Diaz v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
20
Memorandum Opinion and Order declining to adopt 17 Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and affirming Commissioner's decision denying benefits. This case is terminated. Judge Donald C. Nugent 4/7/16 (C,KA)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
KEVIN DIAZ,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,)
)
Defendant.
)
CASE NO. 1:15 CV 1000
JUDGE DONALD C. NUGENT
Magistrate Judge Vecchiarelli
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge
Nancy A. Vecchiarelli. (Docket #17.) The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Commissioner
of Social Security’s final determination denying Plaintiff, Kevin Diaz’s claim for a Period of
Disability (“POD”) and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423, and Supplemental Security Income Benefits (“SSI”) under Title
XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., be reversed and the case remanded.
As set forth by the Magistrate Judge, the procedural history of this case is as follows:
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 17, 2012, Plaintiff filed his applications for POD, DIB, and SSI,
alleging a disability onset date of January 29, 2012. (Transcript (“Tr.”) 11.) The
application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and Plaintiff requested
a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Id.) On October 16, 2013,
an ALJ held Plaintiff’s hearing. (Id.) Plaintiff participated in the hearing, was
represented by counsel, and testified. (Id.) A vocational expert (“VE”) also
participated and testified. (Id.) On November 15, 2013, the ALJ found Plaintiff
not disabled. (Tr. 22.) On March 17, 2015, the Appeals Council declined to
review the ALJ’s decision, and the ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s
final decision. (Tr. 1.) On May 19, 2015, Plaintiff filed his complaint to challenge
the Commissioner’s final decision. (Doc. No. 1.) The parties
have completed briefing in this case. (Doc. Nos. 14, 15, 16.)
Plaintiff asserts the following assignment of error: the ALJ’s residual
functional capacity (RFC) finding failed to accommodate Plaintiff’s visual and
mental limitations.
II. EVIDENCE
A.
Personal and Vocational Evidence
Plaintiff was born in March 1968 and was 42-years-old on the alleged
disability onset date. (Tr. 21.) He had a marginal education and was able to
communicate in English. (Id.) He had past relevant work as a machine feeder,
degreaser acid dripper, grinder/degreaser, packager, and furniture deliverer. (Tr.
20.)
B.
Medical Evidence
1.
Medical Reports
On December 16, 2011, Plaintiff treated with primary care physician
Anita Singh, M.D. (Tr. 369.) He complained of difficulty seeing at night. (Id.) Dr.
Singh diagnosed diabetes mellitus and hypertension and prescribed medication.
(Tr. 371.) On January 12, 2012, William Roscoe, O.D., performed an eye
examination. (Tr. 365.) Plaintiff’s vision was 20/30 to 20/40 with glasses on. (Id.)
Dr. Roscoe recommended that Plaintiff consult with neuro-opthamology for an
evaluation. (Id.) Plaintiff treated with Dr. Singh in February 2012 and
complained of a migraine headache with sensitivity to bright light. (Tr. 362.) Dr.
Singh prescribed medication. (Tr. 363.)
On February 28, 2012, Plaintiff underwent a diabetic eye examination
with Karolinne Rocha, M.D. (Tr. 356.) Plaintiff reported decreased temporal
vision, flashing lights, and difficulty driving at night. (Id.) Plaintiff’s bilateral
corrected visual acuity was approximately 20/50 to 20/40. (Tr. 357.)
William Cappert, M.D., examined Plaintiff on February 29, 2012, and
noted a mild nuclear sclerosis cataracts in both eyes. (Tr. 358.) Dr. Cappert
opined that Plaintiff’s decreased vision was not explained by his eye examination
and the doctor questioned whether it was related to migraine headaches. (Id.) That
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same day, Plaintiff treated with neurologist Hari Kunhi Veedu, M.D. (Tr. 348.)
Plaintiff reported having a headache three to four times per week over the past
year. (Tr. 349.) The headaches involved a throbbing pain and mild blurry vision.
(Id.) Plaintiff described visual hallucinations of seeing shadows once a week for
the last four to five months. (Id.) Dr. Veedu diagnosed poorly controlled diabetes,
migraine-type headaches without papilledema, and mild diabetic neuropathy. (Tr.
351.) Dr. Veedu recommended additional testing and prescribed Depakote for
headaches. (Tr. 352.)
