Gibson v. Mohr et al
Filing
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Memorandum of Opinion and Order: The plaintiff's complaint fails to state a plausible claim and is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. Further, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Patricia A. Gaughan on 11/16/15. (LC,S) re 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Reginald Gibson,
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Plaintiff,
v.
Gary Mohr, et al.,
Defendants.
CASE NO. 1: 15 CV 1375
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
Memorandum of Opinion and Order
Introduction and Background
Pro se plaintiff Reginald Gibson, a state prisoner confined in the Lake Erie Correctional
Institution, has filed this in forma pauperis civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983
against the Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections Gary Mohr;
Warden Brigham Sloan; “Institutional Inspector” Jeffery Fisher; and nine prison employees:
Finance Administrator Linda Obeshaw; Finance Department employees Linda Snyder and
Elaine Waller; Librarian Denise McManus; Library Aid Ms. Stickel; Case Manager Charles
Bender; Unit Manager Jesse Harsin; Head of Education/Instructor Norman Thiel; and MailRoom Supervisor Mitchell Simms.
The basis for the plaintiff’s complaint is that Defendants Fisher, Obeshaw, Snyder,
Waller, McManus, Bender, Harsin, Thiel, Sims, and Stickel refused to send his outgoing legal
mail to the courts and refused to copy legal materials for him when he had insufficient funds in
his prisoner account to cover the costs. He was allegedly told that the prison has a policy
prohibiting putting an inmate in debt. (Complt., Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 14-17.) The plaintiff also
alleges Defendants Snyder and Waller refused to give authorization to the mail room to send his
outgoing legal mail to the courts and to the library to make copies of legal materials for him,
and that “Institutional Inspector” Fisher never investigated the facts of an informal complaint
the plaintiff submitted and “misrepresented the facts” in finding no violation of any law or
policies. (Id., ¶¶19, 21-22.)
The plaintiff alleges all of the defendants violated his constitutional right of access to the
courts by (1) refusing to send his legal mail to the courts; (2) refusing to copy/print his legal
documents, and (3) delaying sending his legal mail. (Id. ¶24.) He seeks injunctive relief
restraining the defendants from “depriving [him] of access to the courts” and compensatory and
punitive damages. (Id., ¶28.)
Analysis
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) requires a
federal district court to screen and dismiss before service any in forma pauperis action the court
determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Similarly, a district
court must dismiss as soon as practicable after docketing any civil action brought by a prisoner
against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity that fails to state a
claim. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010). In order to state a claim, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. Id. (holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) governs
dismissals under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A)).
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Upon review, the Court finds the plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for failure to
state a plausible claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915A.
Although prisoners have a right under the First Amendment of access to the courts, see
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821–24 (1977), this right is not unlimited. See Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). The constitutional right does not extend to every legal action or
claim a prisoner wishes to pursue. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. Rather, “a prison’s right of access to
the courts is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas corpus applications, and civil rights
claims challenging the conditions of confinement.” Courtemanche v. Gregels, 79 Fed. App’x
115, 117 (6th Cir. 2003), citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. “Impairment of any other litigating
capacity is simply one of the incidental, and perfectly constitutional, consequences of
conviction and incarceration.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355.
Additionally, in order to state a claim for the denial of the right of access to the courts, a
prisoner must show that he suffered “an actual injury to existing or contemplated litigation
which raises nonfrivolous claims.” Courtemanche, 79 Fed. App’x at 117. That is, a prisoner
must allege “specific facts showing that he suffered prejudice” to a non-frivolous direct appeal,
habeas corpus application, or civil rights action challenging the conditions of his confinement.
See McCurtis v. Wood, 76 Fed. App'x 632, 634 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of a
prisoner’s access to the court claim where the prisoner failed “to allege the exact nature of his
frustrated claims, whether he actually had pending cases which were dismissed, or why he was
unable to proceed on [the] alleged claims”).
The plaintiff’s complaint in this case must be dismissed because it does not allege facts
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suggesting the defendants’ alleged conduct prevented the plaintiff from filing or pursuing any
non-frivolous claim on direct appeal, or in a habeas corpus application or civil rights action.
Thus, the plaintiff has failed to allege he suffered an “actual injury” as required to allege a
cognizable access to the courts claim.
The plaintiff asserts in a paragraph of an “Exhibit Reference Sheet” attached to his
complaint that the Ohio Supreme Court rejected as untimely a reply brief he filed in State of
Ohio ex rel. Reginald Gibson v. Honorable Taryn L. Heath, Case No. 2015-0271, because “Ms.
McManus refused to copy” his reply brief. (See Doc. No. 1-3 at ¶A.) However, even if this
assertion is accepted as true, it is insufficient to support a plausible access to the court claim
against Ms. McManus because the plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting he raised a nonfrivolous underlying claim in the referenced case. Indeed, the Ohio Supreme Court’s public
docket indicates the plaintiff filed a complaint for a writ of procedendo in that matter seeking an
order requiring a state court judge to rule on a successive motion for post-conviction relief on
which the judge had already ruled. Nothing in the public docket indicates the plaintiff raised the
kind of non-frivolous underlying legal claim that could support a cognizable access to the courts
claim.
In sum, the plaintiff has failed to allege a cognizable access to the courts claim against
any defendant in the case because he has not alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate he suffered
actual injury to existing or contemplated litigation which raises non-frivolous claims. The
plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted against ODRC
Director Mohr and Warden Sloan for the additional reason that the plaintiff has not alleged facts
indicating these defendants themselves engaged in any wrongful conduct, and it is well-
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established that liability cannot be imposed on supervisory employees under 42 U.S.C. §1983
solely on the basis of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th
Cir. 1984) (“Section 1983 liability will not be imposed solely upon the basis of respondeat
superior. There must be a showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of
misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.”).
Conclusion
For all of the reasons stated above, the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a plausible
claim and is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. Further, the Court
certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken
in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge
Dated: 11/16/15
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