Ruffin v. Cuyahoga County Executive & Council (Cuyahoga County) et al

Filing 38

Memorandum of Opinion and Order: Defendants Cuyahoga County, Sheriff Pinkney, Marcus Harris, Officer Anderson, and Corporal Huerster's Motion to Dismiss Official-Capacity Federal Claims and to Dismiss Official-Capacity State Tort Claims (Doc. 22 ) is GRANTED. Judge Patricia A. Gaughan on 8/31/16. (LC,S)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

Linda Ruffin,
Plaintiff,
Vs.
Cuyahoga County, et. al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 1:16 CV 640
JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

Memorandum of Opinion and Order

INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court upon Defendants Cuyahoga County, Sheriff Pinkney,
Marcus Harris, Officer Anderson, and Corporal Huerster’s Motion to Dismiss Official-Capacity
Federal Claims and to Dismiss Official-Capacity State Tort Claims (Doc. 22). This is a civil
rights dispute. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.
FACTS
This case arises out of the death of Robert Sharp on March 26, 2015, while he was an
inmate at the Cuyahoga County Corrections Center. Sharp’s mother, as the administrator of his
estate and individually, brings suit against Cuyahoga County; Clifford Pinkney, the Cuyahoga

1

County Sheriff; several employees who work at the Corrections Center, including nurse Marcus
Harris, Corrections Officer Anderson, and Corrections Corporal Huerster; the MetroHealth
System; and two employees of the MetroHealth System who provide health care in the
Corrections Center.1 Other than Sheriff Pinkney, plaintiff has sued all of the individual
defendants in both their official and individual capacities. She sues Sheriff Pinkney in his official
capacity only. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
In her Third Amended Complaint, plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs as well as for violation of various state laws:
Count I is a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to Sharp’s
serious medical needs in violation of Sharp’s Fourteenth Amendment Rights.
Plaintiff brings this claim against Cuyahoga County, MetroHealth, Harris,
Anderson, Huerster, and the MetroHealth employees.
Count II is a wrongful death claim under Ohio Rev. Code § 2125.02. She brings
this claim against Sheriff Pinkney, the MetroHealth System, Harris, Anderson,
Huerster, and the MetroHealth employees.
Count III is a claim under Ohio law alleging that Sheriff Pinkney, the
MetroHealth System, Harris, and the MetroHealth employees “breached their
duty and standard of care to provide medical care to Sharp during his
incarceration” by “act[ing] in a negligent, reckless, intentional, deliberately
indifferent and willful manner.”
Count IV is a claim for medical malpractice against Dr. Thomas Tallman, one of
the MetroHealth employees.
Count V is a claim for “negligence by nurses” against Harris and Elizabeth
Kempe, one of the MetroHealth employees.
In their motion to dismiss, the individual Cuyahoga County defendants–Sheriff Pinkney,
nurse Harris, Officer Anderson, and Corporal Huerster–now move to dismiss the official-

1

Plaintiff has also sued a number of John and Jane Does.
2

capacity claims against them. Plaintiff opposes the motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the allegations of the
complaint must be taken as true and construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Lawrence v.
Chancery Court of Tenn., 188 F.3d 687, 691 (6th Cir. 1999). Notice pleading requires only that
the defendant be given “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. However, the complaint must set forth “more than the bare
assertion of legal conclusions.” Allard v. Weitzman (In Re DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d
1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993). Legal conclusions and unwarranted factual inferences are not
accepted as true, nor are mere conclusions afforded liberal Rule 12(b)(6) review. Fingers v.
Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District, 101 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. Nov. 21, 1996),
unpublished. Dismissal is proper if the complaint lacks an allegation regarding a required
element necessary to obtain relief. Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 489-490 (6th
Cir. 1990).
In addition, a claimant must provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 (2007). A pleading
that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1955 (2009). Nor does a complaint suffice
if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
3

acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent
with” a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’
Id. at 1949 (citations and quotations omitted). See also, Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d
603 (6th Cir.2009).
ANALYSIS
1. Federal official-capacity claims against Harris, Anderson, and Huerster
Harris, Anderson, and Huerster move to dismiss the official-capacity claims brought
against them in Count I, a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to Sharp’s serious medical
needs. They argue that such claims are redundant of the § 1983 claim against Cuyahoga County.
The Court agrees. An official-capacity claim for damages “generally represents only another way
of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (quotations omitted). If the government entity “received notice and an
opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated
as a suit against the entity.” Id. (noting that a plaintiff may only recover on a damages judgment
in an official-capacity suit against the government entity, not the official). Thus, if the entity has
been named as a defendant, an official-capacity claim brought against an individual agent of the
entity is “superfluous” and may be dismissed. See Faith Baptist Church v. Waterford Tp., 522 F.
Appx. 322, 327 (6th Cir. 2013) (dismissing official-capacity claims against prosecuting attorney
because township was named as a defendant)2; see also Foster v. Michigan, 573 F. App'x 377,

2

The district court in Faith Baptist had erroneously dismissed the claims on other
grounds. But, noting that it “may affirm on any grounds supported by the record
even if different from the reasons of the district court,” the Sixth Circuit affirmed
because the official-capacity claim was redundant of the claim against the
township. Faith Baptist, 522 F. Appx. at 327.
4

389–90 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Where the entity is named as a defendant, an official-capacity claim is
redundant.”).
Here, Cuyahoga County has been named as a defendant and has had an opportunity to
respond; the official-capacity claims against Harris, Anderson, and Huerster in Count I are,
therefore, redundant. Plaintiff does not dispute this but argues instead that the claims should not
be dismissed because the Sixth Circuit does not mandate dismissal of such claims. While
dismissal may not be mandated, the Court finds that this is the more practical and efficient
approach. See, e.g., Epperson v. City of Humboldt, Tenn., 140 F. Supp. 3d 676, 683 (W.D. Tenn.
2015) (dismissing official-capacity claims that were redundant of claim brought against
government entity and citing cases where district courts dismissed such claims). The federal
official-capacity claims brought against Harris, Anderson, and Huerster in Count I are, therefore,
dismissed.
2. State official-capacity claims against Pinkney, Harris, Anderson, and Huerster
The individual Cuyahoga County defendants next move to dismiss the state officialcapacity claims brought against them. They argue that, as agents of Cuyahoga County, they are
entitled to the same political subdivision immunity set forth in Ohio Revised Code § 2744.02
that the county is entitled to. Again, the Court agrees.
Determining whether a political subdivision is immune from liability involves a threetiered analysis. Lambert v. Clancy, 125 Ohio St. 3d 231, 233 (2010). First, with certain
exceptions, § 2744.02 provides a general grant of immunity to political subdivisions for
“damages in a civil action for injury [or] death...allegedly caused by an act or omission of the
political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in connection with a

5

governmental or proprietary function.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.02(A). The second step of the
analysis focuses on whether any of the five exceptions to political subdivision immunity listed in
§ 2744.02(B) apply. Lambert, 125 Ohio St. 3d at 233. The exceptions to immunity are for:
(1) an employee’s negligent operation of a motor vehicle;
(2) an employee’s negligent performance of acts with respect to proprietary
functions;
(3) the negligent failure to keep public roads in repair and other negligent failure
to remove obstructions from public roads;
(4) an employee’s negligence that occurs within or on the grounds of, and is due
to physical defects within or on the grounds of, buildings that are used in
connection with the performance of a governmental function, “but not including
jails, places of juvenile detention, workhouses, or any other detention facility”;
and
(5) a catchall provision for liability expressly imposed by other statutes.
Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.02(B). If one of the exceptions to immunity applies, then the analysis
proceeds to the third step. At this step, the court determines whether any of the defenses set out
in Ohio Revised Code § 2744.03 apply to shield the political subdivision from liability. Lambert,
125 Ohio St. 3d at 233. If none of the exceptions to immunity in § 2744.02(B) applies, then the
court does not address defenses. Rankin v. Cuyahoga Cty Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 118
Ohio St. 3d 392, 397 (2008) (“We need not go further in our immunity analysis, as R.C.
2744.02(A) prohibits the appellees’ claim against the department, and there is no exception in
R.C. 2744.02(B) that permits the claim to be resurrected.”).
In Lambert, the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether the immunity analysis for
political subdivisions applies to office holders who are sued in their official capacity or whether
the employee-immunity provisions of Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03 apply instead. Id. at 236.
Because suing an officeholder in his or her official capacity is “the equivalent of suing the
political subdivision,” the court held that the officeholder is entitled to the grant of immunity for