Plaintiff treated with Dr. Singh on March 16, 2012, and he reported that
Depakote had provided moderate relief of his headaches. (Tr. 344.) On March 20,
2012, Plaintiff complained to Dr. Veedu of headaches and a tingling sensation in
his fingers. (Tr. 338-39.) Plaintiff was less irritable but claimed that he still had
severe pain. (Tr. 339.) Dr. Veedu increased Plaintiff’s prescriptions of Depakote
and Gabapentin. (Tr. 341.)
On April 25, 2012, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Veedu and reported no
improvement in his headaches or neuropathic pain. (Tr. 329.) Dr. Veedu adjusted
Plaintiff’s medications. (Tr. 330.) In May 2012, Plaintiff continued to report no
change in his headaches. (Tr. 323.) In June 2012, Plaintiff again reported
neuropathic pain and indicated that he was unable to work. (Tr. 313-14.) Dr.
Veedu prescribed medication and referred Plaintiff to pain management. (Tr.
316.)
In September 2012, Plaintiff treated with pain management specialist
Andrew Messiah, M.D. (Tr. 469.) Plaintiff reported on-going pain in his lower
legs and forearms for two years. (Id.) He also told Dr. Messiah that he
experienced visual blurring. (Id.) Dr. Messiah assessed severe diabetic
neuropathy of the bilateral upper and lower extremities. (Tr. 472.) The doctor
directed Plaintiff to stop smoking and drinking alcohol and to control his diabetes
and weight. (Id.)
2.
Agency Reports
On July 4, 2012, William Bolz, M.D., conducted a review of the record.
(Tr. 104-05.) Dr. Bolz opined that Plaintiff would be limited to occasional
climbing of ladders, ropes, and scaffolds and to frequent balancing. (Tr. 104.) Dr.
Bolz opined that Plaintiff’s near and far acuity were “limited” in both eyes. (Tr.
104-05.) Plaintiff’s depth perception, accommodation, color vision, and field of
vision were unimpaired. (Tr. 105.) Dr. Bolz explained that due to Plaintiff’s
20/50 visual acuity, Plaintiff was precluded only from driving at night. (Id.) The
doctor also noted that Plaintiff reported he could see well with his glasses during
the day and completed his activities of daily living, including driving. (Id.)
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On December 22, 2012, Charles Misja, Ph.D., performed a psychological
evaluation of Plaintiff. (Tr. 480.) Plaintiff reported that he experienced depression
and feelings of worthlessness. (Tr. 481.) Plaintiff lived alone, but his girlfriend
frequently visited and cared for him. (Id.) Plaintiff had been fired for entering into
a verbal altercation with his boss. (Tr. 482.) He described other verbal altercations
and indicated that he preferred to work alone. (Id.) Plaintiff had little social
interaction and liked to remain home by himself, although he enjoyed helping
friends. (Id.) Dr. Misja noted that Plaintiff was entirely unrepentant of his quick
temper and verbal aggressiveness in the workplace, even though he had lost a few
good jobs as a result. (Tr. 484-85.) Dr. Misja opined that Plaintiff would be able
to understand and implement ordinary verbal instructions and would have
minimal problems in maintaining attention, concentration, persistence, and pace
to perform simple and multi-step tasks. (Tr. 485.) Plaintiff was likely to have
severe problems in responding appropriately to supervision and to coworkers.
(Id.) Dr. Misja opined that Plaintiff would have moderate to severe problems with
his ability to respond appropriately to work pressures in a workplace setting. (Tr.
486-86.)
In January 2013, psychologist Jennifer Swain, Psy.D., reviewed the
record. (Tr. 128-30.) She opined that Plaintiff would be able to perform simple,
one- and two-step tasks that did not require reading written instructions. (Tr. 128.)
Because Plaintiff’s focus on physical pain would cause some problems in
maintaining concentration, Dr. Swain opined that Plaintiff could perform static
tasks without strict demands on production or pace. (Tr. 129.) He could work in a
setting where social distractions and demands were minimal. (Id.) Plaintiff could
not participate in ongoing work with the general public, but could engage in brief,
occasional, and superficial interactions with others. (Id.) Plaintiff could sustain
work in solitary and relatively static setting where changes were easily explained
and some time was provided to make any needed adjustments. (Id.)
