Brown-Bey v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas et al

Filing 3

Opinion & Order signed by Judge James S. Gwin on 2/4/16 dismissing this action for the reasons set forth in this order. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. (D,MA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
------------------------------------------------------:
DAVID JOHN BROWN-BEY,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
vs.
:
:
CUYAHOGA COUNTY
:
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
:
-------------------------------------------------------

CASE NO. 1:15-CV-2482

OPINION & ORDER

JAMES S. GWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pro se plaintiff David John Brown-Bey, a state prisoner incarcerated in the Grafton
Correctional Institution, has filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas and Cuyahoga County Prosecutor Timothy McGinty.
His complaint is incomprehensible. The Court is unable to discern from the plaintiff’s pleading
any intelligible factual basis for a claim under § 1983, or any request for relief available under
that statute.1 The plaintiff asks the Court only “to issue this LEGAL NOTICE OF REMOVAL
to the proper venue, Federal Jurisdiction in summons/Suits/Tickets & Hearing of federal court
involving Moor American National David John Brown-Bey Ex Rel: DAVID JOHN BROWN.”
However, the plaintiff nowhere identifies any case he seeks to “remove.”

1

Furthermore, Ohio courts are not sui juris and cannot be sued under § 1983. Yoel v. Gandolf,
Case No. 1:06–cv–387, 2007 WL 777983, *5 (N.D.Ohio March 12, 2007).

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per
curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), pro se litigants must still meet basic
pleading requirements, and a court is not required to conjure allegations on their behalf. See
Erwin v. Edwards, 22 Fed. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction and have a duty to police the boundaries of their jurisdiction.
Therefore, “a district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the
allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of
merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.1999).
The Court finds this action warrants sua sponte dismissal pursuant to Apple v. Glenn.
The allegations in the complaint are so frivolous, implausible, and unsubstantial that they do not
provide a basis to establish this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
Accordingly, this action is dismissed. The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 4, 2016

s/ James S. Gwin
JAMES S. GWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-2-