6

political subdivisions. Id. Courts have applied Lambert to a variety of officials and employees.
See, e.g., Snyder v. United States, 990 F. Supp. 2d 818, 846 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (police officer);
Harris v. Columbus, 2016 Ohio 1036, 2016 WL 1051129, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. March 15, 2016)
(sheriff); Newton v. City of Cleveland Law Dept., 2015 Ohio 1460, 2015 WL 1737935, at *4
(Ohio Ct. App. April 16, 2015) (police detectives, county medical examiner, county office
administrator).
Plaintiff does not dispute that employees of political subdivisions who are sued in their
official capacity are entitled to political-subdivision immunity. Nor does she dispute that the
general grant of immunity in § 2744.02(A) is applicable because her claims involve a
government function. See Ohio Rev. Code Chapter § 2744.01(C)(2)(h) (listing the operation of a
jail as a governmental function). She also does not argue that any of the exceptions to immunity
set forth in Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.02(B) resurrect her claims. Instead, she cites to Cater v. City
of Cleveland, where the Ohio Supreme Court states:
The political subdivision is immune from liability if the injury [or]
death...resulted from the exercise of judgment or discretion in determining
whether to acquire, or how to use, equipment, supplies, materials, personnel,
facilities, and other resources unless the judgment or discretion was exercised
with malicious purpose, in bad fath, or in a wanton or reckless manner.
83 Ohio St. 3d 24, 32 (1998). Relying on this statement in Cater, plaintiff argues that the
individual Cuyahoga County defendants are not entitled to dismissal of the official-capacity
claims against them because the facts alleged in the Third Amended Complaint show that they
acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or recklessly.
However, the portion of Cater on which plaintiff relies is quoting Ohio Rev. Code §

7

2744.03(A)(5).3 This provision is one of the defenses that shields the political subdivision from
liability if an exception to the general grant of immunity is applicable. In other words, §
2744.03(A)(5) only comes into play if a plaintiff first shows that one of the exceptions to
immunity in § 2744.02(B) applies. Indeed, the court in Cater recognized this in rejecting the
appellants’ argument that § 2744.03(A)(5) provides an independent basis for imposing liability
on the city: “R.C. § 2744.03(A)(5) is a defense to liability; it cannot be used to establish
liability.” Cater, 83 Ohio St. 3d at 32 (emphasis added). Because plaintiff has not shown or even
argued that any of the exceptions to liability in § 2744.02(B) apply, the Court need not proceed
to the third step of the immunity analysis and consider whether any of the defenses in § 2744.03
shield defendants from liability. Thus, because Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.02(A) prohibits plaintiff
from bringing her state law claims against Cuyahoga County, it likewise prohibits her from
bringing such claims against Sheriff Pinkney, Officer Anderson, Corporal Huerster, and nurse
Harris in their official capacities. These claims are, therefore, dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Cuyahoga County, Sheriff Pinkney, Marcus
Harris, Officer Anderson, and Corporal Huerster’s Motion to Dismiss Official-Capacity Federal
Claims and to Dismiss Official-Capacity State Tort Claims (Doc. 22) is GRANTED.

3

Plaintiff notes elsewhere in her brief that Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6)
“provides the proper analysis for determining whether an employee of a political
subdivision is entitled to any political subdivision immunity.” (Pl.’s Mem. in
Opp. at 5). Plaintiff is correct that § 2744.03(A)(6) would provide the proper
analysis for determining if the individual defendants sued in their individual
capacities were entitled to immunity. The current motion, however, is directed at
plaintiffs’ claims against the individual Cuyahoga County defendants in their
official capacities.
8

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 8/31/16

/s/ Patricia A. Gaughan
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge

9