Sanders v. Cuyahoga County
Filing
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Memorandum Opinion and Order dismissing this action pursuant to 28 US.C. § 1915(e). The court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Signed by Judge Solomon Oliver, Jr on 11/30/2015. (D,M)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
COREY LAVELLE SANDERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No.: 1:15 CV 1943
JUDGE SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
AND ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Corey Lavelle Sanders filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Cuyahoga County, former Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Judge Steven J. Terry, and
Attorney Stanley Toliver. In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts his criminal conviction was unfair
because his trial judge was corrupt and his defense attorney was ineffective. He asks this Court to
vacate his conviction and compensate him for injuries caused by his conviction.
Background
Plaintiff’s Complaint is very brief. He indicates he was convicted in 2008 in Cuyahoga
County. Former Common Pleas Court Judge Steven Terry presided over his case. He contends
Terry is currently serving a sentence in federal custody for corruption. Plaintiff further alleges his
defense attorney, Stanley Toliver failed to competently represent him leading to a miscarriage of
justice. He asserts he was denied access to the courts until he agreed to accept a plea deal that
resulted in his wrongful conviction. That conviction was used to enhance a subsequent sentence in
federal court, which he is currently serving. Plaintiff asks this Court to vacate his state court
conviction and award him damages.
Standard of Review
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the Court is required to dismiss
an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319
(1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d
194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). An action has no arguable basis in law when a Defendant is immune from
suit or when a Plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise
to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992);
Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199.
When determining whether the Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted,
the Court must construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, accept all factual
allegations as true, and determine whether the Complaint contains “enough fact to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The
Plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. Although a
Complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, its “factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the
Complaint are true.” Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
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The Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-678 (2009), further explains the
“plausibility” requirement, stating that “ a claim has facial plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Furthermore, “the plausibility standard is not akin
to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted
unlawfully.” Id. This determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
Analysis
Plaintiff cannot challenge a criminal conviction in a civil rights action. To the extent he asks
the Court to vacate his conviction, his sole remedy for obtaining that type of relief is habeas corpus.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Plaintiff has already filed a Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus in this Court. See Sanders v. State of Ohio, No. 1:15 CV 1409 (N.D. Ohio filed July
16, 2015)(Oliver, J.). That Petition is still pending.
To the extent he seeks damages, this Court cannot grant that request for relief. In order to
recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983
Plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence was reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called
into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994). A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a
conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Therefore,
when a prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the Court must consider whether a judgment in
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favor of the Plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. If it
would, the Complaint must be dismissed unless the Plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or
sentence has already been invalidated. If, however, the Court determines that the Plaintiff’s action,
even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against
the Plaintiff, the action will be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.
In this case, Plaintiff directly attacks his conviction and seeks damages for injuries caused
by the conviction. He cannot proceed with this claim unless his conviction has been invalidated.
His Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is pending in this Court. His § 1983 claims are therefore
not cognizable at this time.
Conclusion
Accordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court certifies,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good
faith.1
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/S/SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides:
An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that it is not
taken in good faith.
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