Stancik, Jr. v. New York Stock Exchange LLC

Filing 12

Memorandum of Opinion and Order: For the reasons set forth in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, even liberally construed the Complaint does not state a valid claim for relief. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is granted, and this case is dismissed. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Patricia A. Gaughan on 9/29/15. (LC,S) re 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
MARTIN S. STANCIK, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE,
Defendant.

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CASE NO. 1:15 CV 1149
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER

This action was originally filed by Plaintiff pro se Martin Stancik, Jr. in the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas against Defendant New York Stock Exchange. Plaintiff alleges
in the Complaint that Defendant failed to monitor Deutsche Bank and Ocwen Financial, Inc., and
that these entities should have been delisted from the New York Stock Exchange. He seeks $1
billion in damages under various federal statutes and state common law theories.1 Defendant
removed the case to this Court based on diversity of citizenship and because Plaintiff’s claims
rely entirely on allegations that Defendant violated rules promulgated under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Act”).
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, asserting Plaintiff’s claims are barred
by SRO (self-regulating organization) immunity and are preempted by the Act. Plaintiff’s

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On the face page of the Complaint, Plaintiff lists the following legal claims:
“Unfair Trade Practice, Civil Conspiracy, Contract Claims, Racketeering Claims,
Mail and Wire Fraud, Fair Debt Collection, Negligence Claims, Defamation
Claims, Breach of Contract, RESPA Claims, Fraud Claims, Intentional Distress,
Unjust Enrichment, Fair Credit Reporting, Ohio Credit Claims, Tortuous
Interference, Truth in Lending Claims, Conversion Claims, Reckless
Misconduct, Home Ownership and Equity Protection Claims, Trade Commission
Act, Vicarious Liability, Declaratory Relief, Injunctive Relief.”

responses (ECF Nos. 6 and 9) to the Motion do not address these arguments, which are
conclusive as a matter of law. Instead, he asserts Defendant is liable for harm done to him by
Deutsche Bank and Ocwen Financial because Defendant “is a commercial enterprise seeking to
make a profit, and as such is bound by Federal and State law.” ECF No. 9.
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
“plausibility in the complaint.” Bell At. Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A
pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the
pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The
plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (2009). A
pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not meet this pleading standard. Id.
For the reasons set forth in Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, even liberally construed the
Complaint does not state a valid claim for relief. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is
granted, and this case is dismissed. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3),
that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: 9/29/15

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