On January 14, 2013, Paul Morton, M.D., conducted a review of the
record and opined as to Plaintiff’s physical limitations. (Tr. 126-27.) Dr. Morton
opined that Plaintiff was limited to medium exertional work with frequent
balancing and occasional climbing of ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. (Tr. 126.) The
doctor found that Plaintiff’s near and far acuity were “limited” in both eyes. (Tr.
127.) Dr. Morton opined that Plaintiff was restricted from night driving due to
problems with lights and early cataracts. (Id.)
C.
Hearing Testimony
1.
Plaintiff’s Hearing Testimony
Plaintiff testified that he stopped looking for work due to his neuropathy.
(Tr. 56.) He experienced vibrations accompanied by a sharp, tingling feeling
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throughout his body at all times. (Tr. 56-58.) Plaintiff could not work because he
had difficulty feeling and picking up objects. (Tr. 67.) If he attempted to hold
objects, like a coffee cup or gallon of milk, he would drop them. (Id.) Plaintiff
could stand or walk for no longer than fifteen minutes. (Tr. 68.) Plaintiff went to
the store in the early hours in order to avoid being around people. (Id.) Plaintiff
grew panicked and frustrated around other people. (Id.) Plaintiff believed his
medication did not help to alleviate his mental health issues. (Tr. 71.)
2.
Vocational Expert’s Hearing Testimony
Thomas Nimberger, a vocational expert, testified at Plaintiff’s hearing.
The ALJ asked the VE to assume a hypothetical individual of Plaintiff’s age,
education, and work experience. (Tr. 86-87.) The individual could perform light
work and occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. (Id.) The individual
could frequently balance. (Id.) The individual was limited to unskilled work;
could maintain concentration, persistence, and pace for unskilled work; and could
interact with the general public occasionally. (Id.) The individual was limited to
jobs that involved only routine-type changes. (Id.) The VE testified that Plaintiff
could perform such jobs as a mail clerk, bench assembler, and packager. (Tr. 87.)
The ALJ asked the VE to assume a hypothetical individual with the same
restrictions as above, as well as a limitation on the use of hands for occasional
fingering. (Tr. 88.) Plaintiff’s counsel added to this hypothetical question the
additional limitations of no fast-paced work and no production rate quotas. (Tr.
93-94.) The VE testified that Plaintiff could perform such jobs as counter clerk,
gate guard, and bakery worker. (Tr. 89, 94.)
Counsel asked the VE what degree of social interaction the gate guard job
involved. (Tr. 91.) The VE indicated that the position required no more than
occasional interaction with the public. (Id.)
III. STANDARD FOR DISABILITY
A claimant is entitled to receive benefits under the Social Security Act
when he establishes disability within the meaning of the Act. 20 C.F.R. §
416.905; Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1981).
A claimant is considered disabled when he cannot perform “substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a).
To receive SSI benefits, a recipient must also meet certain income and resource
limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1100 and 416.1201.
The Commissioner reaches a determination as to whether a claimant is
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disabled by way of a five-stage process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) and
416.920(a)(4); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). First, the
claimant must demonstrate that he is not currently engaged in “substantial gainful
activity” at the time he seeks disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) and
416.920(b). Second, the claimant must show that he suffers from a “severe
impairment” in order to warrant a finding of disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520©
and 416.920©. A “severe impairment” is one that “significantly limits . . .
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Abbot, 905 F.2d at 923.
Third, if the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, has a severe
impairment that is expected to last for at least twelve months, and the
impairment meets a listed impairment, the claimant is presumed to be disabled
regardless of age, education, or work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d) and
416.920(d). Fourth, if the claimant’s impairment does not prevent him from doing
his past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f)
and 416.920(e)-(f). For the fifth and final step, even if the claimant’s impairment
does prevent him from doing his past relevant work, if other work exists in the
national economy that the claimant can perform, the claimant is not disabled. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 404.1560©, and 416.920(g).
IV. SUMMARY OF COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1.
The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through December 31, 2016.
2.
The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
January 26, 2011, the alleged onset date.
3.
The claimant has the following severe impairments: loss of visual
acuity, peripheral neuropathy, mood disorder, and personality
disorder.
4.
The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1.
5.
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to
perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) with the following additional limitations: occasional
climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, frequent balancing, can
maintain concentration, persistence, and pace for unskilled work,
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is limited to occasional interaction with the general public, there
are no limitations on interacting with coworkers and supervisors,
and is limited to routine type changes in workplace settings.
