judge Nancy R. McDonnell, and Jane and John Does. Plaintiff
challenges a judgment of foreclosure against him and the sale of the property foreclosed upon
pursuant to a judgment in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. See U.S. Bank V.
Elbana, Cuy. Cty. Comm. Pls. No. CV-12-777227, http://cpdocket.cp.cuyahogacounty.us/CV.
He asserts violation of his civil rights and numerous state law theories to support this challenge.
Now before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of Defendants Cuyahoga County
Sheriff’s Department and Judge Nancy R. McDonnell, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Rule on the
Pleadings. For the reasons stated below, this action is dismissed.

LEGAL STANDARD
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
“plausibility in the complaint.” Bell At. Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A
pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the
pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The
plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678 (2009). A
pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not meet this pleading standard. Id.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
United States District Courts do not have jurisdiction to overturn state court decisions
even if the request to reverse the state court judgment is based on an allegation that the state
court’s action was unconstitutional. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 292 (2005). Federal appellate review of state court judgments can only occur in the United
States Supreme Court, by appeal or by writ of certiorari. Id. Under this principle, generally
referred to as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a party losing his case in state court is barred from
seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States
District Court based on the party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates his federal rights.
Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 298-99 (6th Cir. 2012).
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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on two United States Supreme Court decisions
interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).1 See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). This statute was enacted to
prevent “end-runs around state court judgments” by requiring litigants seeking review of that
judgment to file a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. The doctrine is based
on the negative inference that, if appellate court review of state judgments is vested in the United
States Supreme Court, then such review may not occur in the lower federal courts. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 544 U.S. at 283-84; Kovacic v. Cuyahoga County Dep't of Children and Family Services,
606 F.3d 301, 308-311 (6th Cir. 2010); Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2008).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine has narrow application. It does not bar federal jurisdiction
“simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state
court.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005); Berry v.
Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 298–99 (6th Cir.2012). It also does not address potential conflicts
between federal and state court orders, which fall within the parameters of the doctrines of
comity, abstention, and preclusion. Berry, 688 F.3d 299. Instead, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

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28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) provides:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State
in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of
the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a
statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States,
or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or
claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any
commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.
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applies only where a party losing his case in state court initiates an action in federal district court
complaining of injury caused by a state court judgment itself, and seeks review and rejection of
that judgment. Berry, 688 F.3d 298-99; In re Cook, 551 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir.2009).
To determine whether Rooker-Feldman bars a claim, the Court must look to the “source
of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.” McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d
382, 393 (6th Cir.2006); see Berry, 688 F.3d at 299; Kovacic, 606 F.3d at 310. If the source of
the plaintiff's injury is the state court judgment itself, then the Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars the
federal claim. McCormick, 451 F.3d at 393. “If there is some other source of injury, such as a
third party's actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent claim.” Id.; see Lawrence, 531
F.3d at 368–69.
Plaintiff’s underlying assertion that the foreclosure action in state court was legally
improper is a direct attack on that court’s decision. Any review of the federal claims asserted in
this context would require the Court to review the specific issues addressed in the state court
proceedings. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to conduct such a review or to grant
the relief requested. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n. 16; Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th
Cir. 1998).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to litigate the foreclosure matter anew, he cannot
proceed. A federal court must give a state court judgment the same preclusive effect it would
have in the courts of the rendering state. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Dubuc v. Green Oak Township, 312
F.3d 736, 744 (6th Cir. 2002). The preclusive effect of the previous state court judgment is
therefore governed by Ohio law on preclusion. Id. Under Ohio law, an existing final judgment
or decree is conclusive as to all claims which were or might have been litigated in the first
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lawsuit. National Amusement, Inc. v. Springdale, 53 Ohio St. 3d 60, 62 (1990). The doctrine of
res judicata requires a plaintiff to present every ground for relief, or forever be barred from
asserting it. Id. The purpose of this doctrine is to promote the finality of judgments and thereby
increase certainty, discourage multiple litigation, and conserve judicial resources. Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). The Ohio court has already determined that the mortgage was
valid and that Plaintiff was in default of his loan. This Court is bound to give full faith and
credit to the decision of that court. Plaintiff is therefore barred by the doctrine of res judicata
from litigating these questions again in federal court.

CONCLUSION
Principles requiring generous construction of pro se pleadings are not without limits.
Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). Even construing the
Complaint liberally in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 924
(6th Cir. 2008), it does not contain allegations reasonably suggesting he might have a valid
federal claim. Further, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's pendent state
law claims. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is granted, the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
is denied as moot, and this case is dismissed in its entirety as to all Defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/Dan Aaron Polster 5/1/15
DAN AARON POLSTER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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