Thomas v. Mohr et al
Filing
3
Memorandum of Opinion and Order: The plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed against Defendants Mohr, Lazaroff, and Wainwright pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e) and 1915A. The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 67;1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. This action shall proceed only as against Defendant Davis. Accordingly, the Clerk's Office is directed to forward the appropriate documents to the U.S. Marshal for service of process on Defendant Davis. A copy of this order shall be included with the documents to be served. Judge Patricia A. Gaughan on 8/31/15. (LC,S) re 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Prentiss A. Thomas,
Plaintiff,
v.
Gary C. Mohr, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CASE NO. 1: 15 CV 812
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
Memorandum of Opinion and Order
Pro se plaintiff Prentiss A. Thomas is a state prisoner currently incarcerated in the
Mansfield Correctional Institution (“ManCI”). He has filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Gary C. Mohr, the Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction (ODRC), Michael Davis, ODRC’s Religious Services Administrator, Alan Lazaroff,
the Warden at ManCI, and Lyneal Wainwright, the Deputy Warden of Special Services.
The plaintiff alleges he was “conveyed” to the custody of the ODRC in August 2014, and
at that time indicated that his faith required him to keep a kosher diet. He was referred to Lorain
Correctional Institution Chaplain Pollard, who interviewed the plaintiff. The plaintiff submitted
a form requesting inclusion in the Kosher Diet Program and accommodations for access to
Jewish Religious Services. His form was forwarded to Michael Davis for
“approval/disapproval.”
The plaintiff was transferred to ManCI on September 18, 2014, and identified himself as
a practitioner of Judaism and indicated a kosher diet as a tenet of his faith. He was told to send a
“kite” to Chaplain Butts. He did so, but received no response. After he filed an informal
complaint and a grievance, he was visited by Chaplain Maas, who allegedly told him “there’s no
Jewish services” and that the State isn’t buying “religious books, etc.” Chaplain Maas also
allegedly told the plaintiff, “it’s a money thing” and that he would have to sue the State if he
wanted religious meals. Three weeks after the plaintiff filed another informal complaint,
Chaplain Maas returned “with 3 questions on a piece of paper.” The plaintiff answered the
questions, and Chaplain Maas submitted his answers to Chaplain Butts.
On January 21, 2015, Michael Davis “denied [his] participation in the Kosher Diet
Program citing ‘lack of demonstrated sincerity.’” The plaintiff contends his religious beliefs are
sincere and alleges violations of his constitutional rights under the First Amendment. He seeks
injunctive relief, punitive damages, and reimbursement for his expenses.
Because the plaintiff is a prisoner suing a governmental entity and employees and is
proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e) and 1915A. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir.1997), overruled
on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). These statutes require the Court to
dismiss any complaint, or portion thereof, the Court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Further,
because the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his complaint is construed indulgently. See Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
Upon review, the Court finds the plaintiff’s complaint alleges at least a plausible First
Amendment claim against Defendant Davis, the decision-maker who denied the plaintiff’s
-2-
request for a religious accommodation.1 Therefore, the action may proceed against Defendant
Davis.
The Court, however, finds the complaint fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim and must
be dismissed on initial screening against the remaining defendants. The plaintiff’s complaint
sets forth no allegations of unconstitutional conduct, or any conduct at all, on the part of
Defendants Mohr, Lazaroff, or Wainwright. It is well-established that § 1983 liability may not
be imposed on a supervisory official on the basis of respondeat superior. “[A] § 1983 claim
must fail against a supervisory official unless ‘the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of
misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.’” Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794,
802 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted.) “At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at
least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of
the offending officers.” Id.2 The plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting Defendants
Mohr, Lazaroff, or Wainwright engaged in conduct sufficient to impose liability on them under §
1983. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a plausible claim and must be
dismissed against them.
1
Although not unlimited, prisoners are entitled to protection under the First Amendment to freely
exercise their religion. See O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). “A prisoner alleging that
the actions of prison officials violate his religious beliefs must show that ‘the belief or practice
asserted is religious in the person’s own scheme of things’ and is ‘sincerely held.’” Flagner v.
Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 2001), quoting Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1224 (6th Cir.
1987). The plaintiff’s allegations viewed favorably to him are sufficient to plausibly suggest
Defendant Davis violated his rights under the First Amendment by denying him accommodation
for a sincerely-held religious belief.
2
Merely denying a prisoner’s administrative grievance or failing to remedy a subordinate’s
unconstitutional conduct are insufficient bases to hold a supervisory official liable under § 1983.
See Shehee v. Lutrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999).
-3-
Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, the plaintiff’s complaint is hereby dismissed against
Defendants Mohr, Lazaroff, and Wainwright pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e) and 1915A. The
Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could
not be taken in good faith.
This action shall proceed only as against Defendant Davis. Accordingly, the Clerk’s
Office is directed to forward the appropriate documents to the U.S. Marshal for service of
process on Defendant Davis. A copy of this order shall be included with the documents to be
served.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge
Dated: 8/31/15
-4-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?