6.
The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work.
7.
The claimant was born on March 27, 1968, and was 42-years-old,
which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49 on the alleged
disability onset date.
8.
The claimant has a marginal education and is able to communicate
in English.
9.
Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of
disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a
framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,”
whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills.
10.
Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.
11.
The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from January 26, 2011, through the date of
this decision.
(Tr. 11-22.)
Report and Recommendation at pp. 1-10. (Footnotes omitted.)
Plaintiff filed his Complaint with this Court on June 13, 2012, challenging the final
decision of the Commissioner. (Docket #1.) In his Brief on the Merits, Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ’s RFC finding is insufficient to accommodate his visual and mental limitations or to
substantiate a finding that he is not disabled. (Docket #14.) In response, the Commissioner
argues that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could perform a limited range of light work is
supported by substantial evidence; that the ALJ accounted for all of Plaintiff’s medically
determinable impairments; and, that remand for the reasons argued by Plaintiff would not change
the ALJ’s determination in this case. (Docket #15.)
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On January 26, 2016, the Magistrate Judge issued her Report and Recommendation.
(Docket #17.) The Magistrate Judge recommends that the decision of the Commissioner be
reversed and remanded. The Magistrate Judge found that the ALJ erred by not providing an
explanation as to why she did not include limitations on social interaction, pace and production
noted by the state agency psychologist, Dr. Swain. The Magistrate Judge instructed that “because
the ALJ’s calculation of Plaintiff’s RFC was less restrictive than Dr. Swain’s limitations, and
therefore contradicted the psychologist’s opinions, SSR 96-8p required the ALJ to explain her
decision not to include the limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC.” Further, the Magistrate Judge stated
that although the record contains no evidence to support Plaintiff’s claims that “daily blurred
vision” is a limitation, the ALJ should clarify her decision as it relates to the visual findings of
Drs. Bolz and Morton because remand is otherwise necessary to address the social interaction,
pace and production limitations.
On February 5, 2016, the Commissioner filed Objections to the Report and
Recommendation. (Docket #18.) The Commissioner argues that the Record shows no reversible
error and, therefore, that remand is unnecessary and the ALJ’s decision should be affirmed. With
regard to social limitations, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ asked the VE directly
regarding limitations on production and pace and that the VE testified that any such limitations
would not significantly impact the available jobs identified. Further, the Commissioner argues
that
while the VE did not address whether restrictions of Plaintiff’s ability to interact with coworkers
and supervisors would impact the available jobs, he did testify that in the gate guard job, 99-100%
of the time, it did not require speaking to anyone and that the definition of bakery worker set forth
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in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles provides that a bakery worker’s social interaction is
limited. With regard to visual limitations, the Commissioner argues that Plaintiff has failed to
satisfy his burden of proving disability because there is no evidence of record to demonstrate
Plaintiff’s limited acuity affects his ability to work and no evidence that Plaintiff’s visual
impairment resulted in daily blurred vision.
On February 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed his Response to the Defendant’s Objections to the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and [Recommendation]. (Docket #19.) Plaintiff notes his agreement
with the Magistrate Judge’s findings, arguing that the ALJ did not fulfill her duty to weigh the
medical opinions of record and that the Magistrate Judge correctly applied applicable law.
Standard of Review for a Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
The applicable district court standard of review for a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation depends upon whether objections were made to the report. When objections are
made to a report and recommendation of a magistrate judge, the district court reviews the case de
novo. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) provides:
The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s
disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge may accept,
reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return
the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
The standard of review for a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is distinct
from the standard of review for the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision regarding
benefits. Under the Social Security Act, the ALJ weighs the evidence, resolves any conflicts,
and makes a determination of disability. This Court's review of such a determination is limited
in scope by § 205 of the Act, which states that the "findings of the Commissioner of Social
Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C.
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§405(g).
The substantial-evidence standard requires the Court to affirm the
Commissioner's findings if they are supported by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937, citing
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (citation
omitted). Substantial evidence is defined as "more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a
preponderance." Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. Ohio 2007).
