Morris v. Ohio Department of Corrections et al
Filing
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Memorandum of Opinion and Order: Accordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith. Judge Patricia A. Gaughan on 3/14/16. (LC,S)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Darin E. Morris,
Plaintiff,
v.
Department of
Rehabilitation and Corrections, et al.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 1:16 CV 118
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
Memorandum of Opinion and Order
INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Darin E. Morris filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”), Richland Correctional Institution
(“RCI”) Corrections Officer Covak, RCI Warden Bradshaw, RCI Investigator Perdue, RCI Unit
Manager Walker Williams, and RCI Institutional Inspector Ros. In the Complaint, Plaintiff
claims Covak did not protect him from an inmate assault, the other Defendants did not properly
investigate the incident, and his Unit Manager did not follow the proper procedure before
recommending his reclassification to a higher security level. He seeks monetary damages.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff contends that on July 15, 2015, he was assaulted by fellow inmate Howard. He
states the assault took place directly in view of Covak and another corrections officer. He
alleges that after the assault, Howard was not removed from the housing unit. Instead, both
inmates remained in the day room. He contends Howard continued to make verbal threats to
him. Plaintiff claims he finally decided he needed to respond physically to the threat in order to
defend himself. After the second altercation, both inmates were taken to segregation. He
asserts that Covak failed to protect him from the first assault, and the remaining Defendants
failed to properly investigate the incident. He contends Williams raised his security
classification when recommendations for security level increases are supposed to come from the
Warden or the Institutional Inspector. Plaintiff is now incarcerated in the Mansfield
Correctional Institution.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the Court is required to
dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of
Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact
when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
“plausibility in the Complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A
pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in
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the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555.
The Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than
“an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A
pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a Complaint, the Court must construe the
pleading in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151
F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts three claims for relief. First, he contends Covak failed to protect him.
This claim arises, if at all, under the Eighth Amendment. Second, Plaintiff claims the ODRC,
Warden Bradshaw, Investigator Perdue, Institutional Inspector Ros, and Unit Manager Williams
failed to properly investigate his claims that Howard was the aggressor in both altercations. He
does not indicate the constitutional right he believes Defendants violated by failing to conduct a
thorough investigation. Finally, he claims Williams increased his security classification level,
without following proper procedures. This claim appears to assert a denial of procedural due
process.
A.
ODRC
As an initial matter, the ODRC cannot be sued in federal court for damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. It is an agency of the State of Ohio. The Eleventh Amendment is an absolute
bar to the imposition of liability upon States and their agencies. Latham v. Office of Atty. Gen.
of State of Ohio, 395 F.3d 261, 270 (6th Cir. 2005).
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B.
Failure to Protect
Plaintiff first claims Covak failed to protect him. This claim arises, if at all, under the
Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power
of the states to punish those convicted of crimes by ensuring that the punishment imposed is not
“barbarous” nor in contravention to society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). The Eighth Amendment protects inmates by requiring that
“prison officials ... ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical
care, and ... ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’ ” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)).
This, however, does not mandate that a prisoner be free from discomfort or inconvenience
during his or her incarceration. Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). Prisoners are not entitled to unfettered access to the medical
treatment of their choice, see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), nor can they “expect
the amenities, conveniences and services of a good hotel.” Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232,
1235 (7th Cir.1988); see Thaddeus-X v. Blatter,175 F.3d 378, 405 (6th Cir. 1999). In sum, the
Eighth Amendment affords the constitutional minimum protection against conditions of
confinement which constitute health threats, but does address those conditions which cause the
prisoner to feel merely uncomfortable or which cause aggravation or annoyance. Hudson, 503
U.S. at 9-10 (requiring extreme or grave deprivation).
The Supreme Court in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), set forth a framework
for courts to use when deciding whether certain conditions of confinement constitute cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. A Plaintiff must first plead facts
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which, if true, establish that a sufficiently serious deprivation has occurred. Id. Seriousness is
measured in response to “contemporary standards of decency.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8. Routine
discomforts of prison life do not suffice. Id. Only deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs or extreme deprivations regarding the conditions of confinement will implicate the
protections of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 9. A Plaintiff must also establish a subjective
element showing the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id.