Accordingly, when substantial evidence supports the ALJ's denial of benefits, that finding must
be affirmed, even if evidence exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found plaintiff
disabled. The substantial evidence standard creates a "'zone of choice' within which [an ALJ] can
act without the fear of court interference." Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. Ohio
2001). However, an ALJ's failure to follow agency rules and regulations "denotes a lack of
substantial evidence, even where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based upon the
record." Cole, supra, citing Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. Ky.
2009) (citations omitted).
The Commissioner's conclusion must be affirmed “‘absent a determination that the
Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has made findings of fact
unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.’” Longworth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d
591, 595 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2005) (quoting Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th
Cir. Mich. 2004)). Courts are not required to “‘convert judicial review of agency action into a
ping-pong game’” where “‘remand would be an idle and useless formality.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 654 (6th Cir. Mich. 2009) (quoting Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. Ohio 2001); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6
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(1969)).
Discussion
This Court has reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation de novo
and has thoroughly considered the entire Record in this case, including all of the pleadings,
transcripts, and filings of the parties, as well as the Objections to the Report and
Recommendation filed by the Commissioner and Plaintiff’s response thereto. The Court has
reviewed, in detail, the decision of the ALJ. The Court hereby declines to adopt the Report and
Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. Remand would not result in a different outcome in
this case and is, therefore, unwarranted.
First, with regard to pace and production limitations, the VE testified in response to a
direct question posed by the ALJ that the available unskilled work identified for Plaintiff would
not be significantly impacted by pace and production limitations. (Record at pp. 93-94.)
Therefore, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff can maintain concentration, persistence and pace for
unskilled work is supported by substantial evidence and additional testimony or analysis would
have no impact on the decision denying benefits.
Second, although the hypothetical posed to the VE and the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff
was not limited in interacting with coworkers and supervisors fail to address Dr. Swain’s finding
of moderate limitations in Plaintiff’s ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to
criticism from supervisors or get along with coworkers or peers, the ALJ did indeed consider all
evidence of record in analyzing Plaintiff’s social functioning. The ALJ provides analysis of Dr.
Swain’s conclusions with reference to the findings of Dr. Misja, who examined Plaintiff at the
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request of Disability Determination Services. The ALJ noted that she gave little weight to the
conclusions of Dr. Misja, as they were not supported by objective signs and findings and found,
with respect to Plaintiff’s social functioning, that “the weight of the objective and subjective
evidence of record documents some limitations in social function; however they are not more
than moderate.” (Record at p. 15.) Further, the VE identified available jobs including gate
guard and bakery worker, neither of which involve significant interaction with anyone.
Accordingly, additional testimony or analysis is unnecessary as it would not impact the
Commissioner’s decision denying benefits.
Third, there is no medical evidence of record to substantiate Plaintiff’s claims of daily
blurred vision or the assertion that his visual impairment impacted his ability to work. The ALJ
noted that a January 2012 examination found Plaintiff’s best visual acuity was 20/30-20/40 and,
in February 2012, 20/50-20/40, and the ALJ considered that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with
flashing light/temporal visual field defect. (Record at pp. 13, 18, 357 and 365.) The ALJ also
considered the medical opinions of William Bolz, M.D., and Paul Morton, M.D., who evaluated
Plaintiff’s physical condition based on the evidence of record. Both Dr. Bolz and Dr. Morton
found Plaintiff’s near and far acuity to be limited in both eyes and found that Plaintiff was
precluded from driving at night. (Record at pp. 19, 104-05; 127.) Dr. Bolz noted that Plaintiff
reported that he could see well with his glasses during the day and was capable of completing his
activities of daily living including driving. (Id.) Plaintiff did not mention visual impairment
affecting his ability to perform work during the hearing before the ALJ and there is no medical
evidence of record that Plaintiff’s sight impairment, which restricts night driving, has any impact
on his ability to work in any of the jobs identified by the VE. (Docket #15 at p. 11.) Thus, the
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omission of visual limitations from the RFC or hypothetical posed to the VE was harmless error
and remand for further proceedings is unwarranted.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declines to adopt the Report and
Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. The decision of the Commissioner denying Plaintiff,
Kevin Diaz’s claim for a Period of Disability (“POD”) and Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423, and Supplemental
Security Income Benefits (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381
et seq. is supported by substantial evidence and is hereby AFFIRMED.
This case is hereby TERMINATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Donald C. Nugent
DONALD C. NUGENT
United States District Judge
DATED: April 7, 2016
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