Deliberate indifference is characterized by obduracy or wantonness, not inadvertence or good
faith error. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Liability cannot be predicated solely
on negligence. Id. A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when both the
objective and subjective requirements are met. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
It is not clear whether Plaintiff is claiming Covak failed to prevent the assault, or
whether he is asserting that Covak failed to intervene in a timely manner to break up the
altercation. In either case, Plaintiff does not allege any facts about the altercation. He does not
indicate what prompted it, what happened, how long it lasted, or how it ended. He simply states
that he was assaulted. An assault can encompass anything from a push or shove to an attack
with a deadly weapon. It can come after numerous warnings, or it can be spontaneous. To state
a claim against Covak, Plaintiff must allege facts to show Covak’s actions were more than
negligent. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. He must show Covak knew of and disregarded a perceived
excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety. He must allege facts suggesting Covak was both
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
existed, and that Covak actually drew that inference. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th
Cir. 2000) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Because Plaintiff does not describe either incident,
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and does not allege how Covak responded, he has not adequately alleged that Covak acted with
deliberate indifference to his safety.
C.
Failure to Investigate
Plaintiff also asserts Warden Bradshaw, Investigator Perdue, Unit Manager Williams,
and Institutional Inspector Ros failed to investigate his claim that inmate Howard provoked him
to start the second altercation. He alleges the Institutional Investigator reviewed the video of
the incidents and determined both inmates were at fault. He contends Warden Bradshaw
refused to reopen the investigation. The Institutional Inspector denied his grievance.
It appears Plaintiff disputes the finding that he was partially at fault for the altercation,
which led to his placement in segregation and an increase in his security level classification. A
prisoner has no constitutionally protected right to be free from false or inaccurate accusations of
conduct violations. See Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir.1986); see also Jackson
v. Madery, Nos. 04-1805, 04-1871, 2005 WL 3077136 (6th Cir. May 30, 2006); Jackson v.
Hamlin, No. 02-2040, 2003 WL 1194246, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 11, 2003); Munson v. Burson,
No. 98-2075, 2000 WL 377038 at *3 (6th Cir. April 7, 2000). Conduct violation charges only
implicate constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause if the inmate is deprived of good
time credits as a result of a disciplinary conviction, or is subjected to conditions of confinement
which present an “atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
Even when good time credits or atypical and significant conditions of confinement have
been imposed, the only question for the Court to determine is whether the disciplinary hearing
complied with the basic requirements needed to satisfy due process. The standard is not a
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difficult one to meet. District courts have no authority to review a disciplinary committee’s
resolution of factual disputes, or to make a redetermination of an inmate’s innocence or guilt.
Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Wolpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455
(1985). To comply with the requirements of the Due Process Clause, prison officials need only
provide a prisoner with: (1) a written notice of the charges at least 24 hours prior to any hearing,
(2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when
permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional
goals, and (3) a written statement by the fact-finders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons
for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1972).
Furthermore, due process requires only that disciplinary findings resulting in the loss of
good time credits be supported by “some evidence” in the record. Superintendent,
Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Wolpole, 472 U.S. at 454-56. This standard is
satisfied where “there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by
the disciplinary board.” Id. The Rules Infraction Board is not required to base findings on
overwhelming or irrefutable proof of guilt. Even where the evidence is contradictory or
partially exculpatory, the Rules Infraction Board may base a finding of guilt on only “some
evidence” that indicates the prisoner is guilty. Id. at 457.
In this case, Plaintiff challenges the conclusions these Defendants drew from the tapes
and the evidence presented. He does not complain about the hearing process, nor does he
suggest he did not have sufficient notice of the charges. While Plaintiff disputes Defendants’
resolution of factual issues and his finding of guilt, he has not sufficiently demonstrated he was
denied due process.
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D.
Increase in Security Classification Level
Finally, Plaintiff states that his unit manager recommended his reclassification to a
higher security level without following proper procedure. To establish a procedural due process
violation, Plaintiff must prove that (1) he was deprived of a liberty or property interest, and (2)
the procedures afforded to protect that interest were insufficient. Swihart v. Wilkinson, 209 F.
App’x 456, 458 (6th Cir. 2006). In this case, Plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest
in being held at a particular security classification level. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238,
245 (1983); Cash v. Reno, No. 97-5220, 1997 WL 809982 (6th Cir. Dec. 23, 1997). Increasing
his security classification without following the proper procedure did not violate Plaintiff’s
constitutional right to due process.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). The Court
certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be
taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge
Dated: 3/14/16
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